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Agents of the Hidden Imam: Shiite Juristic Authority in Light of the Doctrine of Deputyship 
Ali-Ahmad Rasek, Ph.D. Concordia University, 2015 
 Deputyship deals with the issue of leadership in Twelver Shiism in a situation in which 
the Imam is believed to be only temporarily absent and still the possessor of ultimate religious 
and political authority. The jurists were recognized as the deputies of the Imam; this was and still 
is the source of their legitimacy and authority.  There was, however, no consensus about the areas 
Deputyship would cover. This was due both to caution about trespassing on the prerogatives of 
the Imam and the unavailability of power to Shiites. The theoretical constraint changed with the 
lengthening of the Occultation after 940, and the practical constraint was also loosened due to 
instances of Shiite political power, principally in Iran.  Change in thought about Deputyship, 
however, is very slow until the twentieth century, so that it can be detected and evaluated in 
juristic and theological texts and sometimes also in historical developments only over the long 
term.  Close to the Occultation, the jurists confined their Deputyship and thus authority to 
juridical issues and Quranic punishments. In the sixteenth century under the Safavids, they 
expanded Deputyship to a wider range of religious matters through new interpretations of Shiite 
jurisprudence. They did not, however, possess or claim actual political authority, and their 
prominence was due rather to their social, economic and political influence and growth of 
religious institutions.  It was in nineteenth-century Persia under the Qājārs that an interpretation 
of deputyship was introduced that would grant the jurists political power and upon which a 
further, even more political interpretation and actual jurist-led Islamic state was established by 
Khomeini in the twentieth century.  
The dissertation argues, contrary to views in a substantial literature on Shiism and Weber, 
that the jurists form a third category of charismatic authority after the Prophet and Imams. The 
chief and essential source of juristic charisma is Deputyship of the Imam, i.e. office charisma.  A 
second source is personal qualities, which help the office charisma to flourish. Shiite jurists who 
possess personal in addition to office charisma and act, in the Weberian sense, “exceptionally” 
gather more followers. The dissertation makes a contribution to Weberian theory by arguing that 
charisma and charismatic office continue to evolve after the pure charismatic event. The 
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The Shiite school of Islam originates in the question of the succession to the Prophet and 
leadership of the Muslim community after his death.  The Shiite account of the succession 
emphasizes a sharp dispute leading to division of the community between those who believed 
that ʻAlī, the son of Abū Ṭālib and the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, was appointed and 
designated by the Prophet as the supreme religious and political authority of the community and 
those who agreed with the selection of an alternate candidate, Abū Bakr, followed by ‘Umar and 
then‘Uthmān. These three, along with ‘Alī, who finally succeeded ‘Uthmān, would be called by 
the Sunnite school of Islam the “Rightly-Guided Caliphs”. As Bernard Lewis writes, the Shīʻat 
‘Alī or “Party of ‘Alī” was at first no more than “a political faction—the supporters of a 
candidate for power, with no distinctive religious doctrines and no greater religious content than 
was inherent in the very nature of Islamic political authority”. Soon, however, “important 
changes occurred both in the compositions of its following and the nature of its teachings.” 1  
That is to say, loyalty to ‘Alī was transformed following his own death into loyalty to various 
lines of his descendants, while the political kernel of the split gradually grew into an elaborate 
political-religious theory. This theory opposed the caliphal leadership (khilāfah) of the 
community of Muslims that came to be known, beginning in the 2nd/8th century, as “Sunnites” 
with the idea of a legitimist, divinely ordained succession of Imams or “leaders”, called Imamate 
(imāmah).    
The Imams are considered by all Shiites to be simultaneously the political and religious 
heads of the community, so that they possess the same authority and prerogatives as the Prophet, 
except revelation. The Imam for Shiites is the “universal leader of both mundane and religious 
affairs” (raʼīs ʻāmm fī umūr al-dunyā wa-al-dīn).2 However, precisely because of the great weight 
                                                 
1 Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: a radical sect in Islam (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 20-21. 
2 ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, Sharḥ al-Bāb al-hạ̄dī ʻashar lil-ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, maʻa sharhịhi:  al-Nāfiʻ li-




placed on the personalities of the Imams and succession within the Imamate, different lines of 
Imams descending from ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib were recognized by different groups, who came to 
hold somewhat different ideas about Imamate beyond the basic principle of universal authority.  
Two numerically important groups surviving today are the Ismā‘īlīs or “Seveners”, with several 
lines today within Ismā ‘īlīsm itself, and Zaydīs or “Fivers”.  This dissertation, however, is 
concerned exclusively with Twelver (Ithnā’ ‘Asharī) Shiism, embraced by the vast majority of 
Shiites today (though Shiites actually represent only about 13% of Muslims worldwide, with 
most concentrated in present-day Iran). The group is called Twelvers for its belief in a line of 
twelve Imams – a line partly shared by the Seveners and Fivers – ending with a messianic figure 
often called Mahdī, i.e. “Guide” or “Guided One”.   The Twelver branch of Shiism gradually 
coalesced in the 4th/10th century around the idea of Twelve Imams and the disappearance or 
“Occultation” (Ghaybah) of the Twelfth. Though far outnumbered by Sunnites and with little 
access to political power, the Twelvers went on to develop a set of communal structures and 
doctrines that has allowed them to survive and sometimes even flourish. Among Shiites, the 
Twelvers developed by far the most potent clerical estate, which has provided religious guidance 
and leadership since the Occultation, and this leadership was achieved and its power justified 
through the idea that the ‘ulamāʼ are the deputies of the absent Twelfth Imam. The idea and 
doctrine of Deputyship, the subject of the present dissertation, is found only in Twelver Shiism.   
The notion of Deputyship begins with the Occultation.  In the eyes of the Twelvers, the 
Imam is “the successor of Muhammad… having his cumulative knowledge and all his attributes 
except divine inspiration without a mediator. He is chosen by God, infallible and sinless, perfect 
and the best man of his age, al-afḍal.”3  In reality, however, the Shiite Imams never obtained 
actual power, apart from the very short (35/656 to 40/661) and tumultuous period of ʻAlī’s 
caliphate. The Imams who came to be regarded by the Twelvers as constituting the Twelver line 
were mostly apolitical, pious and scholarly figures; with the advent of the Sunnite Abbasid 
dynasty in the mid-eighth century, they actually lived under close supervision of the Abbasid 
caliphs to the extent that communication with their followers was limited. In the midst of these 
                                                 
3 See, Joseph Elias, “The Ithnā'asharī-Shī'ī Juristic Theory of Political and Legal Authority,” 




conditions, the Lesser Occultation of the Twelfth Imām occurred in 260/873-874 and the belief 
developed that this Imam, who still lived hidden on the earth in the manner of human beings, 
would return someday to establish a just state and world. The preoccupation of Shiism with 
politico-religious authority, which also underlies the notion of Deputyship, is clearly displayed in 
this belief.   
The first, approximately seventy years of the Twelfth Imam’s absence are termed the 
Minor Concealment (al-Ghaybah al-Sughrā).  In this period, four prominent members of the 
community presented themselves successively as agents of the hidden Imam. These four, 
ʻUthmān ibn Saʻīd al-ʻAmrī (exact date of death unknown), Muḥammad ibn ʻUthmān al-ʻAmrī (d. 
305/917), Ḥusayn ibn Rūḥ al-Nawbakhtī (d. 326/937), and ʻAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Samarrī 
(329/941), played two main roles. They acted as bridges between the hidden Twelfth Imām and 
Shiite community, and they received religious funds due to the Imam. ʻUthmān ibn Saʻīd al-
ʻAmrī was trustee and agent of three Imāms, from the tenth to twelfth. His son, Muḥammad, had 
been a close associate and agent of the eleventh Imam, Ḥasan al-ʻAskarī, as well, so that when he 
succeeded his father, the entire Shiite community recognized his trustworthiness.4  ʻUthmān was 
called upon to verify his successor, Ḥusayn ibn Rūḥ al-Nawbakhtī, as the third agent since some 
in the Shiite community seemed to doubt him.5 The fourth agent was subsequently confirmed 
through decrees from the Imām concerning the future of the Shiite community.  
This is the Twelver Shiite account of how the Imam continued to guide the community 
during his initial absence. One might have expected the four agents of the hidden Imām, who 
enjoyed the titles safīr (courier, envoy or messenger) wakīl (agent, trustee),6 and also nā’ib 
(deputy) to reach for extensive authority, but their deputyship was never political. Even in 
religious responsa, they rarely transferred their own views to the Imam’s followers. This set a 
pattern that would be followed in subsequent authority arrangments, as Elias observes: 
                                                 
4 Muhạmmad ibn al-Hạsan al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-ghaybah (Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Fajr, [1381/2002]), 220-
22. 
5 Ṭūsī, Ghaybah, 231-2. 
6 Ṭūsī, Ghaybah  219, 221, 231 
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 […] during the Lesser Occultation no delegation of the authority of the Shiite was 
claimed by any of the four deputies of the Twelfth Imām, the wukalā’, and ever since 
then Ithnā’asharī-Shī’ī jurisprudence has been consistent in blocking any dogmatic 
trend that might have led to a human claim to infallible authority, be it individual or ex 
consensus, while emphasizing the fallibility of Ijtihād and subjecting it to the principle 
of trial and error and setting utmost limits to the Ijma’ in definition and application.7 
 
With the death of the last agent and thus final disappearance of the Imam in 329/941 into 
his Greater Occultation (al-Ghaybah al-Kubrā), the Twelver Shiite community was faced 
directly with the question of political authority. The Imām, regarded as the only Just Ruler, as the 
sole legitimate leader of Shiites and Muslims temporally and religiously, had vanished and was 
completely out of reach.  The Shiites had now lost all connection with power not only practically, 
but even theoretically. The Twelver community had been in political depression even in the 
presence of the Imāms, but religious and social affairs had, at least, been administered under their 
leadership. The reaction was to emphasize that all temporal rulers were illegitimate, while the 
Shiite scholars emerged as a religious elite. It was now the turn of the jurists to undertake 
administration, though in a necessarily restricted manner due to lack of political power. 
 So far, we have seen that the sole legitimate rulers after the Prophet according to Shiites 
are the Imams. The Imams or “leaders” are the Prophet’s first cousin and son-in-law ‘Alī ibn Abī 
Ṭalib (d. 40/661), who is revered by Shiites to the extent that they are called the Shī‘ah or 
“partisans” of ‘Alī, followed (for the Twelvers) by his eleven descendants. The twelfth and last 
Imam is believed to have retreated into a “Lesser Occultation” in 260/874 during which he was 
seen by only a few persons and maintained very limited communication with his community 
through four personalities viewed as envoys, agents, or deputies of the hidden Imam. The 
Twelfth Imam is believed to have then completely disappeared in 329/941 into a Greater 
Occultation, which lasts to this day and during which he is glimpsed only on very rare occasions 
in dreams and visions. The Twelfth Imam or Mahdī will come back at the end of time in 
messianic fashion to “fill the earth with justice as it has been filled with injustice”.  
                                                 
7 “Ithnā'asharī-Shī'ī Juristic Theory,” 23-24.   
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Who then guides the Twelver Shiite community during the Greater Occultation? I have 
indicated that the Shite scholars – the ‘ulamāʼ or jurists – play this role. Two different currents of 
Twelver Shiism, however, view this development in different ways. The Akhbārīs minimize the 
prerogative of the scholars by reducing them to interpreters of the Traditions (akhbār), i.e. 
anecdotes of the sayings and doings of the Imams and Prophet. The Uṣūlīs, on the other hand, 
believe that the scholars or ‘ulamāʼ should act as jurists in order to guide the community and are 
therefore entitled to engage in interpretation of the Traditions and Quran, using the “principles” 
(uṣūl) of jurisprudence.  The doctrine of Deputyship (often termed niyābah in Arabic) is 
exclusive to the Uṣūlī current, not surprisingly since Uṣūlīsm allows the ‘ulamāʼ to take more 
initiative and power. Deputyship, in fact, seems to be an Uṣūlī product that arose in 4th/10th 
Baghdad. Before the time of al-Mufīd, the Akhbārī School was the dominant intellectual 
movement in Shiism, but Akhbārism then gave way to Uṣūlīsm and lost its importance or 
continued under the shadow of Uṣūlīsm for centuries afterward. Though Akhbarism has 
experienced revival from time to time and still survives, both as a formal school (for instance, in 
Bahrain) and in a general literalist tendency among some scholars, it represents a very small 
minority in Twelver Shiism today.  
Deputyship refers to the idea that the Shiite jurists act on behalf of the hidden Twelfth 
Imam during his Occultation, which has lasted, according to the Twelvers, from the middle of the 
tenth century until today. It is on the basis of Deputyship that the chief jurists – the figures 
familiar in the West as “Ayatollahs” – have the responsibility of guiding the Shiite community in 
the place of the Imam during his absence.  This is not to say that there is agreement on the areas 
the authority of the jurists is supposed to cover. In fact, the relation between Shiites and actual 
power remained unsolved among Uṣūlī Twelver scholars, so that various views emerged without 
ever producing a fully workable solution. Mufīd, for instance, who appears at the outset of 
Uṣūlīsm in the 4th/10th century, confined the authority of the jurist (faqīh) to judgeship, while 
Narāqī (d. 1245/1829), working in the Qājār period, and after him Khomeini expanded it to 
politics as well to claim the Imām’s authority in that sphere.  
The issue of the scope of Deputyship is entwined with the relation of post-Occultation 
Shiism and its religious leaders, the jurists, with politics. The mainstream has opted for quietism, 
even though, in practice, a number of Shiite scholars worked for the temporal rulers of their time 
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(while viewing them as essentially “unjust”). Activism, however, gradually found its place in 
Twelver Uṣūlī Shiism in instances in which the ‘ulamāʼ accumulated social and economic power, 
leading to the rise of political jurisprudence both in the juristic mentality and practice. This 
happened in Iran. Thus both activist and quietist attitudes towards prevailing political authority 
are seen in Twelver Shiism, as Algar confirms.8  And this is not, at heart, contradictory, since 
both attitudes are concerned in their own way with respecting the Imām’s right. Quietism during 
the Major Occultation signals that political leadership is the exclusive right of the Imam, whose 
return must be patiently awaited for the re-establishment of the Mahdī’s own state. For activists, 
on the other hand, political power is the great issue because without it, Muslim (Shiite) law 
cannot be enforced. In the view of contemporary activists, political power also provides the 
ground for the Mahdī’s return.   
Thus, although the quietist approach has certainly been dominant, activism also has its 
advocates, and this activism has found expression through the doctrine of Deputyship. Those 
who would characterize Twelver Uṣūlī Shiism as essentially either activist or quietist have both 
missed both the point I make in the previous paragraph and failed to examine developments in 
Deputyship. Elias, for instance, maintains that the Twelvers do not grant the jurists (he uses the 
term marji‘ al-taqlīd, though this came into use under the Qājārs) the “sovereign legal authority 
of the Imam”, because they essentially look upon the mujtahid as “not more than an ordinary 
mukallaf”  (person responsible for fulfilling the law),  though skilled in the ordinances of the 
Shariah and their application. It is even more wrong, says Elias, to regard the mujtahid “as a 
performer of the function of the Imām during the Great Occultation by virtue of ‘an ex ante 
appointment’.”9 Elias and the like do not take into account developments in Shiite jurisprudence, 
even though the jurists express themselves principally through that discipline. As mentioned, the 
doctrine of Deputyship is a product primarily of Uṣūlī jurisprudence that makes the jurists the 
Imam’s deputies during his Occultation, and the doctrine is liable to both quietist and activitist 
interpretations.  Nevertheless, the move toward combining religious and political roles for the 
                                                 
8 Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 2. 




jurists is a major transition – something quite new and unusual, even if not out of line with the 
basic logic of Deputyship and still expressed within the frame of traditional jurisprudence – 
wrought and justified by charismatic figures without whom it would not have been possible.   
The authority of the Shiite religious class has been extensively studied, but without real 
attention to Deputyship. This is a serious omission, since juristic authority is, in the final 
analysis, legitimized solely by it. The occulted Twelfth Imam still ultimately holds, in theory, all 
religious and political power, which he will take back into his hands again when he reappears. 
The authority of the Shiite religious class is therefore derivative; without Deputyship, they have 
nothing. Until this day, Shiite jurists routinely remark that they are taking this or that action – for 
instance, managing religious taxes and issuing fatwas – as agents or deputies of the Imam. This 
fact alone tells us that Deputyship is worthy of study and that Shiite juristic authority can be truly 
comprehended only if it is taken into account.  
My study of Deputyship draws on jurisprudential, theological, and historical sources. The 
jurisprudential texts contain specific references to the kinds of functions jurists may undertake as 
deputies – for instance, acting as the guardians of orphans, collecting certain taxes, sitting as 
judges, and so on. Due to the formal, conservative nature of Islamic legal writings, 
jurisprudential references to Deputyship tend to be brief and repetitive, and careful reading is 
required to detect and evaluate change through time. Material in theological sources consists of 
discussion of the authority of the Imams in their times and how certain parts of it were 
supposedly delegated to their scholarly followers. These discussions can also be quite sparse and 
enigmatic – with the exception of those appearing in the twentieth century, which are written in a 
modern, more expansive style, as seen in the works of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The 
shifting Arabic terminology of the theological and especially legal sources presents a real 
challenge. We are not dealing with a stable vocabulary, so that even the central concept of 
Deputyship is at one point called niyābah, at another wilāyah, and in the earliest period not even 
explicitly named, though obviously present. Because of these difficulties with the texts, I begin 
each chapter with an examination of terms and concepts.  
I place the discussion in historical context in order to throw light on the actual 
relationship between the Shiite religious class and temporal events and authorities, a reality that 
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is not directly addressed in jurisprudence and theology. The thesis argues that Deputyship can be 
understood only in historical context, as it plays out differently under different conditions. 
Furthermore, Deputyship and therefore juristic authority, including the modern instance of 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s jurist-led Islamic state, are comprehensible only in a long view that allows 
us to compare shifts in this foundational doctrine and real conditions relating to it.  
The fact that Deputyship must be studied as a long-term, contextualized development 
along with the elusiveness of the Arabic texts may explain why it has been neglected by scholars, 
even though it is absolutely basic to juristic authority and also key to the explanation of current 
events. In order to place Deputyship in long-term historical context, I have focused in Chapters 
Two to Four on three points in history. I do not pretend to provide a full historical account. 
Rather, I look at these three “moments”, as I call them, in full consciousness that other 
developments and situations existed between them. Despite this limitation, I do suggest that 
Deputyship and therefore the juristic authority that is based upon it tends to waver between 
apoliticality, that is limiting of Deputyship to non-political functions, and realization of the 
political side of Imamic authority – keeping in mind that the Imams are believed to have been the 
absolute political as well as religious authorities of the community. The present investigation 
counters the rigidity of two current scholarly views, one which insists that Twelver Shiism is 
quietist, and the other that sees it as activist. In fact, juristic authority based on Deputyship can be 
understood only in historical context; it was born in a specific period of Shiite history in a 
particular location, and has developed since in various and particular places and periods. 
Individual Shiite scholars contemporary with each other have also had different interpretations of 
the doctrine, depending on their circumstances. Seen from this dynamic point of view, the 
apoliticality of Deputyship favored by the majority of Shiite scholars because of their feeling that 
claiming political authority trespasses on the Imam’s exclusive right is understandable in the 
context of the earliest period of the Occultation. It is understandable because the Shiite 
community expected their Imam to come back soon and also did not dare to think of political 
power since they lived, for the most part, as a very small minority amidst the Sunnite majority. 
At this time, references in the texts to Deputyship seem artificial since they usually speak about it 
as if the Imam were still present and his deputies personally appointed by him. The activist 
approach emerges, political circumstances permitting, as time goes on and Shiites lose their hope 
of the Mahdī’s imminent return; but this alternate possibility emerges only very slowly and is 
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always restrained, even for Khomeini, by the sense that the occulted Imam ultimately owns all 
authority.  
The first “moment” of Deputyship selected occurs in the fourth/tenth century when the 
last Imam finally disappeared and the Greater Occultation began. In this period, we see the initial 
emergence of the idea of Deputyship in response to a crisis of leadership caused by the Imam’s 
withdrawal. Deputyship begins to change from delegation to a few specific individuals as 
occurred during the Lesser Occultation, when the Imām was thought to be still accessible, to a 
general version with the potential of conferring authority on the religious class as a whole. For 
this period, I utilize the writings of the prolific jurist and theologian Shaykh Mufīd (d. 413/1022). 
The second moment of Deputyship, lying approximately halfway between the Occultation and 
modern times, is represented by ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Karakī (d. 940/1533), who worked in the 
very different context of the Shiite Safavid dynasty in Iran. In Karakī we see a slight widening of 
the scope of Deputyship, along with increasing political accommodation facilitated by influence 
gained by the Shiite community and its jurist-scholars. The third moment deals with the theory of 
the Guardianship of the Jurist proposed by the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah 
Khomeini (d. 1989). The establishment of an Islamic state led by a Shiite jurist is an astonishing 
development that can be fully understood only in light of the dynamic of Deputyship. Khomeini 
suggests that the jurists as the executors of Islamic law on behalf of the Imam are effectively 
equivalent to the Prophet and Imams in political authority.  
I use Weber’s theory of authority, specifically the concepts of charisma and routinization, 
as an analytical framework for the thesis. My work is certainly not the first to link Shiism and 
charisma, as can be seen in a substantial and growing literature (see bibliography). Much of this 
literature, however, is in my opinion subject to a basic error in that it is inspired by and focuses 
on the remarkable figure of Ayatollah Khomeini, before whose appearance there is really nothing 
on Shiism and charisma or Shiism and Weber. I assert that Khomeini’s charismatic personality 
and the event of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution cannot be understood in isolation, from the 
point of view of either Shiism or Weber’s theory. To put it another way, Weber presents 
charisma as an event within a tradition. The few scholarly works that focus on charisma of the 
Imams (all of which are also subsequent to Khomeini’s appearance on the international stage) 
also end up focusing on the outsize, semi-divine personalities of the Imams and their charisma in 
10 
 
the personal sense. Although I suggest certain refinements to Weber that are helpful for 
understanding Shiism and might be considered by researchers examining other cases, I believe 
that Weber, when properly applied, has a great deal of explanatory power. The thesis 
rehabilitates or reclaims Weber’s theory, and a large part of the first chapter on charisma 




Chapter One: Re-reading post-
Occultation juristic authority 
Scholars of Twelver (Ithnā ‘Asharī) Shiism10 and Islam have been puzzled about how to 
account for the authority of the Shiite jurists. The clerical estate in Shiism seems to be somewhat 
more hierarchical than its Sunnite counterpart, and certain figures – epitomized by Ayatollah 
Khomeini in the 20th century – seem to possess more of what is loosely called “charisma”. 
Providing a sociologically coherent explanation for the authority of the Imams in relation to that 
of the Prophet has also proved a challenge. In this chapter, I will relate the views of those who 
have addressed this double problem, and then provide my own reading, which serves as the 
theoretical framework for the thesis.  
Scholars who have attempted to analyze the authority of the Shiite Imams and jurists all 
depend in some way on the thought of Max Weber, with each attempting to fit the views of the 
great 19th-century German sociologist to the Shiite case by suggesting refinements to his well-
known tripartite theory of authority. The general premise seems to be that Weber’s theories, 
though still very important in thinking about religious authority today, are inadequate to Shiism. 
Note that although Weber wrote on Islam, he did not take account of Shiism, since it was little 
known amongst European scholars in his time.  
Some scholars of religion continue to apply Weber to Islam without considering or fully 
considering Shiism. The work of contemporary Islamicist Jonathan Brockopp is an example. In 
attempting to theorize the “charisma” of the early Sunnite jurists, Brockopp maintains that the 
Prophet Muḥammad’s charisma was reproduced in various ways following his demise. He 
suggests that by “theorizing the Prophet” as “something more than an ordinary leader”, the 
tradition provided “space for new exemplary leaders to create their own cycles”. Thus, 
 
For Islamic law, this cycle of derivative charisma includes charismatic individuals 
(the mujtahid mutlaqs of the past) and a community of followers made up of students 
                                                 
10 Throughout this work, ‘Shiism’ refers to Twelver Shiism, particularly the dominant Uṣūlī 
tendency.   All branches of Shiism except, to a limited degree, the Zaydīs are not led by jurists and have 
different patterns of authority.   
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who collect and publish the master’s work. As this cycle develops and flourishes, it 
remains in creative tension with both the central Prophetic cycle and also with other 
forms of Islamic leadership and governance.11 
  
Brockopp’s scheme is apparently also meant to explain Twelver Shiism, since he refers at 
least briefly to the work of Hamid Dabashi, for whom Twelver Shiism is a central concern. And 
indeed, Brockopp’s idea that charisma may be redefined and reproduced after the death of a pure 
charismatic personality, i.e., the Prophet, does seem to fit Shiite history. His argument, however, 
that prophetic charisma is taken on by a range of personalities – not only jurists, but also figures 
involved in “other forms of Islamic leadership and governance” – does not fit Shiism. In Twelver 
Shiism, as we shall see, religious authority and charisma accrue to the jurists only. Nor do the 
jurists’ authority and charisma exist “in tension” with those of the Prophet or Imams. Rather, 
they always remain, even as they develop and flourish, in accord with the central prophetic 
cycle.12  
Brockopp’s treatment of charisma is also vague, despite his attempts even to diagram it. 
Who are the “charismatic” figures involved in “other forms of Islamic leadership and 
                                                 
11 Jonathan Brockopp, “Theorizing Charismatic Authority in Early Islamic Law,” in Comparative 
Islamic Studies, Dec 2005, Vol. 1 Issue 2, 139. Mujtahid muṭlaq or “absolute mujtahid” refers to legal 
authorities competent to produce original rulings in all areas of the law. The term is sometimes applied 
particularly to the eponymous founders of the Sunnite schools of law.  
12 It seems that Brockopp’s emphasis on creative tension between juristic cycles with the central 
Prophetic cycle is based on experiences and examples in history of Judaism and Christianity, as Wach 
explains it. Wach says: “[…] we can trace the transition from purely personal charismatic prophecy to an 
institution with professional training, habits, and rewards. History shows that the priest, in addition to 
being the successor, is frequently also the antagonist of the prophet” (Joachim Wach, Sociology of 
religion [Chicago & London: the University of Chicago Press, 1944], 350. Wach also refers to tension 
between the priest and the prophet, saying: “[…] the emergence of new prophetic charisma will evoke the 
opposition of those who either reject the prophetic principle or oppose the claims of some individual 
prophet.” (loc. cit). In spite of such tension in Judaism and Christianity, it does not exist in either Shiite or 
Sunnite Islam. Muslims deny the emergence of new prophetic charisma, so there is no ground for the 
creative tension Brockopp claims.  
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governance” apart from the jurists? Are they rulers of various kinds, or warriors? What exactly is 
“creative tension”? Brockopp seems to conflate charisma with mere authority, prestige, or 
magnetism. There is a danger when speaking about charisma of applying it in a general rather 
than precise Weberian sense, and Brockopp appears to have gone down that road.   
I see similar problems with other discussions that deal more fully with Shiism. In the 
following sections of the chapter, I engage with scholars who have attempted to theorize Shiite 
Imamic and juristic authority, while examining the charisma of the Prophet Muḥammad and its 
routinization in the Imams; the charisma of the Imams themselves; and finally the charisma of 
the Shiite jurists, the main focus of this dissertation.  
Prophetic charisma and its routinization 
 
Before turning to the original charismatic event of the prophethood of Muḥammad, let us 
review Weber’s own definition of charisma. Weber defines charisma as:  
[A] certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered 
extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to 
the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the 
basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a "leader."13 
Weber further says that where charisma is “fully served”, it amounts to “a gift that 
inheres in an object or person simply by natural endowment.” This is “primary charisma”, which, 
he emphasizes, “cannot be acquired by any means”, whereas “charisma of the other type may be 
produced artificially in an object or person through some extraordinary means.”14 In Weber’s 
view, “charismatic grounds” rest on “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary 
                                                 
13 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology,  edited by Guenther Roth 
and Claus Wittich, Vol. 1 (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1978), 241;  
see also Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated, edited and with an introduction 
by H.H., Gerth, and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979-2), 245-48, 295-96. 
14 Max Weber, the Sociology of Religion, introduction by Talcott Parsons with a new foreword by 
Ann Swidler (Boston: Beacon Press, [1993]), 2. 
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character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by 
him [the charismatic authority].”15 Finally, how charisma might be judged “from any ethical, 
aesthetic, or other such point of view” is irrelevant to its definition. All that is important 
according to Weber is “how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic 
authority, by his ‘followers’ or ‘disciples.’”16  
Weber cites the Prophet Muḥammad as an example of such a holder of charismatic 
authority.17 He is no doubt led to this conclusion by his evaluation of the quality of prophethood 
in general. In Weber’s view, the prophet is “a purely individual bearer of charisma, who by virtue 
of his mission proclaims a religious doctrine or divine commandment”; 18 the “prophet’s [very] 
claim”, he says, is “based on personal revelation and charisma.”19 On the basis of oracles or 
dream interpretation received through gifts of the spirit and a magical or ecstatic ability, the 
prophet proclaims a religious doctrine or divine commandment.20 “Islam”, Weber concludes, 
“developed out of a charismatic community of warriors led by the militant prophet and his 
successors; it accepted the commandment of the forcible subjection of the infidels, glorified 
heroism, and promised sensual pleasures in the here and the hereafter to the fighter for the true 
faith.”21  
                                                 
15 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, 215. 
16 Economy and Society, Vol. 1, 242. 
17 Weber includes prophets in his examples of charismatic figures. Insofar as he characterizes 
Muḥammad as a prophet, he considers him to be a charismatic figure. See Weber, Sociology of Religion, 
46, 54-55, 185, 202, 264. 
18 Weber, Sociology of Religion, 46; Max Weber,  Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building,  
ed. and trans. S.N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 253. 
19 Weber, Sociology of Religion, 46; Max Weber, Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building, 
253. 
20 Max Weber, The religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, translated and edited by Hans H. 
Gerth (Illinois: the Free Press, 1951), 46-47. 
21 Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 2, 1185. 
15 
 
Muḥammad is indisputably such a figure. The source of his charisma is his prophethood, 
i.e., contact with the Divine, proceeding in an oracular fashion and resulting in commandment 
and doctrine. The event of Muḥammad’s contact with the divine is considered by the tradition to 
be unique and not repeatable by his successors, however revered or powerful they may be. 
Muḥammad produced the revelations of the Quran as miraculous proof of that contact, so that he 
came to be viewed as distinct from the rest of the people as his charisma was hailed or 
constructed by his followers.  
Weber’s views on prophetic charisma were seconded some decades later by Joachim 
Wach in his Sociology of Religion. Like Weber, Wach emphasizes the prophets’ contact or 
communion with Heaven, crediting them with the ability to transcend time and place. Through 
illumination, the prophet is able to interpret the past and anticipate the future. An essential 
element of the prophetic personality in Wach’s estimation is the extraordinary spiritual power 
with which they are credited, symbolized by miracles, the power for which comes from God.22 
Dustin Byrd in his Ayatollah Khomeini and the Anatomy of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran: Toward a Theory of Prophetic Charisma proposes a major amendment to Weber’s scheme. 
He combines Weber’s concept of charisma and his definition of ‘prophet’ with Erich Fromm’s 
concepts of the prophet and priest.23 Fromm paints a picture of the prophet as a bringer of 
transformative ideas opposed to the prevailing system. The prophet awakens the people to reality 
and inspires them to protest against injustice and oppression in a time of hopelessness and 
disillusionment. He shows alternatives to the dilemmas with which man is confronted. Fromm 
also emphasizes the necessity of dialectic between theory and praxis. That is to say, in order to be 
properly considered a prophet, a personality must put into practice and thus embody in their life 
                                                 
22 Joachim Wach, Sociology of Religion (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 
346-348.   
23 Dustin Byrd, Ayatollah Khomeini and the Anatomy of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Toward a 
Theory of Prophetic Charisma (Lanham; Boulder; New York; Toronto; Plymouth, UK:  University Press 
of America, 2011), 25. Also, see Armand J Boehme, review of Byrd, Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
Anatomy of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Toward a Theory of Prophetic Charisma in Reviews in 
Religion & Theology, Volume 20, Issue 1 (January 2013), 22.  
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the “theoretical” ideas proposed.24 Fromm contrasts the type of the prophet with that of the priest. 
Priests, in his view, do not live the prophetic message, instead exploiting those of prophets, once 
they are gone, with the aim of maintaining a status quo that works to their own advantage. Most 
priests, Fromm says, simply use the ideas of the prophets to organize men and “control them 
through controlling the proper expression of the idea.”25  
Under the influence of these ideas of Fromm, Byrd offers the following definition of the 
prophet as a charismatic figure:  
 
An individual who possess or is perceived to possess charisma, i.e., extraordinary 
gifts, talents, and or abilities, not generally attainable to the average person; whose 
uncompromising goal is to show alternative vision of being; the dissemination of 
rational authority over irrational and or authoritarian authority; and in general 
embodies that rational authority through the theory – praxis dialectic; thus becoming 
an example of the alternative mode of being; without regards to his own personal 
safety, status, and or wealth.26  
 
Once again, the wide focus leaves us with no way to distinguish between different 
personalities in the Shiite tradition – even though Byrd’s work is aimed specifically at Shiism! 
The Prophet, Imam, and jurist – or a particular jurist, in the person of Ayatollah Khomeini – turn 
out to be essentially similar, in Byrd’s telling. One very obvious problem with Byrd’s 
formulation is his failure to seriously consider,27 as Weber does, the office of prophethood 
conferred on Muḥammad by revelation - or more precisely, the perception of Muḥammad’s 
followers, in response to his claim, that he had received revelation. Even if it is admitted that 
                                                 
24 Erich Fromm, On Disobedience and other Essays (New York: the Seabury Press, 1981), 42.  
25 Fromm, Disobedience, 43-4.  
26  Byrd, Khomeini, 36. 
27 Byrd does acknowledge that no-one in the Islamic tradition can “legitimately claim to be divinely 
designated as a prophet” (p. 42). He supposedly solves this problem by noting that he uses the word 
“prophet” for a person who is so in Islamic doctrine, and “prophetic” for those who are prophets only in 
Fromm’s sense (ibid.).  Apart from ignoring a very clear distinction in the tradition, this is confusing.  
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prophetic charisma springs from a dialectic between theory and praxis, the office of prophethood 
still forms the core of Muḥammad’s personality as prophet. Without this, he has no prophetic 
charisma. To take another example, from an Islamic perspective, Jesus would be a prophet even 
without the events of the crucifixion (or staged crucifixion, in the Muslim view), even though 
that particular episode indicates that he had personal qualities unattainable for the average 
person. Just so, ʻAlī and his son Ḥusayn possessed, according to the Shiites, several 
characteristics attributed to Muḥammad, including infallibility.  Nevertheless, they neither 
claimed to be prophets, nor were they regarded as such.  
Fromm’s very broad definition of ‘prophet’ – essentially, the prophet is one who 
advances and embodies universal values and ideas – appears to be a result of his aim to speak 
normatively or inspirationally, rather than analytically. Fromm’s prophet figure, in other words, 
is part of his lifelong project of humanistic social commentary. His picture of the prophet is not 
at all Wertfrei. Byrd’s attempt to incorporate Fromm consequently compels him to paint an 
idealized picture of the Prophet Muḥammad as social revolutionary and, more problematically, to 
depict Ayatollah Khomeini in the same way. It must surely also be obvious that Khomeini was a 
priest, whose whole political theory, moreover, was aimed at firmly establishing and 
institutionalizing priestly rule.  
Having treated prophetic charisma, I will now go on to its routinization. Again, I believe 
that Weber’s theory serves quite well for Shiism, testifying to the strength of the theory itself. 
According to Weber’s analysis, prophetic charisma, as the pure form of charisma, needs to be 
“routinized” and “become radically changed.”28 Accordingly, Muḥammad’s charisma after his 
death is routinized, from the point of view of Sunnism, into the office of the caliphate, in which 
“designation of a successor by the charismatically qualified administrative staff and his 
recognition by the community” is legitimized.29 An additional clause from Weber particularly fits 
the Shiite perception of transition of prophetic authority. Weber refers to “designation on the part 
of the original charismatic leader of his own successor and his recognition on the part of the 
followers.”30 This nicely describes the Shiite view that the crisis of leadership that arose at the 
                                                 
28 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, 246. 
29 Economy and Society, Vol. 1, 247. 
30 Economy and Society, Vol. 1, 247. 
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Prophet’s death was resolved in the designation of ʻAlī. ʻAlī’s designation represents the 
routinization described by Weber in which the successor “no longer rules by virtue of purely 
personal qualities, but by virtue of acquired or inherited qualities.”31 The Imams are actually 
called the “heirs” (wārithūn) of the Prophet; they inherit their extraordinary Knowledge (‘ilm) 
ultimately from him, and other qualities flow to them through the blood. Crucially, organization 
of authority in the Shiite view becomes permanent in the office of the Imamate, the power and 
authority of which is believed to endure to the end of time. This development also matches 
Weber’s account of routinization in which the circle around the ruler is comprised of officials 
dependent upon him and “the staff supporting the charismatic ruler becomes routinized.”32 The 
economic and legal systems described below in this chapter richly testify to such a circumstance.  
Dabashi asserts that Weber’s theory of routinization does not work for Shiism, since, he 
says, the Prophet’s charisma is actually continued in the Imams to the end of time. According to 
Dabashi:             
 
The particular nature of ʻAlī’s designation” necessitated a significant clause in the 
Weberian stipulation of the "routinization" of charismatic authority. If "routinization" 
refers to "the charismatic authority to become radically changed", then the 
continuation of authority from Muḥammad to ʻAlī and the subsequent 
institutionalization of the imamate (the legitimate leadership of Ali and his male 
descendants) cannot be considered as the "routinization" of charisma, a situation in 
which the social relationships are not "strictly personal, based on the validity and 
practice of charismatic personal qualities".33  
 
Dabashi’s answer to this apparent problem is to assert that Muḥammad’s charisma 
continued in ʻAlī. Thus he speaks of a “perpetuation” of charisma through which “the original 
                                                 
31 Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, 297. 
32 Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, 297. 
33 Hamid Dabashi, Authority in Islam: From the Rise of Muhammad to the Establishment of the 
Umayyads (New Brunswick (U.S.A; London (U.K.): Transaction Publishers, 1989), 100. The quotation 
marks indicate citations from Weber.  
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source that was believed to have legitimated Muḥammad’s authority [i.e., God] now, through 
him, established and legitimated ʻAlī’s authority.”34 Dabashi goes on to explain that the death of 
Muḥammad “in the larger metaphysical context… is considered as an inevitable phase, inevitable 
because of the natural laws established by the source of the Prophet’s charismatic authority 
[again, God], which does not alter, qualitatively, the nature of authority to be transferred to his 
successor.”35 According to Dabashi, Muḥammad’s authority, which was both this-worldly and 
other-worldly, tells us that the title “Successor to the Prophet” [khalīfat rasūl Allāh] used to refer 
to the Imams indicates a “persistent continuation of his charismatic authority.”36  
Dabashi cites Shiite doctrine in which ʻAlī’s qualities are the same as or close to those of 
the Prophet. For instance, ʻAlī is a member of the same bloodline, he is infallible, he possesses 
extraordinary knowledge, and so on.37 In trying to place ʻAlī in the same rank as the Prophet, 
                                                 
34 Dabashi, Authority in Islam, 100. 
35 Dabashi, Authority in Islam, 100. 
36 Dabashi, Authority in Islam, 101.  
37 Dabashi, Authority in Islam, 102-110. In order to do justice to Dabashi’s point of view it is 
necessary to cite the list of parallel qualities in full:   
The charismatic nature of ʻAlī's authority for the Shi’ites can be verified further by 
considering the particular characteristics attributed to him by his pious followers: (1) the 
lineage of ʻAlī, who had close family ties to the Prophet; (2) the birth of ʻAlī inside Kaʻbah, 
the holiest shrine of Islam; (3) ʻAlī’s childhood, spent under the protective care of 
Muhammad; (4) ʻAlī’s marriage, to the Prophet's daughter, Fatimah; (5) the Qur'anic 
references to ʻAlī—the Shiʻites believe that verses such as II:255 refer to ʻAlī; (6) ʻAlī’s 
membership in ahl al-bayt, which, according to Qur'anic verses III:61 and XLII:23, among 
others, is infallible; (7) ʻAlī as guide (hadi) to his people, from Qur'anic verse XIII:7; (8) ʻAlī 
as the leader (Imam) of his people, from Qur'anic verse XXXVI:12; (9) ʻAlī as the most 
knowledgeable Muslim, from Qur'anic verse XIII:43; (10) ʻAlī as the most virtuous person, 
from Qur'anic verse LXVI:4; (11) ʻAlī as the foremost amongst the truthful, from Qur'anic 
verse IX:119; (12) ʻAlī as a charitable Muslim, from Qur'anic verse V:55; (13) ʻAlī’s bravery 
in the battles of Badr, Uḥud, Khaybar, the siege of Khandaq, and other battles; (14) ʻAlī 
merits according to many Shiʻite-accepted prophetic traditions, among them "I and ʻAlī are 
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Dabashi actually goes beyond traditional Twelver Uṣūlī Shiite thought, which is careful to 
attribute to the Imams less direct contact with God than the prophets, by adding observations of 
his own, remarking that, although ʻAlī was not considered a prophet and did not introduce a new 
religion, “the source of his authority, which defined and constituted its nature as charismatic, was 
Allah, through the medium of His Prophet” [emphasis added]38 (whereas the source of the 
Imams’ charisma according to Twelver Shiites is the Prophet, and never God, even through the  
Prophet’s “medium”). 
Dabashi’s views are open to criticism on three grounds. First, he takes power to be equal 
to charisma. He argues that since the Prophet held absolute power, the same absolute power held 
by the Imams, even in theory - for none of the Imams actually ruled, save ʻAlī during his short 
and contested reign - amounts to perpetuation of Muḥammad’s charismatic authority in the 
imamate. The crucial point, however, is not the level of power or authority transferred from the 
pure charismatic figure to his successor, but rather the perception by the followers of the 
charismatic individual of his or her personality. Though it is true that Twelver Shiites attribute 
absolute political and religious authority to their Imams, they nevertheless place them (unlike 
some groups of the Shiite so-called Ghulāt or “Exaggerators”) in a lower position than the 
Prophet.39 The central quality or event from which prophetic charisma flows is revelation, which 
was never claimed for the Shiite Imams, at least in the form attributed to Muḥammad. Thus 
Muḥammad’s charisma remains exceptional and unrepeatable.  
Second, for the early Shiites, the Imams were regarded as successors to the Prophet and 
interpreters of the Islam brought by Muḥammad. As Turner rightly says, after the Prophet, Islam 
“came to be constituted around the law, the book and the prophet.”40 The situation of the Shiite 
                                                                                                                                                              
from one and the same light"; "O ʻAlī your flesh is my flesh, your blood is my blood, your 
self is my self, and your soul is my soul"; "Verily, ʻAlī  is from me and I am from him and he 
is the ruler of all the faithful"; "O ʻAlī, your relationship to me is similar to the one that 
existed between Moses and Aaron"; "I am the city of knowledge and ʻAlī is its gate"  
(Authority in Islam, 111-112). 
38 Dabashi, Authority in Islam, 103. 
39 This is not, of course, the case in the so-called Extremist groups such as the Nuṣarīs and Druze.  
40 Bryan S. Turner, “Revisiting Weber and Islam,” British Journal of Sociology (2010): 163. 
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community was no different; the Imams became the lawgivers by virtue of being incorporated 
into the prophetic Sunnah (life-pattern of the Prophet), and certainly not because they brought a 
new law or new book. As interpreters of the Book and prophetic Sunnah, the Imams do not enjoy 
the same status as the Prophet. This is underlined by the rule that when there is a conflict 
between two ḥadīths or sunnahs, one from Muḥammad and another from an Imam, the Prophet’s 
dictum or behavior is preferred. Moreover, the Imams are represented as mostly referring their 
dicta to the Prophet.41 Thus, contrary to Dabashi’s argument, the succession of the Imams to the 
Prophet does exhibit the Weberian characteristic of routinization in which “the charismatic 
message inevitably becomes dogma, doctrine, theory, règlement, law or petrified tradition.”42  
Third and finally, Dabashi’s argument that the charisma of the Prophet was not routinized 
in the office of imamate is belied by the economic arrangements connected with it. According to 
Weber, for charisma to be routinized, “it is necessary that its anti-economic character should be 
altered.”43 Economics is central to Weber’s theory, as he says:  
 
                                                 
41 The Quran is the main source of authentication of Traditions of the Prophet or Imams. The Prophet 
and Shiite Imams order their followers to refer Traditions to the Quran and to take what is in accord with 
it, and to reject what is not; see Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 8 vols. , edited by ‘Alī Akbar al-Ghaffārī, vol. I (Tehran: 
Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyah, 1363 [1984]), 8; al-Ḥurr al-ʻĀmilī, Wasāʼil al-Shīʻah, 20 vols, ed. ʻAbū al-
Ḥasan al-Shaʻrānī and Muhạmmad Rāzī, vol. 18 (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī), 78-79; 
Muḥammad Kāzịm Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-usụ̄l (Beirut: Muʼassasat Āl al-Bayt li-Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth, 
1411/1990), 444. Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq says to his followers that whenever they find a Tradition supported by 
the Quran or the Prophet’s sayings, they can follow it; see Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid al-Barqī, al-
Maḥāsin, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī, vol. 1 (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyah, 1330/1951), 225; 
al-Ḥurr al-ʻĀmilī, Wasāʼil al-Shīʻah, vol. 18, 78. The Imams’ Traditions are clearly subordinate to those 
of the Prophet since the latter are used as a criterion of authenticity, so that there are many cases in which 
the Imams fortify their responsa by referring to the Prophet; see  for instance Muhạmmad ibn al-Hạsan al-
Ṭusī, al-Istibsạ̄r fi-mā ikhtalafa min al-akhbār, 4 vols. (Najaf: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyah, 1375/1955), 30, 
52, 55, 58, 63, 66-8, 154, 170, 185, 196, 203, 211, 259.  
42 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 2, 1122. 
43 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 2, 251. 
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The process of routinization of charisma is in very important respects identical with 
adaptation to the conditions of the economy, since this is the principal continually 
operating force in everyday life. Economic conditions in this connection play a 
leading role and do not constitute merely a dependent variable. To a very large extent 
the transition to hereditary charisma or the charisma of office serves as a means of 
legitimizing existing or recently acquired powers of control over economic goods.44 
 
For Weber, what he calls “pure charisma” is foreign specifically to economic 
considerations. Wherever it appears, it constitutes a "call" in the most emphatic sense of the 
word, a "mission" or a "spiritual duty." Thus the “pure type” certainly “disdains and repudiates 
economic exploitation of the gifts of grace as a source of income” even if that “often remains 
more an ideal than a fact.”45 This is true for the time of Muḥammad, in which the “typical form 
of charismatic provision for needs”46 was booty, a sporadic source of income not amounting to 
an organized and rationalized system.  
Because of the importance of economics to Weber’s thought and the abundance of data in 
the sources, I will devote several pages to the topic here, particularly in connection with khums, 
the “one fifth-tax” mentioned in Quran 8:41 which Shiites (different, obviously, from Sunnites) 
interpret as a kind of income tax to be turned over to the Prophet and subsequently to his 
descendants the Imams.  
There is no evidence to indicate that the first through fifth Imams received khums. 
Modarressi finds that the sixth Imam Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq was the first to be regularly funded by his 
followers, though this was still in the form of voluntary donations and gifts and not systematic. 
Nevertheless, at least two reports handed down in the sources have the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr 
reproach Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq for receiving obligatory alms and kharāj, i.e., land taxes. That Jaʻfar was 
                                                 
44 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 2, 254. 
45  Economy and Society, vol. 2, 254. For Weber, economic factors “predominantly determine the 
routinization of charisma” due to “the need of social strata, privileged through existing political, social, 
and economic orders, to have their social and economic positions legitimized”  (Gerth and Mills, From 
Max Weber, 262). 
46 Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 245. 
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suspected of usurping the authority of the ruler by setting up financial arrangements suggests 
some degree of systemization. According to Modarressi, the seventh Twelver Imam, Mūsā al-
Kāẓim, subsequently proceeded to establish an actual system in which the Imams’ agents 
(wukalāʼ, sing. wakīl) collected religious funds, the network of agents having “already grown 
into an elaborate and well-organized institution by the middle of the third/ninth century”. The 
system was methodical and extensive, to the point that: 
 
Mūsā’s representatives served in all the major Shiite communities in Egypt, Kūfa, 
Baghdad, Medina, and elsewhere. At the time of his death, Mūsā’s agents had large 
sums for him in their possession, from ten to thirty and even seventy thousand dīnārs. 
These funds came from a variety of levies, including the zakāt.47 
 
The financial system continued to develop and grow through the time of the eleventh 
Imam, with envoys being periodically sent out especially for the purpose of collecting taxes. 
Letters were also sent underlining the duty of payment - even equating non-payment to unbelief - 
and urging the faithful to remit funds due. It appears that, with the addition of the khums tax in 
particular, the amounts gathered grew considerably.48  
The shift from an ‘anti-economic’ position or one indifferent to economy to a pro-
economic stance continued during the Lesser Occultation. In fact, the four agents of the Imam 
during the Lesser Occultation functioned primarily in an economic capacity, as Modarressi points 
out:  
 
ʻUthmān b. Saʻīd al-ʻAmrī served as a financial agent first to Imam ʻAlī al-Hādī 
(apparently from the time of the Imam’s removal to Sāmarrāʼ) and then as the 
principal financial aide to Imam Ḥasan al-ʻAskarī during whose time ʻUthmān was in 
full control of the office. ʻUthmān outlived both of his masters and remained head of 
                                                 
47Hossein Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam: Abū Ja‘far 
ibn Qiba al-Rāzī and his Contribution to Imamite Shi‘ite Thought (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1993), 
13-14. 
48 Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation 14. 
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the imamate administration after the death of Ḥasan al-ʻAskarī, continuing to receive 
religious funds on behalf of his son who had passed into occultation beyond the reach 
of ordinary Shiisms. Upon ʻUthmān’s death, his position was assumed by his son, 
Muḥammad b. ʻUthmān, and then by two others.49  
        
Thus, to summarize, two major shifts occurred in the time of the Imams in regard to the 
khums tax, both of which were prompted by new circumstances in which the Shiite community 
found itself. First, in the first half of third/ninth century during the time of the ninth and tenth 
Imams, the sphere of khums was expanded from booty to the general income of community 
members. The interpretation of Quran 8:41 mentioned above expresses that development, which 
is understandable in view of the need to consolidate a community deprived of political power and 
economic privileges, e.g. the possibility to collect booty. The second shift concerns the notion 
that economic prerogatives, primarily the khums, were hereditary. The one-fifth booty that had 
belonged to the Prophet and his family now accrued to each Imam as he succeeded the one 
before. Exactly as Weber says, economic prerogatives belonging to the charismatic leader 
“become patrimonial in nature” after his death.50 The firm establishment of khums as a hereditary 
right is confirmed in numerous texts, such as the following statement attributed to the eighth 
Imam ʻAlī ibn Mūsā al-Riḍā:  
 
The khums helps us with our religion, to meet the expenses of our family, support our 
followers, and maintain our respect in front of those whose power we fear. Do not 
refrain, as far as you are able, from paying us the khums. Do not deprive yourselves of 
our prayers, for paying the khums increases your sustenance, purifies you from sin, 
and prepares you for unexpected days of hardship. A [true] Muslim is not one who 
promises with his tongue but opposes in his heart!51  
 
                                                 
49 Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 17-18. 
50 Gerth and Milles, From Max Weber, 297. 




Both the patrimonial nature of the Imams’ economic prerogatives and magnitude of this 
change in economics can be judged by objections raised by persons outside the Imāmī Shiite 
community. A Zaydī author contemporary to the Imam ʻAlī al-Hādī, criticizes him for levying 
the khums on the general income of all Shiites, appointing representatives to collect funds, and, 
he claims, using the money for personal needs rather than giving it to the poor.52 This critique 
demonstrates how influential and central economics had become for the office of the imamate, 
while it was a marginal issue during the period of pure charisma, i.e., that of Muḥammad, and 
even in the time of the first five Imams. Both the fifth Imam Muḥammad al-Bāqir53 and ninth 
Imam al-Jawād54 call khums their own “right” (ḥaqq), a tendency that began with the fifth Imam 
and continued thereafter. After more than a thousand years of Occultation, pious Shiites still 
remit fifty percent of their khums to the notables (sādāt, i.e., sayyids) who claim to be the 
descendants of Muḥammad.  
The two shifts described above represent nothing other than the routinization and 
transformation of prophetic charisma into the office of the imamate, conclusively disproving, in 
my view, Dabashi’s argument that prophetic charisma continues essentially unaltered in the line 
of the Imams. If the Shiites had not been prevented by having to operate as a marginalized group 
from building an economic system as the Sunni caliphs did, the office of Imamate might have 
become even more systematized and extensively staffed.  
Imamic charisma  
 
The basic point I wish to make in this section is that the charisma of the Imams is 
derivative of the charisma of the Prophet. It represents, in other words, a routinization.  
                                                 
52 Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 16. A Ḥanafite scholar, Abū al-ʻĀbbās al-Ṣāghānī, who met 
Ibn Junayd in Nisabūr in 340/951, claimed that the Shiites of the city gave him a great deal of money 
(mālan kathīran) to deliver to their Imam, whom they believed to be still alive, living in an area of Ḥijāz. 
According to al-Ṣāghānī, Ibn Junayd told the Shiites that he was in contact with the Imam through 
correspondence (mukātabah); see Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Nu'mān al-Mufīd, Al-Masāʼil al-
Ṣāghānīyah, ed. al-Sayyid Muḥammad a-Qāḍī (Qum: al-Muʼtamar al-ʻĀlamī li-Alfīyat al-Shaykh Mufīd, 
1413/1993), 12-13, 56.  
53 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 8, 285-286. 
54 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 7, 36. 
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In Shiism, there are two sources for the charisma of the Imam: hereditary and acquired. In 
Weber’s theory, the acquired aspect of the routinized charisma loses its place in favor of the 
office or the hereditary aspect. What I propose instead is a combination of charisma of office and 
personal qualities. I argue that charisma of office, though the main source of juristical charisma, 
is not the final cause of being an influential religious leader. In what we may call the 
“maximalist” view of the Imams (different degrees of charisma being attributed to the Imams by 
different Shiite scholars), the inherited and inheritable charismatic qualities of the Imam include 
blood, a supernatural constitution, God-given knowledge (ʻilm ladunī), the ability to work 
miracles, and appointment. Acquired charisma, on the other hand, involves individual qualities, 
which are not conferred but acquired and exhibited over time. ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, for instance, 
had charisma through standing bravely against injustice and ministering to the poor – qualities 
not possessed or featured in the personalities of any of the other Imams.  
In regard to charisma of office, the Imam’s charisma, contrary to that of the Prophet, is 
not of a pure type, because he acts according to the vision God revealed to Muḥammad. To 
legitimize his rulings, the Imams need to refer to the Prophet, making them only interpreters 
(even if the “only true” ones) of Muḥammad’s legacy. The juristic literature says clearly that the 
Imam is the mufassir (interpreter). This does not mean, however, that the Imam’s charisma is 
completely different from that of the Prophet, for it represents its routinized and institutionalized 
form, which “like its genuine antecedent, remains something extraordinary and inaccessible to 
most people”.55 As Weber says, “after its routinization its very quality as an extraordinary, 
supernatural and divine force makes it a suitable source of legitimate authority for the successors 
of the charismatic hero; moreover, in this form it is advantageous to all those whose power and 
property are guaranteed by this authority, that is, dependent upon its perpetuation.”56  
We can now proceed to consider the sources first of the Imams’ hereditary charisma 
(charisma of office), and then their acquired charisma. God-given knowledge is one of the chief 
hereditary qualities of the Imams, according to Shiite theology. Concerning the sources and 
nature of the Imam’s knowledge, Kohlberg says:  
                                                 
55 Ron Van Dooren, Messengers from the Promised Land: An interactive theory of political charisma 
(Leiden: DSWO Press, 1994), 18.  




The sources are essentially four, all of a kind denied to ordinary mortals: transmission 
from the previous Imam, knowledge acquired in hereditary fashion, knowledge 
acquired from books whose contents are known only to the Imams, and knowledge 
acquired through direct contact with an angel. This last manner of transmission is 
often referred to as ‘inspiration’ (ilhām), and its recipient is described as a mufahham 
or muḥaddath (one addressed by a divine messenger). Unlike a Prophet, the Imam 
does not see the messenger, but only hears his voice in a dream… Views concerning 
the nature and scope of the Imam’s knowledge range from the minimalist position, 
according to which the Imam’s ʻilm is largely confined to a superior knowledge of the 
law (al-ḥalāl wa’l-ḥarām), to the popular conception of the Imam as partaking of 
many of the divine mysteries (ghayb), such as knowledge of all languages (including 
those of animals and plants), future events, and the innermost thoughts of other 
persons.57   
 
Kohlberg notes the extraordinary nature of the Imam’s knowledge, referring to 
Muḥammad Ibn ʻAlī Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381/991), who is the main representative of the 
maximalist position. This position maintains that the Prophet granted supernatural knowledge to 
the Imam.58 Kohlberg also, however, points out the clear difference, according to Shiite doctrine, 
between the Imam’s knowledge and that of the Prophet. Thus it is clear that even the maximalist 
position as reflected in the work of Ibn Bābawayh envisions transmission of prophetic charisma 
to the Imam not in the sense of its perpetuation, but rather routinization. The main reason for this, 
as I have explained, is that the Imam is dependent on the Prophet, while the Prophet is 
subordinate to no one. The pure charisma of the Prophet is clearly highlighted in the notion that 
he and he alone is able to see and talk to the angel (i.e., only the Prophet receives revelation in 
                                                 
57 Etan Kohlberg, “Imam and Community in the Pre-Ghayba Period,” in Authority and Political 
Culture in Shiism, ed. Said Amir Arjomand, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 26. 
58 Kohlberg, “Imam and Community”, 26-27; Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Kitāb al-khiṣāl, vol. 2 (Qum: 
Muʼassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1362/1983), 642-652.  
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the full sense), while the Imam, though he enjoys some kind of communication with Heaven, is 
not so able.  
Mufīd represents the minimalist position in regard to the Imam’s knowledge. The basic 
position is that, while the Imams’ knowledge may be supernatural, that is not obligatory (wājib) 
by reason and analogy, as falsely claimed, he says, by the Banū Nawbakht, Delegators 
(mufawwiḍah) and Exaggerators (ghulāt), i.e., different groups of maximizers. At the same time, 
Mufīd observes that there are traditions from trustworthy sources confirming that the Imams are 
indeed possessed of supernatural knowledge. Such traditions, he concludes (with some 
hesitation) bring certitude, which makes their acceptance mandatory. This is the moderate view 
held by the majority (jamāʻah) of Twelver Shiites.59 
Mufīd takes care to distinguish his position from that of the maximizers also on the issue 
of the Imams knowing the minds (ḍamāʼir) of men and the Unseen (ghayb). He reports that the 
Delegators and Exaggerators believed in these things, along with another very small group of 
Twelvers who cited rational necessity. Nevertheless, Mufīd acknowledges that the Imams had the 
ability to read the minds of certain individuals and preview future events before they came into 
existence. For him, this particular knowledge is not a mandatory [wājib] attribute of the Imams or 
a condition of their Imamate. Rather, the Imams possess that knowledge 
 
…because God honored them and gave them such knowledge to aid [the people] in 
obeying them and adhering to their imamate. [Our knowledge that] they must have had 
that comes not through rational necessity, but revelation. As for asserting absolutely 
that they knew the Unseen (al-ghaib), that is an obvious error. No one deserves that 
qualification except Him who knows things by Himself and not by a knowledge 
bestowed upon Him. That is God alone.60 
 
                                                 
59 Mufid, Awaʼil, 67; for a French translation, see Dominique Sourdel, L’Imâmisme vu par le Cheikh 
Mufīd  (Paris : Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1974),  62; also see Martin McDermott, The Theology 
of Al-Shaikh Mufīd (d. 413/1022)  (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq, 1978),  105-110.   
60 The Theology of Al-Shaikh Mufīd (d. 413/1022), 108.  
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The ability to work miracles is another hereditary attribute of the Imams discussed by 
Mufīd. He takes the same minimalist approach seen above in regard to knowledge, saying:  
 
As for their performing miracles and receiving signs, it is possible but not necessary 
from reason, nor is it impossible from analogy. Mutually confirmatory and 
widespread traditions have come down to this effect. I hold it on the basis of 
revelation and the truth of traditions. With me in this are the majority of the 
Imamites.61  
 
Again, the maximalists on the issue of miracles are those who considered it rationally necessary, 
such as (Mufīd says) the Nawbakhtīs.62 
Thus we see that although Mufīd was a minimalist, he like other Shiite scholars strives to 
ascribe ever more qualities to the Imams. He describes them as the successors to the prophets in 
enforcing judgments, executing legal penalties, safeguarding the law, and educating humankind. 
Like the prophets, they are infallible; they do not commit even venial sins (except in cases where 
this would be possible for prophets) and they are protected from error in relation to religion and 
ordinances. “Nor can they be negligent in anything pertaining to religious duty. Nor can they 
forget any of the rules of the Law”.63 It seems that, with the exception of receiving revelation, the 
Imams in regard to their hereditary qualities are quite like the prophets.64  
It is important to note that none of the supernatural qualities discussed by Mufīd and other 
Shiite scholars is acquired. They are rather conferred by God through being passed down from 
the Prophet through his blood. To be an Imam, the recognition of the preceding Imam (or in the 
case of ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib, the Prophet) is also necessary. These inherited qualities, i.e., office of 
charisma, take first place in the imamate. It is these qualities that make the Imams – even in the 
                                                 
61 Mufīd, Awā’il, 68-69. English translation quoted from McDermott, Theology, 112. 
62 Mufīd, Awā’il, 68-69. English translation quoted from McDermott, Theology, 112. 
63 English translation quoted from McDermott, Theology, 107; see Mufīd, Awaʼil, 65. 
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minimalist view, as we seen – supernatural figures whom believers must obey whether they 
“stand or sit”. “Stand or sit” (qāma aw qa‘ada) is a phase in a tradition from the Prophet 
referring to Ḥasan, who “sat” rather than rising up, and Ḥusayn, who, in contrast, stood against 
the powers of his time. Ḥasan and Ḥusayn had entirely different acquired personal qualities, but 
they were both Imams just the same by virtue of inheritance.  
  Thus we see that, while personal charisma springing from the acquired qualities of the 
Imams such as bravery, resistance against injustice, aiding the poor, and so on has been very 
significant, these are not relevant to the doctrine of the Imamate, i.e., to formal theology. The 
Imam is an Imam by virtue of the inherited, supernatural qualities enumerated above; that ‘Alī is 
just or Ḥusayn is revolutionary is not material to their holding the office of Imamate. In practice, 
however, personal, acquired, qualities make them more charismatic in the eyes of their followers. 
After more than thirteen centuries, Twelver Shiites still commemorate Ḥusayn’s brave actions at 
Karbala. Popular focus on this event is, in fact, increasing even in our day. This is evidently not 
the case for other Imams who did not perform exceptional acts; yet they are still Imams, without 
doubt or contest, by virtue of office charisma.  
Mufīd differs from the majority of Shiite theologians in specifically acknowledging 
personal, acquired qualities. He describes the Imamate as a favor from God (tafaḍḍul, luṭf) given 
to the person whose qualities God knows and who deserves to be honored, revered, and obeyed 
by the people because of his determination to perform the duties given him by God.65 Mufīd thus 
connects the Imam’s actions in following God’s commands with the respect and obedience he 
receives from his followers, which would appear to make the Imams somewhat unequal, since, 
for instance, ʻAlī and Ḥusayn did not compromise in the face of unjust authority, while Ḥasan, as 
is well known, made peace with the Umayyad caliph, Muʻāwiyah. The dominant scholarly 
opinion, in contrast, holds that ʻAlī and two his sons, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn – as well as the 
subsequent Imams – are all equal.  
I will now turn to the analysis of the prominent German scholar of Shiism, Heinz Halm. 
Halm counts the Imams’ knowledge (‘ilm) as the prime source of their charisma. Contrary, he 
                                                 
65 Mufīd, al-Muqni‘ah, 64; also see Sourdel, L’Imâmisme, 62.   
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says, to prophetic charisma, the charisma of the Imams resides not in their genes, but their ʻilm.66 
Now, there is no doubt that knowledge or ʻilm is a very important quality of the Imam. It is not, 
however, the only source of their charisma. More to the point for my argument here, Imamic ‘ilm 
is clearly heritable, that is, it is part of the charisma of office rather than a personal quality as 
Halm seems to say. In fact, as we saw in Mufīd’s remarks, the Imams’ charisma overall has a 
genetic or genealogical aspect, i.e., they must be from Muḥammad’s family. So the genealogical 
aspect is part of the Imams’ charisma, contrary to Halm. The jurists also claim that they are the 
“heirs” of the Imams’ knowledge during the Occultation. This is clearly a case not of pure but 
hereditary charisma. We return to Weber, who says:  
 
In the case of hereditary charisma, recognition is no longer paid to the charismatic 
qualities of the individual, but to the legitimacy of the position he has acquired by 
hereditary succession. This may lead in the direction either of traditionalization or of 
legalization. The concept of divine right is fundamentally altered and now comes to 
mean authority by virtue of a personal right which is not dependent on the recognition 
of those subject to authority. Personal charisma may be totally absent.67 
 
Weber’s view of hereditary charisma and its turning to a “personal right” gives a much 
better account of the charisma of the Shiite Imams than Halm does; notice how even Mufīd, 
despite also discussing individual deeds, essentially characterizes the Imams’ extraordinary 
qualities as hereditary and conferred through God’s favor. Weber’s theory matches the fact of the 
Imams’ charisma being hereditary, i.e., attributable to their kinship with the Prophet, as he says: 
“the belief in the charismatic qualification of the charismatic leader’s sib can lead to a belief in 
hereditary charisma”.68  
                                                 
66 Heinz Halm, “Das Charisma der Imame,” in Das Charisma: Funktionen und symbolische 
Repräsentationen, ed. Pavlína Rychterová, Stefan Seit und Raphaela Veit, et al (Berline: Akademie, 
2008), 451. 
67 Weber, Economy and Society, Vol.I, 248. 
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Halm emphasizes the stability and continuity of the Imams’ charisma, though he confines 
it to their knowledge, even when they are not present. The genius of Twelver Shiite teachings, 
according to Halm, is that only fourteen figures (the Prophet, Imams, and Fāṭimah) are infallible, 
thirteen of which are deceased, and one of whom is inaccessible. This means that no living 
person can arrogate their authority to himself. It is also the basis for a paradox: the charismatic 
leader may be considered to be present, but is at the same time not present.69 Halm further 
observes that the charisma of the Imam is not missing because of their absence; it is present not 
only in their sayings in the four books, but also at their tomb-shrines.”70 All this is basically 
correct, but Halm’s error, in my view, is that he tends to view all Imamic charisma as personal 
alone. Personal qualities give the Imams increased standing in the eyes of their followers, but the 
chief source is still office charisma. Pilgrimage to the tombs of ‘Alī, Ḥusayn, and Riḍā, for 
example, attracts millions of the faithful because of their personal qualities; but from the point of 
theology, they are equal to the Imams whose tombs are not usually the goal of pilgrims. Note 
well that Ḥusayn and ‘Alī, whatever their deeds, would not have become the goal of pilgrimage 
to begin with if they had not been, theologically speaking, Imams.  
If it is asked what the Imams actually did as charismatic figures by virtue of office 
charisma (rather than personal qualities), the answer is that they were lawgivers, something that 
is extremely important in Islam. They functioned chiefly as interpreters of the Quran and Sunnah. 
They even became, according to Shiites, part of the Sunnah; that is, their sayings and actions 
became a source of law like those of the Prophet. (Note here that traditional doctrine stands 
entirely opposed to Khomeini’s statement that the successors of the Prophet were not lawgivers 
and that their duty was rather to guide the community politically.71) It is important here to 
understand that the sayings of the earlier Imams, including even ‘Alī, were not part of the 
Sunnah. ‘Alī, in fact, is depicted instead as constantly insisting that the Prophet’s practice be 
preserved. The sixth Imam, by contrast, is depicted as issuing his own dicta, which are 
incorporated in the Shiite books of Traditions. This is evidence of a dynamic in which there is a 
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tendency to elaborate office charisma as the time of original, pure charisma becomes more 
distant. We will see this phenomenon – not addressed by Weber – also in the case of the clerics.  
Charisma of the jurist  
In the period of the Occultation, the jurists’ religious authority is expressed through the 
theory of Deputyship (sometimes called niyābah) of the Imam. By virtue of Deputyship, they fall 
into a third category of charisma after the Prophet and Imams. Brockopp is thus correct (in my 
view) to the extent that he recognizes the jurists’ charisma as being “derivative”.72 The theory of 
Deputyship has been elaborated over the centuries by various scholars, with wide debate about its 
exact definition and extent. There has been, as I have explained in the Introduction, sharp 
disagreement in particular between the Uṣūlī and Akhbārī tendencies. The Akhbārīs do not 
recognize the ‘ulamāʼ as the deputies of the Imam. For Akhbārīs, the idea of jurists’ charisma 
and even a clerical estate is meaningless. For this reason, Akhbārīsm is not relevant to the present 
work.  
Before proceeding to discuss juristic charisma, it is necessary to address Liyakatali 
Takim’s assessment in his Heirs of the Prophet of the authority of the scholarly Companions of 
the Imams who were the forerunners of the Shiite clerics. Takim proposes a refinement of 
Weber, designed particularly to explain the position of these personalities. He sees prophetic 
charisma as continuing through to the Imams, who are then envisioned as transferring their 
authority to the jurists during their lifetimes. The straight continuation of charisma from the 
Prophet, indisputably the original charismatic figure, to the Imams is itself an innovation in terms 
of Weber, which Takim, unlike Dabashi, does not address. He does, however, have a great deal 
to say about transfer of authority to the Companions.  
The transfer according to Takim happens in the manner of a precipitate 
institutionalization. The charisma of the Imams, he says, “was institutionalized during, rather 
than after” their lifetimes, routinization of their charismatic authority being “interwoven with the 
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need to provide religious guidance to their followers in far-flung areas.”73 In Takim’s view, 
“delegation of the Imams’ authority to their close associates” was “an important landmark in 
Shi‘i intellectual history insofar as it signified a transition from the centralized, universal, 
charismatic authority of the Imams to a more structured and organized charismatic office of the 
rijal.” Rijāl (literally, “men”) means the Companions of the Imams who transmitted their 
teachings, and “charismatic office” apparently refers to Weber’s office charisma, involving 
investment of charisma from the original charismatic figure in an institutionalized position. 
Takim concludes: “In the process of divesting their authority to their close disciples, the Imams 
were routinizing their charismatic domination and diffusing their charisma into a nascent, 
symbiotic structure, one that was dominated by the rijal.”74  
Two objections may be made to Takim’s formulation. First, the functions of the rijāl or 
scholarly associates of the Imams do not point to a transfer of charisma. In the pre-Occultation 
period Takim treats, some Shiite scholars worked on behalf of the Imams, mostly by collecting 
taxes and giving advice on religious issues. They were deployed to remote areas far from the 
cities where the Imams dwelt such as Khurāsān, Ray, Fārs, and the further parts of Iraq. These 
scholars did indeed provide religious guidance for members of the community scattered over 
these territories, as well as working to propagate the doctrine of the Imamate. However, sending 
envoys to “far-flung” areas in order to “provide religious guidance” is merely to employ 
someone as a functionary. The Imams’ envoys did not exercise power in their own right, but held 
it only as their trustees or delegates. Community members heeded the scholars for the sake of the 
Imams whose teachings and commands they conveyed, and certainly not because of the scholars 
themselves. The position of the rijāl in the Imams’ lifetimes is thus comparable to that of the 
“delegates” (wukalāʼ, sing. wakīl) of a marjiʻ in modern times; the wakīl has no independent 
authority and is appointed and dismissed entirely at the pleasure of the marjiʻ. Transfer of power 
and authority from a charismatic leader to his successors requires that the successors exercise 
power in their own right, something that never happened during the lifetimes of the Shiite 
Imams. The situation is also comparable to that of the Prophet Muḥammad sending his delegates 
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or functionaries to newly conquered territories. Sending envoys to distant lands does not amount 
to routinization of the charisma of those who send them, neither according to Weber nor, in fact, 
Takim himself, who does not explain the case of the Prophet’s envoys even though it seems 
parallel to that of the Companion-scholars in the time of the Imams.  
My point is confirmed by comparison of delegation of the Imams’ authority during their 
lifetimes with the principle of appointment (naṣṣ) by which the Imams themselves were 
appointed by the previous Imam. Delegation is different from succession. Delegation took place 
during the Imams’ lifetimes, while succession occurred upon the death of each Imam. Delegation 
finishes with the death of the delegator or delegate. Efforts made by the rijāl to establish Shiite 
doctrine and promote the Imams’ teaching while an Imam is alive are thus quite different from 
enjoying the personally-owned, durable quality of charisma and charismatic authority. The rijāl 
were instead dependent on and beholden to the Imam living in their times for their authority. 
They did not occupy their own independent, routinized office. The faithful asked the 
Companions about the views of the Imams, not their own views, just as Shiites today ask the 
“delegates” of the marji‘ about the views of the marji‘, and certainly not about their own views.  
Second, Takim’s argument that the Imams’ charismatic authority was routinized during 
their lifetimes – that routinization consisted of a process in which charisma was gradually 
diffused while the Imams were still alive to the nascent charismatic office of their close 
disciples75 – raises questions about the compatibility of two categories of charismatic figures 
living simultaneously. Takim does not explain this illogical or unusual situation.  
My own contention is that Weber’s original model, when properly applied, has a great 
deal of explanatory power for Shiism, including the position of the jurists. The structure of Shiite 
political theology and history has been formed under the shadow of the two categories of 
prophethood and Imamate, so that the third category, that is, clerical office, is perceived to be 
derivative. Muḥammad as a prophet represents, in Weberian terms, the pure type of charismatic 
figure and event. Prophetic charismatic authority is then transferred into the Imamate, according 
to Shiite sources. In Weberian terms, this is routinization of pure charisma through succession, or 
as Weber says: “designation on the part of the original charismatic leader of his own successor 
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and his recognition on the part of the followers.”76 Weber’s words here exactly match the Shiite 
view of the transfer of the Prophet’s authority to ‘Alī. Dabashi and Takim apparently do not want 
to call this transfer routinization because they are impressed by the great charisma of the Imams; 
they consequently fail to consider that the charisma is not original, but inherited and derived. 
They seem to forget that Weber envisioned a continuation of some form of charisma even in the 
midst of routinization. Pure charisma, in other words, ended with the Prophet, but transmitted 
elements were redefined in the forms of the Imams’ and jurists’ charisma. One should not be 
confused or misled, as I believe several of the critics of Weber examined in this dissertation have 
been, by the endowment of charisma either in the Imams or certain outstanding jurists, including 
Khomeini. There is no Imamic charisma without the charisma of the Prophet and no charisma of 
jurists without the Imamic and prophetic charisma before. The matter in essence is as simple as 
that.  
I would, however, like to propose adjustments to the Weberian frame in relation to the 
authority and charisma of the Shiite jurists in particular, the chief subject of my research. While 
Weber’s concepts of charismatic authority and its transformation through routinization help (if 
applied precisely) in understanding the basic position of the Imams and jurists in Twelver 
Shiism, the peculiar circumstances of the Occultation, in which the Twelfth Imam is considered 
to be hidden but still living as a human upon the earth, necessitate further reflection. In Shiite 
theological theory at least, the term “routinization” does not apply to the relation between the 
Imams and jurists. It is true that during the absence of the Twelfth Imam, the jurists (fuqahā’, 
sing. faqīh) emerged as a third category of potentially charismatic authority and that they have 
led the community and functioned as interpreters of religion for more than a millennium of 
Occultation. Transfer of authority and charisma to the jurists, however, has been only partial, and 
- as I shall demonstrate in the following chapters - very gradual. This is due not only to the jurists 
remaining within the prophet-Imam structure described above, but also because of the continued 
“living” (virtual) presence of the Twelfth Imam. Because of the notion that the Twelfth Imam 
still lives on this earth, the jurists remained somewhat in the position of the Companions during 
the other Imams’ lifetimes; i.e., they operated, in theory, as functionaries with delegated tasks. 
The great difference between the Companions living in the times of the earlier Imams and jurists 
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living during the Occultation is that the Twelfth Imam’s temporary absence allowed the latter to 
play a greater and more independent role. In sum, while the jurists as the dominant educated 
class certainly played important roles both during the time of the Imams’ presence and during the 
Occultation, they saw themselves and were viewed by the people merely as deputies (sing. nā’ib) 
of the Hidden Imam, who retained both political authority and ultimate religious authority.  
Attention also has to be paid in the Shiite case to a distinction between political and 
religious authority. Both types were united in the persons of the Prophet and Imams, since they 
were destined to rule the community - the Prophet in fact and the Imams in theory on the model 
of the Prophet. The jurists, on the other hand, enjoy – in theory – only religious authority. They 
have limited political authority, or none, since political rule is considered to be in abeyance until 
the return of the Twelfth Imam. The theory of Shiite political authority, in other words, continues 
to be structured according to prophethood and Imamate. After the Prophet, it is the Imams who 
lead the community, until the end of time. Although the last Imam, the Mahdī, has gone into 
Occultation, he is only temporarily absent and may return at any time to (as it is commonly said) 
“fill the earth with justice as it has been filled with injustice.” The always present and persistent 
idea of the Mahdī’s return bridges the gap in Imamic political authority caused by the 
Occultation, leaving (again, in theory) little or no independent political space for the jurists to 
occupy. 
In order to express this essentially subordinate position, the jurists produced the doctrine 
of Deputyship. Over time, they have developed the doctrine as far as they have been able within 
its conceptual limits. Through developing Deputyship, the activists among them have aimed both 
to expand their religious authority and extend it from the purely religious to the political sphere.    
My account in this thesis of juristic authority examines these historical developments. It 
distinguishes between religious and political aspects and examines relations between the two 
within Shiite history. Through historical contextualization, it will be shown how Mufīd and 
(contrary to what some scholars assert) also Karakī possessed religious authority only, while 
Ayatollah Khomeini many centuries later enjoyed both religious and political authority. In fact, 
Khomeini’s political theory of Guardianship of the Jurist actually does not fit the theological 
prophetic-Imamic structure of authority described above. Guardianship of the Jurist, as I will 
explain in Chapter Four, is a new and unusual development in Shiism.  
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I will also argue that, while the pure charisma of Muḥammad with his prophethood as the 
originating charismatic event and the derivative charisma of the Imams were associated by the 
charismatic community with supernatural qualities, charisma when it is attributed to the jurists is 
attached to exceptional but still decidedly human qualities and actions. This is consistent with the 
jurists being at a further remove from original, prophetic charisma and the flow of charisma 
being impeded, in effect, by the virtual presence of the Twelfth Imam.  
In Shiism, the jurists or fuqahā’ are charismatic figures, with their charisma springing 
chiefly from that of the Imam. They possess authority and are followed because they are 
perceived to be (collectively) the deputy (nā’ib) of the Imam. The authority derived from 
delegation has – as I have stated above - tended to expand over time. It began, as we shall see, as 
judgeship and became elaborated by the third “moment” of juristic authority I describe in the 
dissertation to political sovereignty. 
Who are these deputies? What charismatic qualities do they possess? How do they gain 
their position? It will be helpful to know first how they were understood in the early period of the 
Occultation. Mufīd briefly discusses the agents of the Imam (at this point, they are called wulāt 
and not nā’ib) in his treatise Awāʼil al-maqālāt. Although he does not say who the delegates he 
describes are, it may be inferred that there are the “specific” (khāṣṣ) delegates, meaning the 
Companions:  
 
The impeccability and infallibility of the Imams’ wulāt is not necessary [wājib], but 
what is mandatory is their knowledge of that by which they govern and their 
superiority over their subjects, because it is impossible that those who are inferior 
command those who are superior [in terms of knowledge, li-istiḥālat riʼāsat al-mafḍūl 
ʻalā al-fādil]. In addition, it is not necessary to believe that the wulāt are designated in 
advance, by formal appointment, for instance by naṣṣ. Their appointment has been 
confined to the infallible Imams’ choice.77 
 
This passage, however brief, is significant in terms of charisma. Infallibility and formal 
appointment (naṣṣ), the qualities that would put the wulāt in place of the Imam himself, are 
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explicitly denied. The majority of the Imamites rejected those conditions, with the exception of 
the Banū Nawbakht, who maintained that it was obligatory.78  
The charisma of the Shiite religious leaders, the jurists, has two sources: knowledge 
(‘ilm), which is derived from and approximates the Imam’s knowledge, and their own personal 
qualities. The first represents office charisma, possessed by every well-educated jurist, while the 
second is personal and consequently varies from one personality to another. Office charisma is 
always fundamental; that is to say, it is impossible to become a religious leader without it. It does 
not, however, guarantee the emergence of active charisma. Here we may refer to Weber’s 
statement concerning dormant charisma. Weber explains that: 
 
[I]t is assumed that charismatic powers can be developed only in people or objects in 
which the germ already existed but would have remained dormant unless evoked by 
some ascetic or other regimen.79  
 
Just so, the qualified jurists overall enjoy charismatic authority because of doctrine, specifically 
that of deputization; but their charisma is “awakened” only when they are recognized by 
followers, who heed or, in the case of the highest authorities, “imitate” (taqlīd) their views.  
Halm disagrees with this. He rejects the notion that persons other than the Imam may 
have charisma, on the grounds that they are subject to error. According to Halm, belief in 
existence of a hidden Imam requires someone to stand in his place. If he is not present, someone 
has to be there to guide society daily. Among the Twelvers of Iraq and Iran, Halm says, the 
‘ulamāʼ occupy this position, and none of them, he insists, are charismatic figures. In Halm’s 
view, they are merely jurists, possessing knowledge acquired in seminaries and issuing fatwas 
that are liable to error and can be revised. Thus Shiites, as Halm sees it, finally adopted a model 
of religious authority akin to that of the Sunnites.80 
I would say in reply first that all Uṣūlīs follow the doctrine of Deputyship, and not only 
the Twelvers of Iran and Iraq. Second, although the jurists certainly accept that they are subject 
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to error, they as well as their followers hold that they are allowed by the Imam to carry out some 
of the functions of the latter, or many of them (views on the degree of delegation differing in 
different times and opinions). Thus, in the eyes of their followers, the jurists in fact are 
charismatic figures.  
 At the same time, the clerics’ charisma, contrary to that of the Prophet and also in 
comparison with that of the Imam, is not a pure type, precisely because of its dependence on the 
two aforementioned. To legitimize his acts, the jurist must refer to the sayings of the Prophet and 
Imams, so his impact on the charismatic community is not as deep and widespread as that of the 
Prophet and Imam. As Weber remarks that charisma, in a Wertfrei analysis, may be of many 
kinds,81 jurists may also be considered charismatic figures as the “greatest heroes, prophets, and 
saviors” have been. However, for Shiite Muslims the jurist’s charisma is never of the same rank 
as that of the Prophet. The jurists’ authority depends on their knowledge and interpretation of the 
Imams’ words. As Calder puts it:  
 
Stress on the uniqueness of the Imam's authority when he is present ensures that in his 
absence authority depends on correct interpretation of his words (revelation) and so 
authority is confined, during the Ghayba, to the clerical class: those who extrapolate 
law from sacred texts. Rule of law replaces the rule of the charismatic leader. 
                                                 
81 According to Weber, “[I]t will be necessary to treat a variety of different types as being endowed 
with charisma in this sense. It includes the state of a “berserk” whose spells of maniac passion have, 
apparently wrongly, sometimes been attributed to the use of drugs….. It includes the “shaman,” the 
magician who in the pure type has to be subject to epileptoid seizures as a means of falling into trances. 
Another type is represented by Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, who may have been a very 
sophisticated swindler (although this cannot be definitely established). Finally, it includes the type of 
littérateur, such as Kurt Eisner, who is overwhelmed by his own demagogic success. Value-free 
sociological analysis will treat all these on the same level as it does the charisma of men who are the 
“greatest” heroes, prophets, and saviors according to conventional judgements [sic]” (Weber, Econamy 
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Emphasis on the centrality and superiority of the Imam's rule, when present, gives 
place, in his absence, to an unranked unhierarchic system.”82  
 
Calder here usefully underlines the fact that the extraction of law from sacred texts in the 
time of Occultation is carried out by the clerical class and is the main source of their charisma. 
Other points, however, should be corrected. First, the Imams’ words are not considered 
‘revelation’, at least not in the sense used in relation to the Prophet. In addition, the Imam 
interprets not only the Quran, but also Prophet’s Sunnah, which is not revelation. And second, 
Calder characterizes the Shiite clerical estate as “unhierarchic”, whereas hierarchy and rank 
among the Twelver Shiite clerics during the Occultation is very evident, even if not as visible as 
in, say, the Catholic Church. Denying this leads to ignoring the clerics’ charisma and its 
historical development.  
Various scholars have asserted that the charisma of the Imams is routinized in the ‘ulamāʼ 
(an assertion with which I disagree). Rainer Brunner, for instance, comes to this conclusion in 
analyzing dreams the Shiite scholars have had of the Imams. Visions of the Imams in dreams is a 
time-honoured phenomenon; the author recounts the dreams of, among others, Muḥammad Amīn 
al-Astarābādī (1036/1627), Muḥammad Taqī al-Majlisī (1070/1659-60), Muḥammad Bāqir al-
Majlisī (1110/1699-70/), Mīrzā Ḥusayn Nūrī Ṭabarsī (1902) and ʻAbd Allah al-Māmaqānī (d. 
1933), along with the theorist of the Iranian constitutionalist movement, Muḥammad Ḥusayn 
Nāʼīnī (d. 1936).83 The dreamers receive endorsement of their works, assurance of success, and 
even physical energy to finish writings. To explain the occurrence of such dreams, Brunner relies 
on the Weberian concept of routinization of charisma, in particular the idea of “charisma as a 
quality that may be transferred to others or generated as a whole, as a kind of office charisma” 
(Amtscharisma, in Weber’s language): 
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What is widespread in Western culture in a very formal way as the unction and 
ordination of priests, or the coronation of kings, finds a much more informal 
counterpart in Shiism in the form of a constant and close contact between the Imams 
and the scholars, the latter thereby assuming more and more traits of the former. The 
message to the believers is unequivocal: there is no salvation without recourse to the 
scholars who are the gatekeepers of the Imams. This is also the idea behind the vast 
amount of dreams in which visiting the tombs of the Imams – Najaf and Karbalā first 
and foremost – is strongly recommended. This inevitably puts the believers in contact 
with the learned class of the scholars, which certainly also from an economical point 
of view was not without beneficial consequences for the ʻ’ulamāʼ. At any rate one 
understands one of the reasons why such a firm hierocracy managed to take root in 
Shiism – the dreams narratives [sic] are a popular subtext to the well-known legal 
evolution within Shiism, which put the scholars more and more in the place of the 
Imams.84 
 
Though Brunner’s work on dreams is informative, his analysis in terms of charisma may 
be challenged from several angles. First, the scholars who had dreams of the Imams are mostly of 
the Akhbārī tendency, Nāʼīnī being the sole exception in the list given above. As already noted, 
Akhbārīs do not believe that the charisma of the Imams accrues to the scholars, which is why 
they do not support the idea of Deputyship. It was the Uṣūlīs who conceived and developed the 
doctrine of delegation of authority by the Imam to the jurists, making adducing the dreams of 
Akhbārī “sleeping Mullās” as evidence of routinization of charisma highly questionable. The 
‘ulamāʼ in Akhbārī thought are not the Imams’ deputies, and are therefore not in a position to 
receive their charisma. Second, it is not only the ‘ulamāʼ (or at least not only the higher members 
of the hierarchy, i.e., those who may possess charisma) who dream of the Imams. Many others 
have claimed to have this experience. Third, as already noted above in my critique of Dabashi (as 
well as Takim), the idea that the Imams’ charisma is routinized in the ‘ulamāʼ contradicts 
traditional understandings of the Imamate. In Shiism, the Imams lead the community after the 
Prophet, both in theory and in practice (even though the praxis was realized only for a short time 
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during the caliphate of ‘Alī). Routinization in the office of the jurists would put an end to Imamic 
charisma, which would not make sense as this would challenge the Mahdī’s authority when he 
returns to claim restoration of the second category of charisma.    
Clerical charisma is different from that of the Imams. According to the Uṣūlī school, the 
leading Shiite clerics are the heirs of the Imams in terms of their knowledge, a knowledge that 
serves to maintain the charismatic potential of the clerical estate overall. Clerical charisma also 
springs to a very small extent from blood, since some clerics claim to be descendants of the 
Prophet (although having the status of a “sayyid” does not in the final analysis significantly 
contribute to the possibility of rising in the clerical hierarchy). Thus, in marked contrast to the 
charisma of the Imams which is hereditary and has a supernatural character, the charisma of the 
clerics emerges from or is activated by the actions of the charisma holder. The jurists actually 
make their own charisma, by producing theories, as Khomeini did with his “Guardianship of the 
Jurist”, and by acting upon those theories.  
The clerics also gather charisma through being acclaimed by their followers. This takes 
place chiefly through those followers’ acknowledgement of a cleric’s personal qualities exercised 
in the political sphere.85 Weber does not, unfortunately, pay much attention to the role of 
followers in expanding the charisma of charismatic figures. In Weber’s theory, the source of 
charisma seems static. The political scientist Ron Van Dooren and the sociologist of religion 
Frederick Bird are helpful here. In his Messengers from the Promised Land: An Interactive 
Theory of Political Charisma, Van Dooren describes charisma as a “specific kind of personal 
political leadership” which is particularly relevant to “social levels of analysis”,86 since in the 
political sphere in particular, “what matters is not what qualities the leader ‘really’ possesses, but 
what qualities he is believed to possess”.87 This, as we shall see, is particularly helpful in 
explaining the charisma of Khomeini.  
As for Bird, his research on religious leadership focuses on characteristics of leaders that 
allow them to gain and maintain a following and exercise various forms of leadership. Bird 
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develops seven criteria: leadership must be elective, relational, productive, normative, 
deliberative, administrative, and ceremonial.88 His point in general is that leaders are individuals 
with the ability to gather followers who look to them for inspiration and guidance and finally 
identify with them. Leaders can turn things around, provide direction and establish a new course 
of action. If these accomplishments do not continue, they lose their legitimacy.89 Bird’s view 
does not fit the Shiite case in one aspect. Shiite leaders, whether they be Imams or jurists, do not 
lose their legitimacy as soon as they cease to be productive in the sense suggested by Bird. The 
later Imams are certainly viewed as legitimate, even though they were not active in any 
conventional sense, and were in fact prisoners of the caliphs. As for the “unproductive” jurist – 
for example, a marji’ who is not very active, or a mujtahid who does not do anything to become a 
marji‘ – his leadership is still legitimate by virtue of dormant charisma, even if in practice he 
loses the power to mobilize his followers. Bird’s distinction between religious leaders and 
administrators or officials is, on the other hand, very useful. Weber speaks of religious and 
administrative authority together, that is, religious leaders also functioning as administrators. 
Weber says that the official’s authority is not his own. For Bird, officials are those who hold 
positions within organizations in which they administer, judge, or direct. Obedience to them by 
the rest of the organization comes only from their legitimate right to manage that association, and 
not from any personal source. The members of an organization are not regarded as the followers 
of an administrator, because s/he is not the model to whom they look for inspiration.90 As we 
shall see in the following chapters, there are instances in Shiite history in which clerics 
functioned in the capacity of officials, rather than religious authorities, so that any authority and 
following of them in that role actually indicated the authority of the organization, and not 
independent religious authority with charisma deriving from it.  
The way Deputyship is expressed affects the clerics’ charisma. Wider, more political 
interpretations afford more opportunity for charisma. By confining Deputyship to the field of 
jurisprudence, Mufīd gives little chance to the jurist to be a charismatic figure, politically. 
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Khomeini’s interpretation of Deputship, since it includes politics, gives much more room for the 
jurist to be charismatic in the eyes of his followers. Khomeini’s interpretation was political to the 
degree that it overturned previously accepted views. For example, Mufīd takes into account 
taqiyah (dissimulation of belief, an important Shiite doctrine) in the jurists’ issuing of legal 
opinions and executing punishments, while Khomeini rejects dissimulation. Mufīd and Karakī 
both recognize sovereignty of the salṭanat, i.e., temporal power, whereas Khomeini considers 
temporal power to be non-Islamic and declares that it must be overthrown.91  
The traditional apoliticality of the Shiite jurists, which limits their charisma, is the result 
of both doctrine and history. Mufīd, in an early expression of the doctrine, explicitly excludes 
political activities from Deputyship. We see that Shiite religious leaders who speak only of the 
non-political duties of the jurist are nevertheless charismatic, although only through charisma of 
office (being a marji‘, for instance), since they do not develop Deputyship in the direction of 
politics. As for history, the political circumstances in which Shiites have usually lived 
necessitated avoiding political conflict and politics altogether. With the sphere of Deputyship 
restricted by circumstances such as these, the Shiite jurists were not involved in the social and 
political affairs of their followers, as would have been expected of the Imam. Unlike their Sunni 
counterparts, they did not interpret the law in a political matter or extend it in political directions. 
They laboured for establishment and not for re-establishment; they were not revolutionaries. 
Mufīd, for instance, was not even a judge. He was merely a leading figure in the Shiite 
community, a very popular personality among his followers by virtue of being a leading scholar. 
Since the community in Mufīd’s time lived as a minority under considerable religious and 
political pressure, any potential for political charisma was very far from being realizable.  
As for charisma derived from acclamation of followers, it must be admitted that historical 
evidence for interaction of the Shiite religious authorities with their followers is thin. There is not 
sufficient material to tell us what the community expected from their religious leaders. Nor do 
we have statements of the authorities themselves on such matters, since, apart from the 
limitations of being a minority and the doctrine of taqiyah, working as judge under the temporal 
authority (which some jurists did) encouraged discretion, as judgeship depended on the pleasure 
of that authority. Even though there were episodes of religious unrest and violence in Mufīd’s 
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time and he was even exiled from Baghdad by the Buyids,92 there is no evidence that he actually 
mobilized his followers for political purposes. The political charisma of other prominent Shiite 
religious authorities in this early period also remained dormant. Mufīd’s disciples al-Murtaḍā (d. 
436/1044) and al-Ṭūsī (460/1068), who were both prominent religious authorities and 
community leaders, did not act politically. In fact, they established good relations with the 
Abbasid caliphs of their time, working for them as functionaries in their non-Shiite political 
system. Thus we may say that in the first moment of Deputyship, the political charisma of the 
Shiite jurists was inactive. On the level of theory, they did not produce any writings challenging 
the dominant Sunnite power or providing support for the Shiite amīrs who were looking at that 
time to establish a Shiite system. And practically, they did not – at least as far as we can tell - 
politically mobilize their followers or articulate political demands. This is in contrast to the later 
case of Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn al-Makkī al-‘Āmilī, known as al-Shahīd al-Awwal or “The First 
Martyr” (d. 786/ 1385). Al-Shahīd al-Awwal had political tendencies, writing his famous Kitāb 
al-lumʻah for the Sarbadārān of Khorasan and later being killed by the Sunnite system. Thus to 
sum up, Shiite religious authorities in the first moment were religiously but not politically 
charismatic figures. Their charisma, such as it was, rested rather on a scholarly expertise 
perceived to be exercised on behalf of the Imam, as well as their social status and actions as 
individuals.  
To say that Shiite religious authorities defined Deputyship apolitically and consequently 
narrowed their potential for charisma to strictly religious affairs may seem puzzling in the case of 
Karakī. How can it be that Karakī was less charismatic than, for instance, the outstanding 
jurisprudent ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), when he was part of the power structure of the 
Shiite Safavid state? The answer lies in the type of authority held. Karakī was a state 
functionary,93 even though he did not (in theory) recognize the state as being “just” (i.e., 
religiously legitimate), since it did not represent the authority of the Imam.  
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What are the sources of the derivative charisma (charisma of office) of the jurists during 
the Occultation? These have in fact developed over time. During the first few centuries of the 
Uṣūlī School – which countenances the transfer of charisma – the charisma of the jurists was 
based, as Mufīd points out,94 first on the endorsement or permission they received from the Imam 
as the “sulṭān” (ruler) of Islam. We may also conclude from Mufīd’s arguments that office 
charisma for him is based chiefly on knowledge. He says, for instance, that “it is obligatory to 
carry zakāt to the Shiite trustworthy jurists, for the jurists know better where to spend zakāt than 
others do,” i.e., they know the law that lays out proper distribution of those funds.95 Only a 
generation after Mufīd, however, Abū al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī (d. 447/1055) uses the term “nāʼib of 
the Imam” in its technical rather than general meaning, and places more emphasis on Deputyship 
from the Imam as the source of charisma for the jurists. The crucial point here is that Ḥalabī does 
not distinguish between Deputyship and personal qualities, and in fact makes Deputyship 
dependent on personal qualities. For instance, he says that while enforcement of Shariah rulings 
is an exclusive right of the Imam, those who are the Imam’s nāʼib are permitted to issue 
judgments, provided that they possess the qualities of knowledge, piety, justice, and wide 
tolerance (siʻat al-ḥilm), along with combined reason and discernment (ijtimāʻ al-ʻaql wa-al-
raʼy), the possibility of enforcing the law, insight into the situation at hand (baṣīrah bi al-waḍʻ), 
faith in Shiism, and so on.96 Ḥalabī, however, is speaking here about judgeship in particular, 
which is narrower than the field covered by religious authority in general.  
As the Greater Occultation wore on and the time of the Imams became more distant, the 
transfer of Prophetic and Imamic charisma to the jurist accelerated, albeit slowly, strengthening 
the office of the clerics. Consolidation from the tenth/sixteenth century onwards of the theory of 
ijtihād (independent reasoning by the jurists) is part of this development, as is the 
institutionalization of clerical offices. Consequently, in Iran, “mujtahids were distinguished as 
religious elite and qualifications for acquiring the status of ijtihād were formulated in some 
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detail.”97 Moreover, the mujtahid was defined as one holding three basic qualifications, that is, 
knowledge (ʻilm), justice (ʻadl), and piety (taqwā). Nevertheless, clerical office and capacity for 
ijtihād - the formal requirement for religious leadership – have not been the only source of 
clerical charisma.  
Let us now look more closely at personal qualities, the second source of charisma after 
charisma of office. Factors contributing to the individual personality of a mujtahid who may then 
exude charisma and be acclaimed by followers as charismatic include his studies, social and 
economic connections, descent – whether from a scholarly family or line of sayyids, or both - 
and exceptionality, in the positive meaning of actions. Jurists enjoying office charisma without 
manifesting such traits appear to be quite ordinary, especially if the community is living in 
challenging times. Novel and exceptional actions, especially, increase charisma. Exceptionality 
in actions is different from Weber’s “exceptional powers or qualities”98, which suggests static 
and ahistorical aspects such as being supernatural. Weber’s static conception of exceptionality 
does not apply at all to juristic charisma (even if it does fit the prophetic and Imamic categories). 
This was certainly the case for Khomeini. Shaykh Anṣārī (d. 1281/1864) is another example. 
Anṣārī is recognized by Shiite jurists as well as the community in general as the greatest Shiite 
scholar of the 19th century. Seeking to explain Anṣārī’s complete authority (al-marjiʻīyah al-
ʻāmmah) over the Shiite community in his time, Amanat refers to his “ability to attract funds and 
divert them for the upkeep of his educational and social network—almost the function of a 
rudimentary welfare system—both to the satisfaction of the contributors and the recipients.”99 
From a modern perspective, these actions of Anṣārī’s seem quite normal, but in his time, they 
were exceptional.  
Though I mention Anṣārī and Khomeini together, their sources of charisma were 
different.  Khomeini also had political charisma. Van Dooren, it will be recalled, differentiates 
between political and religious charisma by defining the latter as “a specific kind of personal 
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political leadership”.100 Nevertheless, Khomeini’s charisma or acclaim of it by his followers 
cannot be explained as being only political. He and his following also necessarily depended on 
the already established derivative “office charisma” that accrues to Shiite clerics. Not keeping 
both dimensions in mind leads to the confusion evident in the following statement of Van 
Dooren:  
 
If asked who exactly these people were who went to extremes to show their 
unwavering faith in the Ayat Allah, often risking their lives in the process or 
sometimes even sure of meeting death, we are left with some rough demographic data 
concerning social class, residence, income distribution, employment or migration 
rates, or with some general remarks on religious, tribal or political affiliation. But 
none of these data, although certainly important, give us satisfying answers. They do 
not tell us what the nature of people’s blind obedience to and faith in Khomeini was, 
what personal or collective histories may account for it, why Khomeini was singled 
out as the object for their adoration, rather than someone else, what active part he or 
his closest aides may have played in fostering unusual degrees of loyalty or, as Taheri 
seems to argue, whether there was really something akin to a “collective 
hallucination” taking place in Iran at the end of the 1970’s. Finally, one may ask 
whether the close bond between Khomeini and his followers is a unique phenomenon 
in world history, or whether there are similar cases to be found elsewhere.101 
 
To re-iterate: Khomeini as a religious authority possessed both charisma springing from 
or attributed to his person and charisma of office. As Kimmel and Tavakkol put it, “Khomeini’s 
charismatic authority derives ultimately from his personal characteristics, which are legitimated 
by recourse to religion. But even here, religion justifies charisma […].”102 By virtue of charisma 
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of office, which Khomeini possessed in common with other qualified religious scholars, he was a 
deputy of the Imam. This made obedience to him obligatory for his followers, whatever their 
class, income, tribal affiliation, and so on. This is the basic reason for what Van Dooren 
characterizes as “blind obedience and faith” by a wide variety of persons.  
A key issue in the study of charisma is the attitude of followers toward their leader. 
Dabashi explains the charismatic appeal of the aged Ayatollah to his followers thus:  
 
Khomeini is seen by his followers as the organizer of the three most essential virtues 
missing from a monarchical tyranny. First, he has revived a religious consciousness 
without which men are thought to be trapped in a temporal mendacity; second, he has 
made it possible to believe again in a metaphysics of Ultimate Salvation, whereby 
limitations of rationality do not hinder a view of the eternal in man; third, he is 
considered to have enacted a popular epic, an odyssey of revolt for dignity.103 
 
Since these attributes are novel and exceptional in Shiite doctrine, while also answering to 
current trying circumstances, they stirred acclaim within the charismatic community. As Dabashi 
expresses it:  
 
The charismatic dimensions of [Khomeini’s] leadership rest on the dialectical growth 
of a unique relationship between Khomeini and his followers, whose texture and tone 
go beyond the ordinary authority assumed by a high-ranking Shīʻī cleric. An ayatollah 
does indeed occupy the highest position of religious authority in a Shīʻī community. 
The years of learning, the mystic of devotion, and the concomitant spiritual presence 
they all inevitably attain give the high-ranking Shīʻī authorities a certain air of 
genuine respect and lasting loyalty. Yet the mode and intensity of devotion afforded 
Khomeini by his followers, particularly in moments leading to the revolutionary 
crescendo, drive deeper into the collective consciousness of his mass of followers. He 
grasped something deeply disturbing, something deeply moving, in the midst of the 
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misery, actual and imaginary, that defined his followers. He turned that mute anger 
against indignity into an articulate voice of dissent and then, being an ayatollah, put 
God's stamp of approval on it.104 
 
Notice in Dabashi’s account the combination – although this is not explicit in his analysis 
– of derivative charisma, i.e., charisma of office (“being an ayatollah”) and personal charisma. 
Khomeini also, however, redefined or reconstructed juristic charisma itself. Vanessa Martin 
seems to recognize this activity, as she says:  
 
The title of the Imam was, not inadvertently, applied to Ayatollah Khomeini at the 
time of revolution for the exceptional understanding and therefore charisma it implies. 
It formed part of the conceptual vocabulary used to mobilize the ordinary people and 
to create for Ayatollah Khomeini a unique image. He thus appeared to his followers to 
be deeply pious, even holy. As such he was to them a source of wisdom, faith, and 
strength, of hope and renewal.105  
 
Martin assesses Khomeini’s charisma from the point of view of the charismatic 
community at two levels, that of the common people and Khomeini’s students, i.e., the Shiite 
intellectual elite. Concerning the latter, Martin asserts that Khomeini created a vanguard of 
students whom he had personally trained. As an aspirant gnostic, he conveyed, according to 
Martin, “a sense of awareness of a feeling of spiritual nobility and of responsibility and 
commitment”, while stressing “self-knowledge and with it ethics and self-discipline” that would 
equip the vanguard for the most weighty social and political responsibilities.106 This much, I 
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think, is true. Martin also, however, maintains that ʻirfān was the main source of Khomeini's 
mobilizing charisma:  
 
The jurist as such does not emanate political charisma—the ability to generate 
widespread devotion in the political arena. That must be drawn from personal 
qualities and reference to their association. So Khomeini played upon the image of the 
leader with the divine aura evolved in the Iranian Islamic tradition from the tales of 
the Imams and the vision of Ibn ʻArabī and Mullā Ṣadrā. He was able to use the gulf 
that had developed between ordinary Shiʻa and a remote secular state that insistently 
emphasized the pre-Islamic past—a state that was increasingly perceived as pursuing 
the interests of its own elite and of a foreign power while operating an oppressive 
political system and neglecting the poor. In such circumstances adherence to a 
charismatic leader conferred dignity, and a release from humiliation and rejection; it 
provided new goals along with the potential for human transformation.107  
 
First, it should again be noted, as I have done in relation to Van Dooren’s view of 
Khomeini above, that office charisma is always the basic source of charisma for the jurists. 
Personal charisma is something added. Second, there is reason to doubt the influence of ʻirfān on 
the laity, both because of the specialized and indeed semi-secret nature of the discipline, and 
strong opposition to it by traditional jurists. Thus ʻirfān, along with the notion of the Perfect 
Man, cannot count as a factor in mass political mobilization. Third, I would question Martin’s 
assertion that “the jurist as such does not emanate political charisma—the ability to generate 
widespread devotion in the political arena”.108 The jurist ‘as such’ does have the potential for 
political charisma; two obvious examples found before Khomeini are mentioned above. The 
difference is one of approach and degree; the earlier and later Shīrāzīs did not have mystical 
tendencies or endeavor to establish and rule over an Islamic state. They did not use jurisprudence 
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as a wrapping for mysticism and make mysticism politically operational under the cloak of the 
jurist, as Khomeini did. Juristic charisma had always been a subset of prophetic and Imamic 
charisma, while the spiritual traveler of mysticism is a recipient of pure charisma; this is the 
difference. Thus we may also doubt Calder’s assessment of Khomeini’s charisma as springing 
purely from the juristic tradition:  
 
Khomeini's success as a revolutionary leader was due largely to his ability to exploit 
the revolutionary implications of the Imami Shīʻī juristic tradition in a manner not 
obviously inconsistent with earlier developments. He was able thereby to secure a 
considerable degree of solidarity amongst the clerical class and to rally the traditional 
loyalty of the Iranian people. While the fundamental economic, political and social 
causes of the revolution must be explored elsewhere the reason for the emergence of a 
cleric as the obvious alternative to the actual ruler (and not for example, a colonel) 
may be explained by reference to purely theoretical matters. The Imami juristic 
tradition had for centuries preserved and propagated an idea of legitimate authority as 
belonging ultimately to the fuqaha'.109  
 
In sum: Martin errs on one side by emphasizing personal charisma to the virtual exclusion 
of office charisma; and Calder errs on the other side by emphasizing office charisma without 
paying attention to personal qualities. Byrd’s comment that the sources of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
charismatic authority were “complicated” is more on the mark.110 I must, however, object to his 
analysis on several other grounds. 
First, the line of charismatic authority Byrd traces – God, Muḥammad, ʻAlī, the Twelve 
Imams, and then the ‘ulamāʼ – is not correct. As I have shown, Shiite history in the theological 
view is structured according to prophethood and Imamate; the ‘ulamāʼ do not constitute a third 
category. A good piece of evidence of this is that in religious gatherings, for instance in mosques 
or Husayniyahs, only God, the Prophet, and the Imams are invoked, and never any religious 
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scholar or jurist, no matter what their rank. Second, Byrd frequently refers to Khomeini’s 
“prophetic charisma” and uses the expression as a title for a chapter in which he attempts to 
theorize that charisma, as follows:  
 
Khomeini was considered by many to be [in Weber’s words] “extraordinary” and 
endowed with “exceptional power or qualities.” His power of intellect, persuasion, 
scholarship, and rhetoric, not to mention his unflinching courage, all contributed to 
the almost mystical aura and appeal that surrounded him. However, though he never 
claimed to be anything other than a cleric, many perceived him to be nearly 
“supernatural” and or “superhuman.” In fact, the very title of “Imam”, usually only 
applied to the twelve Imams of Shīʻa Islam, testifies that some speculated, whether 
spoken or only in thought, that he could be the returning Imam Muḥammad al-Mahdī, 
or at least that he was somehow connected with the return of the hidden Imam …. 
However, he was often called nāʼib al-Imam or Vice-Regent of the Hidden Imam…. 
This designation gave him heightened stature through his connection to the Hidden 
Imam, while implicitly denying that he was the Hidden Imam himself.111  
 
Byrd goes on to argue that Khomeini’s so-called prophetic charisma is derived from  
extraordinary personal qualities along with personal actions or stances such as standing outside 
the institutions of power to speak against them, offering an alternative vision for the future, 
suffering with the masses, and so on.112 He distinguishes between Khomeini’s “charismatic” and 
“prophetic” authority. By prophetic authority, he means authority generated by Khomeini’s 
“followers’ perceptions of him.” These perceptions, he says, rest on four conditions: first, an 
environment of alienation and chaos that readies the people for prophetic leadership; second, pre-
existing criteria for prophetic leadership in Shiism; third, recognition by the populace that these 
criteria are met by Khomeini; and fourth, attribution to him of authority to lead because of these 
perceptions.113 Byrd concludes that Khomeini’s charismatic authority rested both on “his 
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education, titles and status, as well as his actions” and “how he was perceived by the Iranian 
people.”114 
The distinction Byrd makes between Khomeini’s “charismatic” and “prophetic” authority 
relies a great deal on Weber’s requirement for charisma of exceptionality, i.e., being perceived as 
supernatural or superhuman by the charismatic’s followers. By likening the exceptionality of 
Muḥammad to that of Khomeini, Byrd attempts to convey the idea that their charisma is similar. 
The exceptionality of the Prophet, however, is very different from that of the jurist, even if they 
may both be charismatic figures. In addition, Khomeini’s followers’ perceptions of him are not, 
as Byrd along with many other Western scholars imagine, the source of his actual authority. 
According to Khomeini’s own theory of Guardianship of the Jurist, Khomeini, as a qualified 
jurist (i.e., one enjoying office charisma), has religious and political authority, and he must be 
followed for that reason, and not because of personal qualities alone. He then had additional 
personal qualities without which his charisma would have remained dormant and which helped 
him to mobilize a large following. Therefore, Khomeini has juristic charisma only (not prophetic 
charisma), even though in his view, the jurist has both political and religious authority. 
Moreover, Byrd believes that Khomeini enjoyed both prophetic authority and prophetic 
charisma. Khomeini did claim prophetic authority, as we will see in the chapter devoted to him. 
This does not, however, mean that he enjoyed prophetic charisma, because prophetic charisma, 
based on revelation and involving a connection to heaven, was unique to the Prophet and (as 
Weber says) unrepeatable. Khomeni claimed prophetic authority, but never revelation. It seems 
that Byrd thinks that to have prophetic authority, it is necessary first to have prophetic charisma, 
which is not the case.  
 Byrd’s insistence on Khomeini’s prophetic charisma is also misleading as it suggests to 
the reader that Khomeini claimed that only he possessed such a quality. Byrd compounds the 
error by at the same time asserting that Khomeini “never claimed to have a special designation 
from the divine that would give him the authority of a prophet,”115 so that (according to Byrd) his 
goal instead was to instill prophetic charisma into the clerics’ priestly attitudes.116 Perhaps Byrd 
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adds this comment because, despite highlighting prophetic charisma, he senses that there might 
be a problem with attributing prophetic authority to the jurist. Khomeini’s own statements prove 
him wrong on both counts, as seen in the following example:   
 
The just jurist possesses everything that the Prophet and the Imams possess, both in 
relation to judgeship [ḥukūmah, i.e., religious authority] and politics (siyāsah). Any 
separation between these two aspects is unreasonable. For the wālī, whoever he may 
be, is the executor of Sharīʻah laws, enforcer of the divine punishments, collector of 
kharāj and other types of tax, and the one who manages the spending of taxes in the 
interests of the Muslims. Thus the Prophet (God bless him and his family) gives the 
adulterer a hundred lashes, as does the Imam (PBUH) and the jurist. All of them 
collect taxes in the same manner in accord with the interests of the people. All of 
them order people to concerning matters that belong to the one in charge [wālī, 
referring to the Prophet, Imams, and jurists], and obedience to the walī is 
obligatory.117  
 
It is clear from what Khomeini says here that all jurists or the clerical estate altogether – 
certainly not only Khomeini himself – possess political authority to the degree that they have the 
same authority as the Prophet. Khomeini refers to the legitimate authority of the jurists as the 
successors of the Prophet, which obviously includes – but is not limited to – his own authority. 
Khomeini emphasizes that even jurists who are not in a position to set up a government still have 
guardianship (wilāyah) over all the affairs of the Muslims, including the public treasury, taxes, 
execution of Quranic punishments, and the lives of Muslims (nufūs al-Muslimīn).118 Note in 
addition that it is not only Khomeini or modern activists who claim to possess elements of 
prophetic charisma, but also traditional quietists, who equally believe they are the “heirs of the 
Prophet”. Concerning Byrd’s error in denying that Khomeini attributed “the authority of a 
prophet” to the jurist, Khomeini, as is well known, says specifically that the Imams and jurists 
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receive their authority from the Prophet such that they become his khalīfahs (caliphs, i.e., 
successors). Though the two types of caliphs (the Imams, who are khalīfah generally and 
universally, and the jurist, who is according to Khomeini, khalifah in a specific area) are not 
equal in charisma, the authority of the Prophet, Imam, and jurist, says Khomeini, are politically 
(min jihat wilāyah wa-salṭanah) at the same level.119 Khomeini’s innovation is to assert that the 
clerics are also the political heirs of the Prophet, while the quietists, i.e., traditionalists, exclude 
political authority.  
Thus in sum, Khomeini is to be regarded as a charismatic authority leading the greatest 
revolution of the second half of the twentieth century. His charisma generally stemmed from the 
religious knowledge and articles of doctrine from which all Shiite religious authorities gain their 
charisma; but he showed himself to be a much more exceptional figure than his colleagues, 
whose charisma remained mostly dormant, especially in regard to politics. Shiite religious 
leaders have two types of charisma: charisma of office, and personal charisma. The former exists 
both in the office of Imamate and office of marjiʻiyah, so that whoever holds the marjiʻiyah may 
be considered a charismatic figure, since he has in the eyes of his followers something more than 
the rest of the community. This does not mean, however, that such a person is an entirely and 
thoroughly charismatic figure, like the Prophet or Imams.  
In the first moment of Deputship, Mufīd’s charisma was built on his acquired personal 
qualities. It is difficult to speak about charisma of office in his time, because the office of 
mujtahid and marjiʻīyah had not yet been established. His charisma sprung rather from his 
knowledge of Shiite law and theology. He was the head of the Shiite community in his time and 
his legal rulings were followed by Shiites in various parts of the Shiite world. Despite being 
apolitical, Mufīd was sent into exile several times, having been accused of playing a role in 
religious unrest in the Abbasid capital, Baghdad. Nevertheless, he does not seem to have acted 
politically, and his charismatic actions were limited to religious scholarship and leadership. In the 
absence of charisma of office, Mufīd’s individual qualities become especially significant. The 
image is that of an exceptionally pious individual, as testified by letters or decrees (tawqīʻ) 
attributed to the hidden Imam that call him “the leader, honest in religion, helper of the 
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righteousness and fighter against injustice”.120 According to the 12th-century Shiite scholar Ibn 
Shahrāshūb, the Hidden Imam granted him the title “al-Mufīd”, meaning “the beneficial”.121 
Thus we see that the acquired qualities of this outstanding scholar were thought to be recognized 
even by the Imam. Such acquired qualities are later formally termed in Shiite jurisprudential 
theory piety (taqwā), justice (‘adl), and knowledge (‘ilm). At the same time, the political aspects 
of Shiite religious leadership were at a low ebb, and thus potential for political charisma was 
lacking.  
This situation did not significantly change in the very long time between Mufīd and 
Karakī, as far as can be discerned from the available religious and historical texts. Karakī’s time, 
however, saw a very significant development: the office of the cleric (mujtahid) was formally 
established and became the chief source of clerical charisma. Karakī’s recognition as the leading 
jurist of the Safavid court with authority over all other scholars made obedience to him 
obligatory. This did not happen without resistance from traditionalists; his novel doctrine and 
practice in regard to religious taxes, for instance, was strongly challenged by many of his 
contemporaries. Karakī’s authority was thus based on his religious office - as well as esteem for 
his origins (he was a sayyid) and of his association with temporal power, although his personal 
charisma did not flourished to the extent of that of either Khomeini or Mufīd.  
Karakī ’s position within the Safavid court and associated Safavid institutions such as the 
Ṣadrship, position of Shaykh al-Islam, and judgeship have sometimes been thought to reflect 
independent authority and charisma. In fact, these accrued to the clerics merely as officials or 
functionaries. Conferral of such offices was no doubt a sign that the candidate was considered a 
qualified religious authority, but they were not actually part of a clerical apparatus. Lambton 
clearly recognizes this fact, as she says:  
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The religious institution under the Safavds was from the first subordinate to the 
political institution. The religious classes, or a section of them were, like the officials 
of the Sunni religious institution before them, virtually incorporated into the 
bureaucratic administration of the state. In due course there emerged a wealthy and 
influential religious class, which owed its rise largely to government patronage and 
which disposed of large revenues.122 
 
Expressed in Weberian terms, Karakī’s situation and power in the Safavid bureaucracy 
would not have resulted in charisma because of his subordinate position. Jurists acting as 
functionaries actually received their authority from the Shahs for whom they worked. As 
Lambton suggests, they resembled the Sunnite ‘ulamāʼ in that they derived their power from the 
fact of appointment by the ruler; they were, as Calder puts it, servants of the state and agents of 
the Shariah.123 Shiite religious authorities hold a mandate and authority that is critically different 
from that granted by a head of a state at any time. As Weber says, though the “official” holds 
power to command, he never exercises that power in his own right, but rather as a “trustee”.124  
Weber’s words probably fit modern institutions and bureaucracies better than the 
sixteenth-century Safavid system in which Karakī worked. Nevertheless, Weber’s basic insight 
alerts us to the fact that the authority given to Karakī by the court was not charismatic authority, 
though it gave him temporal power. Khomeini, speaking from within the tradition, recognizes the 
same fact:  
 
                                                 
122 Ann K. S. Lambton, “A Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja' Al-Taqlīd and the Religious 
Institution,” Studia Islamica, No. 20 (1964), p 115-116. Also See Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia 
politics: religious and political networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press; Paris: Centre 
d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, 2008), 71. 
123 Norman Calder, “Legitimacy and Accommodation in Safavid Iran: The Juristic Theory of 
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Sabzavārī (D. 1090/1679),” Iran, Vol. 25 (1987): 103. 
124 Miller, From Max Weber, 295. 
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It is an established principle that the faqīh has authority over the ruler. If the ruler 
adheres to Islam, he must necessarily submit to the faqīh, asking him about the laws 
and ordinances of Islam in order to implement them. This being the case, the true 
rulers are the fuqahā themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs, to apply to 
them, not to those who are obliged to follow the guidance of the fuqahā on account of 
their own ignorance of the law. Of course, it is not necessary for all officials, 
provincial governors, and administrators to know all the laws of Islam and be fuqahā; 
it is enough that they should know the laws pertaining to their functions and duties. 
Such was the case in the time of the Prophet (s), and the Commander of the Faithful 
(‘a). The highest authority must possess the two qualities mentioned—comprehensive 
knowledge and justice—but his assistants, officials and those sent to the provinces 
need know only the laws relevant to their own tasks; on other matters they must 
consult the ruler.125 
 
In brief, Karakī was able to mobilize his followers or be obeyed by them because of his 
traditional source of charisma, clerical office. He was not obeyed because of acclamation by the 
people, which Van Dooren and Byrd believe to be the source of the charisma of the chief jurists 
(marji‘). His charisma remained limited to the religious type, with its effects restricted to 
gathering more followers. As a servant of the state, he was not in any position to produce a 
political interpretation that might have seemed exceptional or unique to his followers. Some 
scholars, as we will see in Chapter Four, have traced elements of Khomeini’s “Guardianship of 
the Jurist” back to Karakī, but al-Karakī was novel neither in the way he exercised religious 
authority nor in how he expounded Deputyship. He did not, like Khomeini, bring forth a new 
interpretation of clerical charisma and its sources.  
Conclusion  
 
In Twelver Shiism, prophetic charisma is routinized in the office of the Imamate, just as it 
was routinized in the office of the caliphate in Sunnism. With this perspective, I argue that 
                                                 
125 Imam Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist (wilāyat-i faqīh): Islamic Government, Translated and 
annotated by Hamid Algar (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s 
Works, n.d.), 32. 
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Weberian notions of charismatic authority are able to explain the first step of transmission of 
charisma from a pure type or event that is the Prophet Muḥammad, to his successors, i.e., ‘Alī 
Ibn Abī Ṭālib and his descendants the Imams. I then maintain that, in spite of routinization of 
prophetic charisma in the Imamate, the jurists are also charismatic figures, a third category of 
charisma developed in the Uṣūlī school of Shiite thought. While the Weberian theory of 
charismatic authority explains the typology and transformation of authority from Prophet to 
Imam, it is unable to account for developments occurring in the period of the Occultation in 
which bearers and makers of charisma redefined the notion of charisma. Weber’s theory also 
fails to take account of personal qualities when it talks of charisma of office.  
In order to adequately explain Shiism, Weberian theory also needs to be adjusted to 
explain the office charisma of the Imamate and clerics, the second and third categories of 
charisma in Shiism after that of the Prophet. The first adjustment I propose is a combination of 
charisma of office and personal qualities. Contrary to Weber, I argue that office charisma, though 
the main source of clerical charisma, is not the final cause of being an influential religious leader. 
During the Occultation, the jurists have largely been recognized as religious rather than political 
authorities. Their charisma springs from two sources: charisma of office, as expressed in the 
doctrine of Deputyship, and personal, individual qualities. Charisma of office is said in the 
developed doctrine of “qualifications of the mujtahid” to include knowledge, piety, and justice. 
No one without these acquired (non-hereditary) qualities is recognized as a charismatic religious 
figure. However, those who possess them are not necessarily acknowledged as religious leaders, 
or at least not to a high or significant degree. Rather, believers follow jurists who reach the rank 
of “model of emulation” or marji‘al-taqlīd on the basis of truly exceptional personal qualities, 
whether that be extraordinary learning, outstanding piety, giving more public service, social and 
economic status, or perceived political heroism.  
The second adjustment to Weber I propose concerns a tendency toward revitalization of 
pure charisma in the derivative, routinized category of charisma. As the time of the Prophet and 
early Imams becomes distant, this tendency accelerates and the theory of the Imamate is 
elaborated. Hereditary knowledge, infallibility, and miracles are attributed to the Imams, making 
them superhuman. For instance, the ninth and twelfth Imams were thought to have extraordinary 
knowledge even as children, something not claimed for the earlier Imams. In another example, 
the supernaturally long life attributed to the Mahdī is an exceptional quality not possessed even 
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by the Prophet Muḥammad. The Prophet could not establish a global state, but it is said that 
Mahdī will “fill the world with justice”, and even that Jesus will help him in this mission. We see 
the same tendency in the office of the clerics, resulting finally in attribution of prophetic 
authority to the jurists.  
The third adjustment I propose concerns a tendency, not accounted for in Weber’s theory, 
for charisma to be redefined even as it is routinized. This is clearly seen in Shiism. Even matters 
that might be thought not to generate charisma became charisma builders. For instance, economy 
was foreign to the pure charisma of ‘Alī, as predicted by Weber. Also as predicted by Weber, 
routinization involved the introduction of economic considerations. The economic system itself, 
however, was connected to charisma. Let us look again at the tradition from the eighth Imam ʻAlī 
ibn Mūsā al-Riḍā cited above in the discussion of the tax system. In this report, khums is spoken 
of not only as generating income for the Imam’s family and support of the Shiites, but also 
inspiring respect for the Imam from his enemies, purifying the sins of those who remit it, 
increasing sustenance, and attracting the Imam’s prayers. To pay the khums was a sign of being a 
true Muslim. The later Shiite Imams were rich men partly because of this “charismatic 
economy”. Paying attention to such redefinitions is vital for an adequate account of charisma and 
authority in Shiism.  
The fourth adjustment concerns Weber’s term ‘exceptionality’. Weber largely 
understands exceptionality as involving supernaturality; but this characteristic of charisma loses 
its weight in the third category of Shiite charisma. In order to account for Shiite juristic charisma, 
one has to acknowledge a transition to mere exceptional actions. We see that the personal 
charisma of the leading jurists results from their providing novel, exceptional interpretations of 
the sacred texts or providing more new services. If Weber’s “exceptionality” is understood in this 
way, it becomes more dynamic and retains its explanatory power over time and in a variety of 
circumstances. Note again, however, that to say that the Prophet and Imams in Shiism have the 
same authority – i.e., religious and political authority together – does not mean that the two 
possess the same charisma. Rather, prophetic charisma is of the pure type, with the second and 
third categories, i.e., the charisma of the Imams and jurists, in a subordinate relation. The jurists 
– the principal subjects of this dissertation – developed and re-defined this charisma in different 
periods. They expanded their authority and charisma as political conditions allowed. The 
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derivative charismas of the Imams and jurists are nevertheless constantly tied to that of the 
Prophet, from whom they ultimately derive their basic legitimacy.  
Thus, while charisma has been redefined in Shiite literature over time from ʻAlī to 
Khomeini, there are, from a macro perspective it can be said that there are three categories of 
charisma. Historically, various charismas emerged within the second and third categories 
according to the personal qualities of the bearers. For instance, while the Imams were present, 
Ḥusayn ibn ʻAlī evinced a revolutionary charisma, while his son ʻAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn, who 
witnessed his father’s martyrdom at Karbala, chose an apolitical way of life while exhibiting an 
exceptional piety and eloquence in prayer. Shiite theology gives equal credit to these different 
behaviors by emphasizing the ideal nature – for instance, inerrancy – of the Imams overall. The 
result is a smoothing out of the category so that the office of Imamate rather than individual 
qualities may serve as the first basis of charisma. We see the same dynamic in relation to the 
clerics, who represent the third category of Shiite charisma. Clerical office is the constant in 
creating charisma for those who issue legal opinions, while personal, acquired qualities are the 
variables (although in practice, of course, Shiite religious leaders must possess at least some 
measure of the latter in order to be followed).  
The dual structure of charisma also governs the relation of the charismatic figure to the 
charismatic community. A qualified jurist is followed because of his religious position and status, 
i.e., because of the office and not merely due to demand from his followers. Mujtahids are 
charismatic figures by default; they are assumed to possess the basic and general qualities of 
justice, great learning, and piety. Personal charisma, the second part of the dual structure, 
flourishes only if the holder of the qualities that must be acquired to be a mujtahid behaves in an 
exceptional manner. Exceptionality in turn emerges in relation to social, political, economic, and 
intellectual contexts (described in three separate “moments” in the following chapters). Thus, in 
sum, a following does not legitimate a mujtahid, but rather awakens dormant charisma and may 
cause it to flourish. This feature makes the Shiite case different from that envisaged by Weber, 
and also different from the analyses of scholars such as Van Dooren and Byrd.  
The jurists function as interpreters of the sacred texts and providers of religious guidance. 
In order to establish legitimacy in the eyes of their followers, whose attachment and loyalty is, 
after all, to the Imams, they connect themselves to the Imams’ charisma through the doctrine of 
Deputyship. Deputyship has strengthened the jurists’ charisma even economically, since it gives 
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them access to the khums taxes, which also allows them to preserve, in Imam-like fashion, 
independence from temporal governments. I argue that the jurists recreate and strengthen their 
charisma through shifting its elements. They incorporate new elements or introduce new and 
exceptional interpretations. The outstanding example is Ayatollah Khomeini, who incorporated 
political charisma in his version of Shiite thought through reinterpreting the doctrine of 
Deputyship. Khomeini also gained additional charisma by adding elements of a particular form 
of Islamic mystical thought called ‘irfān to his learning and teaching. 
I finally contend that there has often been a reciprocal relation between personal charisma 
and temporal (non-religious) power. We see numerous examples in history of Twelver Shiite 
‘ulamāʼ who worked for the state. For instance, al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044), an outstanding pupil 
of Mufīd, worked for the Abbasids as the head of Niqābah (corporation of descendants of the 
Prophet) and as a judge. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) accepted office from Hulegu Khan, 
founder of the Mongol dynasty of the Ilkhanids, and later became head of the observatory built 
by Abaqa, son and successor of Hulegu, at Marāgha and supervisor of pious endowments 
(awqāf). ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) also co-operated with the Ilkhanids. And finally we 
have Karakī, who associated with the Safavid court and is the topic of the fourth chapter of this 
thesis. The connection of personal charisma and temporal power is apparently due to the political 
deprivation traditionally suffered by the community, which caused Deputyship to be interpreted 
apolitically. When scholars did manage to gain power despite that situation, charisma accrued to 
them. At the same time, the personal qualities or individual characteristics of jurists have slowly 
but steadily pushed the scholars toward a political interpretation of juristic authority and 
charisma. Ultimately, in addition to his religious knowledge and doctrinal support, from which 
all religious authorities gain their charisma, Khomeini moved very far in this direction by 
showing himself to be an exceptional figure in comparison to his colleagues, whose charisma 
remained mostly dormant, especially in relation to politics. Thus we see that charisma brings 




Chapter Two: First moment of 
Deputyship: Struggling with political 
limitation 
In this chapter, I investigate what I call the first “moment” of Deputyship by focusing on 
the 4th/10th century theologian and jurist al-Shaykh al-Mufīd. Mufīd is an appropriate focus 
because of his influence in early Shiite intellectual history. He is also an ideal case because of his 
position as head of the Shiite community in his time, which would have potentially endowed him 
with the charisma we wish to examine, as well as compelling him to reflect in his writings on the 
nature of his own leadership. I contend that in the period Mufīd lived and for some time after, 
Deputyship remained apolitical because the Shiite community, despite progress in establishing 
itself as a sect with its own intellectual heritage, suffered from straitened political circumstances. 
The minority status of Shiism and lack of access to political power influenced views of politics 
and reduced the ambit of Deputyship to non-political affairs.  
Thus for Mufīd, the Deputyship of the jurists during the Occultation is not political. In the 
first part of his most chief legal treatise al-Muqniʻah, he addresses only some topics of the law 
such as purity (ṭahārah), daily prayers, fasting, religious taxes, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.126 
This is, in fact, also the case with other Shiite juristic writing of the period; the focus is on 
devotions and other private affairs such as commercial law. Public matters such as the state, army 
and so on are not addressed. This is in contrast to the Sunnites; ʻAlī ibn Muhạmmad al-Māwardī 
(d. 450/1058), for example, extensively addresses the political, administrative and fiscal 
structures of Muslim society in his Kitāb al-ahḳām al-sultạ̄nīyah.127 Shiite scholars living in the 
earlier period of the Greater Occultation from about the 4th/10th to 5th/11th centuries did not 
theorize or claim political authority. In fact, although delegation by the Imam is clearly a known 
concept, Mufīd does not actually employ the conceptual term niyābah and uses the concrete word 
                                                 
126 Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad in Nu'mān al-Mufid, al-Muqniah (Qum: al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1410 
[1991]), 34.  
127 ʻAlī ibn Muhạmmad al Māwardī, Kitāb al-ahḳām al-sultạ̄nīyah, ed. Aḥmad Mubārak al-Baghdādī. 
(Kuwait: Maktabat Dār Ibn Qutaybah, 1409/1989). 
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nā’ib (deputy) only four times in his extant writings. These words are also rarely used by others, 
and not at all by al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Mufīd’s illustrious predecessor and teacher. Mufīd does 
speak of deputization in administration of the Quranic legal punishments or ḥudūd, likely 
because their application would have stood as a symbol of the continued existence of Shiite law. 
Apparently in response to the community’s lack of political power, he also tries to justify the co-
operation of Shiite jurists and amīrs with “unjust”, i.e., non-Shiite rulers. His justification for 
Shiite scholars working as functionaries for the Abbasid caliphs and other Sunnite political 
powers was taken up by other scholars after him, who essentially repeat his view. For instance, 
Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, an outstanding pupil of Mufīd who worked for the Abbasids as a judge and 
the head of the corporation of the Prophet’s descendants (niqābah), wrote a separate treatise on 
the permissibility of collaboration with supposedly illegitimate, rulers.  
Thus in sum, in the first moment, Shiite jurists such as Mufīd neither produced an 
intellectual basis for a Shiite state or emirate, nor acted politically.128 It is reasonable to suppose 
that the belief in the near return of the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdī, was a factor in limiting 
deputyship and pushing it toward a quite narrow range of functions. Since the Shiites expected 
the Imam to return very soon, there was no need to discuss putting political arrangements in 
place during his absence.  
Mufīd’s juristic and theological works are utilized as the primary sources for the present 
chapter. There are very few secondary works on Mufīd. In English, McDermott’s book, The 
Theology of al-Shaykh Mufīd (d.413/1022) is thorough and well known, while a French 
translation of Mufīd’s Awā’ilal-Maqālāt by Dominique Sourdel and a few articles by the great 
German scholar Wilferd Madelung provide additional useful information. Ian Howard’s 1981 
translation of al-Mufid's Kitāb al-Irshād remains a valuable contribution, although the Irshād 
concerns the lives of the Imams rather than law or authority. Western scholars have focused 
chiefly on theological aspects of Mufīd’s thought rather than his jurisprudential writings, 
although those complete the picture of his thought and are certainly important for the present 
                                                 
128 At the beginning of his chief jurisprudential work al-Muqniah, Mufīd says that he has compiled 
that book in response to the order of a “Great Amīr” in order to provide a guide for the people (p. 27). It is 
said that that Amīr referred to was Abū Naṣr Aḥmad Bahāʼ al-Dawlah, son of ʻIḍad al-Dawlah, (d. 
403/1012). There is, however, no real evidence for this.    
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study. Norman Calder’s 1980 PhD dissertation, The structure of authority in Imamī Shīʻī 
jurisprudence does, however, shed some light on Mufīd’s legal views. Tamima Bayhom-Daou’s 
Shaykh Mufīd covers both theological and legal views, but is written for general readers.  
Life and times  
 
Known as Shaykh al-Mufīd, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Nuʻmān al-ʻUkbarī 
acquired the name of al-Baghdādī as well after living in Bagdad and was also called Ibn al-
Muʻallim since his father was teacher. Born around 336/948129 or 338/950130 in the village of al-
ʻUkbarā, Mufīd was a prominent Shiite scholar during the first century of the Greater 
Occultation. He studied with both Akhbārī figures such as Shaykh Ṣadūq, Ibn Junayd al-Iskāfī, 
Abū al-Qāsim Jaʻfar ibn Muḥammad ibn Qūlawayh al-Qummī, Abū Alī al-Ṣūlī, and Abū Ghālib 
al-Rāzī. Among his students, Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, Sayyid al-Raḍī, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Sallār al-
Daylamī, Abū al-ʻAbbās al al-Najjashī, and Abū al-Futūḥ al-Karājkī are the best known.  
As a theologian, Mufīd played a significant role in the consolidation of Shiite post-
Occultation theology, in which the doctrine of Occultation is a central point. As a jurist, Shaykh 
Mufīd was also a religious leader of the Shiite community in his time. Mufīd represents a turning 
point in the transition from the traditionalist school of Qum—the main figures of which were al-
Kulaynī (d. 329/941) and Shaykh Ṣadūq (d. 381/991)—to the rationalist school of Baghdad, of 
which he was the main representative. For the school of Qum, the Quran, Sunnah and akhbār, 
i.e., sayings or “Traditions” of the Imams, were the legitimate sources from which Islamic legal 
rulings could be derived. Kulaynī, for instance, suggests three criteria for distinguishing a correct 
Tradition from a doubtful one or solving the conflict between traditions: refer the Tradition to the 
Quran, compare it with Sunnite Traditions and take an opposite view, and refer to the consensus 
                                                 
129 Al-Najāshī, Mufīd’s student, considers 336 /948 to be a more accurate dating of Mufīd’s birth; 
Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Najāshī, Kitāb al-rijāl ([Tehran, Iran]: Markaz-i Nashr-i Islāmī, 1407/1986), 402-3.  
130Mufīd’s studen, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī fixes the birth date at 338; Muhạmmad ibn al-Hạsan Tụ̄sī, Al-
Fihrist (Mu’assasat Nashr Fuqāhat, 1417 [1997]), 238. Ibn Nadīm, a contemporary of Mufīd, has the 
same view as al-Ṭūsī; Muhạmmad ibn Ishạ̄q Ibn al-Nadīm, Al-Fihrist, ed. Riḍā Tajaddud   ([Iran]: Riḍā 
Tajaddud, 1350/[1971]), 248. 
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of the Shiite scholars.131 In contrast, within the school of Baghdad the role of human reason or 
“intellect” (ʻaql) is recognized. In Mufīd’s opinion, we know the authenticity of the Quran not 
only from Traditions, but also from reason,132 and when there is lack of knowledge about new 
legal circumstances, we also refer to reason.133 
In the time Mufīd was living, the Abbasid caliphs dominated the political system and 
applied Sunnite law, while the sons of Abū Shujāʻ Daylamī, the Shiite Buwayhid dynasty,134 
were in their service, holding the title of Commander of the Commanders [amīr al-umarāʼ], a 
military title with executive power. The Hamdanids in the northern part of Iraq were another 
Shiite dynasty working for the Abbasid caliphs. Thus circumstances were relatively favorable for 
the Twelver Shiite community, and the Shiite-Sunnite relationship was also relatively stable. The 
Būyid dynasty promoted Shiite religious ceremonies such as ʻAshūrā’, which took place in 
public space in Baghdad, the centre of the Sunnite caliphate, in 352/962135, and the ʻĪd al-
Ghadīr136 commemorating Ali’s Imamate. The Būyids did not, however, play sectarian politics 
against the majority Sunnite population. As for Mufīd’s relations with the Būyids, they were 
mostly friendly, though he was at one point exiled from Baghdad by them because of Sunnite-
Shiite unrest. We know from Ṭūsī and Ibn al-Nadīm that he served as the head of the Shiite 
                                                 
131 Kulaynī, Kāfī, vol.1, 8-9, 68.  
132 Mufīd, al-Tadhkirah bi-uṣūl al-fiqh, in Silsilat muʼllafāt al-Shaykh Mufīd, ed. al-Shaykh Mahdī 
Najaf, vol. 9 (Beirut: Dār Mufīd lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 1414 Q/1993), 28.   
133 Mufīd, Rasāʼil fi al-Ghaybah, ed. ʻAlāʼ Āl Ja‘far, vol. 1 (Congress of Shaykh Mufīd), 14-15.    
134 Whether the Buwayhids were Zaydī or Twelver is a matter of debate. Thus modern historians 
often call them simply “ʻAlawī”, i.e. followers of ‘Alī. 
135 Abū al-Faraj ʻAbd al-Rahṃān ibn ʻAlī Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazạm fī tawārīkh al-mulūk wa-al-
umam, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir ʻAṭā and Muṣtafā ‘Abd al-Qādir ʻAṭā, vol. 14 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-Ilmīyah, 1992 [1412]), 150. 




community for an extended period.137 Mufīd died in 413/1022. Because of his high status and 
influence, thousands of Baghdad residents, both Shiites and Sunnites, participated in his funeral 
commemoration.   
Ideas and influence  
 
Mufīd stands as a leading theologian and jurist not only in his time, but long after. His 
main book in law is al-Muqniʻah. The Muqniʻah was expanded and commented upon by Shaykh 
al-Ṭūsī (460/1068), Mufīd’s prominent pupil, under the title Tahdhīb al-aḥkām, which became 
one of the main four Shiite legal sources. Mufīd applies reason in interpreting the Quran and 
traditions, a great change, as indicated above, from the school of Qum and from his teacher, Ibn 
Bābawayh al-Qummī, known as “al-Shaykh al-Saduq”. McDermott identifies the establishment 
of a rational foundation for Shiism as one of Mufīd’s chief goals.138 Along with Ibn Abī ʻAqīl al-
ʻUmmānī (fl. 4th/10th century, and thus al-Kulaynī’s contemporary) and Mufīd’s tutor Ibn al-
Junayd al-Iskāfī (d. 381/991, and so a contemporary of al-Ṣadūq) he is the founder of 
independent legal reasoning or ijtihād in Shiism.139 Ijtihad became possible because Shiite 
                                                 
137 Tusi, Al-Fihrist, 238; Ibn al-Nadīm’s words; he died in 338/950 around thirty years before 
Mufīd’s death, indicating that Mufīd was the religious leader of the Shiites for more than thirty years. See, 
al-Fihrist, 248. 
138 Martin McDermott, “Muqāyasah’i ravish-i kalāmi-yi Shaykh Mufīd bā kalām-i masīḥī,” Kayhān-i 
Farhangī, 97 (1372/1993), 11. English version available at http://www.al-islam.org/al-
tawhid/mufid_kalam/ under the title “Method in Mufid's Kalam and in Christian Theology”. 
139 Wilfred Madelung asserts that Mufīd repudiates the use of ijtihād and analogy in law and 
criticizes Ibn al-Junayd for employing them: Wilfred Madelung, “Mufīd,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, 
2d ed., vol. 7 (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1993), 312-313. In another place, Madelung adds that in the 
7th/13th century, Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī and ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī admitted the use of ijtihād (Wilferd Madelung, 
“Authority in Twelver Shiism in the Absence of the Imam,” in La notion d’ autorité au Moyen Age: 
Islam, Byzance, Occident. Colloques internationaux de la Napoule 1978, ed. G. Makdisi, D. Sourdel, J. 
Sourdel-Thomine [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982]), 168-9. Arjomand expresses the same 
view in his Authority and political culture in Shi'ism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 
5. I believe, however, that Mufīd is a co-founder of Shiite ijtihād. Although he questioned Ibn al-Junayd’s 
standing in knowledge of jurisprudence and Traditions among the Shiites, he emphasizes (in reaction to a 
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scholars started using the science of jurisprudence, in which consensus, reason, linguistic 
analysis, and “the custom of rational persons” (sīrat al-ʻuqalā’) occupied an important place.140  
                                                                                                                                                              
Sunnite scholar’s critique) that Ibn al-Junayd was more knowledgeable than and superior to the Sunnite 
imams (al-Masāʼil al-Ṣāghāniyyah, 58). Mufīd’s reaction against Ibn al-Junayd’s view of ijtihād has cast 
doubt on his sympathy for it, and it it true that he did argue against in on several occasions, in addition to 
which al-Najjāshī’s Rijāl (p. 402) gives the title  of a work of his criticizing Ibn al-Junayd’s approach. It 
seems, however, that his concern was more with Ibn al-Junayd’s use of analogy in religious law and his 
adoption in some cases of the views of Abū Ḥanifah and other Sunnite jurists (al-Masāʼil al-Ṣāghānīyah, 
58-59). Mufīd accuses Ibn al-Junayd of not separating the Traditions transmitted from his personal 
opinion, or not sufficiently trusting their well-attested traditions (mutawātir) Traditions (Mufīd, al-Masāʼil 
al-sarawīyah, 73).  Explaining why ijtihād and analogy are rejected, Mufīd argues that in every new case, 
there is an explicit text (naṣṣ) from the Imams which guarantees the authenticity of law, so that it is not 
permitted or at least not necessary to employ ijtihād or analogy (Awā’il, 139; see also al-Taḍkirah bi-uṣūl 
al-fiqh, 38). We may understand from Mufīd’s statements that he rejects only the type of ijtihād Ibn al-
Junayd introduced and employed in his legal works, but not ijtihād per se, because, as McDermott notes, 
Mufīd talks about real or legitimate ijtihād as well. Legitimate ijtihād refers to the Book, the Sunnah, 
including the Imams’ Traditions, and the works of preceeding ‘ulamāʼ. Where there is no specific 
determination from revelation for new cases, they are to be subjects to the judgement of reason (‘aql) 
(McDermott, Theology, 294-96). Those who postpone the beginning of ijtihād to the time of the School of 
Ḥillah are, I believe, mistaken. In their evaluation of ijtihād, they have focused on how the Traditions are 
perceived, but other key elements of ijtihād having to do with the application of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-
fiqh) have been neglected. Madelung does point to the importance of legal methodology or uṣūl al-fiqh 
when he talks about the constant renovation of ijtihād in Shiism (Madelung, Authority in Twelver Shiism, 
169), but he does not pay enough attention to its role in the ijtihād of Mufīd. Though Mufīd’s position on 
reason is not as clear as that of medieval and modern mujtahids, he does discuss it. In his al-Tadhirah bi-
uṣūl al-fiqh, he says that reason as a way to understanding the authenticity of the Quran and proofs of the 
traditions (p 28), though not as an independent but supplementary source (see Awā’ʼil, 4). Nevertheless, 
Mufīd points to reason as independent source in this same book frequently; see pp. 57, 67, 69, 87, 157-
158. Elsewhere, he places reason next to the Quran, Sunnah, and Consensus in a manner similar to that 
seen in our time. See also Khulāṣat al-ijāz fī al-mutʻah (Beirut: Dār Mufīd, 1414/1993), 22.  
140 Abū al-Qāsīm Gurjī, Tārīkh fiqh wa-fuqahā’, 5th edition (Tehran: SMT, 1382 [2003]), 140-141. 
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Mufīd’s most significant theological writings are Awāʼil al-maqālāt, al-Fuṣūl al-
mukhtārah, and the Kitāb al-irshād. He also occasionally discusses legal topics in these texts. 
Mufīd favours reason (‘aql), which was necessary for legitimizing ijtihād because analogy 
(qiyās) was forbidden in Shiism. He says that whenever one needs knowledge to produce a 
judgement (ḥukm) or is involved in legal dispute, one has first to review it in light of the Quran 
and the Sunnah. If the Imam, Mufīd says, is not accessible, it is necessary to refer to the ‘ulamāʼ 
or jurists to find out what they learned from the former Imams. If there is no relevant specific text 
(naṣṣ) from those Imams, it is permitted to refer to the judgement of the intellect.141 There is, of 
course, an ambiguity here. Because Mufīd lived close to the time of the Occultation, he does not 
specify if he means the Twelfth Imam who is not accessible because he is occulted, or other 
Imams in the past who were not accessible to their followers because, for instance, they were far 
away or imprisoned by the Abbasids.  
It is also relevant to our study that Mufīd was recognized as an exceptionally pious figure 
- in Weberian terms, as possessing religious charisma. The several decrees (s. tawqīʻ) issued, it is 
said, by the Twelfth Imam call Mufīd “a leader, honest in religion, support of the righteous, and 
fighter against injustice”. As already mentioned the Hidden Imam is thought to have granted him 
the title al-Mufīd, i.e., “useful” [to the religion and community]. Mufīd’s view on the relationship 
between the Shiite ‘ulamāʼ and an “unjust”, i.e., non-legitimate, government was formed in the 
context of the political system of his time in general and that of the Abbasid caliphate in 
particular. His views on theology show an earlier Shiite thought coming to terms with the 
Occultation.   
Contemporary politicization of the image of Mufīd  
 
This thesis contends that Deputyship or niyābah was originally not political, and only 
became so gradually and rather late, i.e., only in the 18th century under the Qājārs. There has 
been a drive, however, to portray Deputyship as political so that it may serve as a basis for the 
modern doctrine of Guardianship of the Jurist or wilāyat al-faqīh. Since I have often had to undo 
what I consider to be errors related to this drive throughout the work, it will be useful to see some 
examples here. 
                                                 
141 Mufīd, Ghaybah, ed. ʻAlāʼ Āl Ja‘far, vol 1 (Congress of Shaykh Mufid), 14-16.   
72 
 
 In 1413/1992, a “Millennium International Congress” on Shaykh Mufīd was held by the 
seminary school of Qom, Iran, following which his extant works were (re-) published along with 
several articles submitted to the Congress. The Congress, unfortunately, was finally an effort to 
politicize Mufīd, specifically to cast him as a proponent of Khomeini’s theory of wilāyat al-faqīh 
or Guardianship of the Jurist. The politicization of Mufīd continued after the Millennium 
International Congress. Abū al-Faḍl Shākūrī, the author of a long preface to the work on 
Guardianship of Ayatollah Muntaẓirī, a prominent proponent of the theory, asserted that Mufīd 
had been active in politics and society. Shākūrī asserts that Mufīd’s writings address the theory 
as well as the necessity of establishing a Shiite state. He claims that Mufīd made it obligatory for 
Shiites to support a political system or government created by qualified jurists. Shākūrī also 
claims that Mufīd forbade any collaboration with “erring kings” and oppressive powers (sulṭān), 
though his writings show quite the opposite. For Shākūrī, Mufīd’s legal opinions and views on 
politics represent a propitious development in Shiite jurisprudence, in contrast to the views of his 
teacher Shaykh Ṣadūq.142 
Contrary to Shākūrī’s claims, however, Mufīd never uses the term “Guardianship of the 
Jurist” or discusses anything like it. Nor does he broach the necessity of establishing a Shiite 
state. Mufīd did not tell Shiites to support a system created by the jurists. Far from being a 
political activist, he held that it is permissible and even in some circumstances obligatory to work 
for an unjust ruler. Shakuri does not provide any proof for his claim and no reference to a source. 
He refers to developments in Shiite jurisprudence between the time of Ṣadūq and Mufīd, i.e., 
from the traditionist school of Qom to more rationalist school of Baghdad as involving politics, 
but the shift in fact occurred mostly in methodology and certainly not in the approach to politics. 
Al-Ṣadūq and Mufīd were both apolitical.  
Shākūrī quotes a lengthy passage from the Kitāb al-Ḥudūd (Section on Quranic 
Punishments) of Mufīd’s Muqniʻah and then comments as follows:  
 
It is individually incumbent (wajibʻaynī) upon one who has obtained power [ghalabah 
yaft] and become caliph and amīr, as well as anyone appointed by such a person, to 
                                                 
142 Ḥusayn ‘Alī Muntaẓirī, Mabānī-fiqhī’i ḥukūmat-i Islāmī: Dawlat va-ḥukūmat, tr. and ed. Maḥmūd 
Ṣalawātī, vol.1 (Tehran: Intishārat-i Sarāīī, 1379 [2000]), 32. 
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administer the Quranic punishments (ḥudūd), enforce the Shariah, encourage good 
and forbid the evil [… and so on].143  
 
The issue of the jurists administering Quranic punishments will be discussed in detail later on, 
but very briefly, it must be said that the quotation is not accurate. Mufīd writes about the 
necessity of observing ḥudūd by a Shiite jurist appointed by a non-Shiite ruler, not a Shiite 
person such as a jurist possessing the power to appoint someone else. There are two very evident 
tendencies in Shākūrī’s interpretation of Mufīd’s views about politics and the relation between 
Shiite jurists and “unjust” rulers. First, he tries to prove that political Deputyship has long and 
strong roots among prominent Shiite jurists. Second, he undermines the idea of working for an 
unjust ruler, obviously with the conditions of pre-revolutionary Iran in mind.   
Aḥmad Āzarī Qummī is even more eager than Shākūrī to politicize Deputyship. He states 
with apparent certainty that Mufīd is the first jurist to introduce the theory of Guardianship, 
especially in his Muqniʻah, and adds that he tried to strengthen the intellectual basis for it.144 He 
does not, however, tell us where this is stated in the Muqniʻah or any other of Mufīd’s writings. 
Āzarī Qummī cites prayer leadership on the two Eids, prayers for rain, and prayers in the event of 
a lunar or solar eclipse as evidence that Mufīd propounded niyābah.145 Apart from these being 
quite minor functions, the jurists are actually asked, in Mufīd’s telling, to lead the prayer as a 
general duty of a religious figure, and certainly but not as something delegated by the Imam. 
From Mufīd’s view on enjoining good and forbidding evil, execution of legal penalties, and the 
necessity of paying alms (zakat) to the Shiite jurists, Āzarī Qummī, astonishingly, infers 
“Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist” (wilāyat-i muṭlaqah-i faqīh). His argument is that absolute 
power or sulṭān in the above-mentioned cases refers to the Prophet and the Imams; and since 
during the Occultation, the jurists function as the deputy of the Imam, their authority is 
                                                 
143 Muntaẓirī, Mabānī-i Fiqhī, 33.  
144 Aḥmad Āzarī Qummī, “Vilāyat-i faqīh az nigāh-i Shaykh Mufīd,” in ʻUlūm-i insānī “Majmūʻah 
Maqālāt Congarah Shaykh Mufīd” 4 (1371/1992), 46. 
145 Āzarī Qumī, “Vilāyat-i faqīh,” 52. 
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absolute.146 Āzarī Qummī does not stop there, for, based again supposedly on Mufīd, takes the 
jurists to actually themselves be the “sulṭān al-Islam”.  
It is not my goal here to respond in detail to Āzarī Qummī’s or Shākūrī’s understandings 
of Shaykh Mufīd. I will only point out three basic defects, which greatly contrast with the picture 
of Mufīd presented in this chapter. First, as I have said, both represent Mufīd’s approach to 
Deputyship as being thoroughly political without proof or reference. Second, their understanding 
of Mufīd is constructed by expanding a specific case to something general or universal. For 
instance, Āzarī Qummī quotes from the Muqniʻah as follows: “The Shiite jurists who are just, 
knowledgeable, wise, and virtuous take up the duties of the sulṭān [yatawallū mā yatawallāhu al-
sulṭān].”147 The passage quoted actually concerns a very specific and narrow case, one in which a 
person who is the executor of someone’s will himself dies without having executed the whole 
will. Can the executor of the will of the second person then complete the execution of the will of 
the first? Mufīd says that he cannot; rather he should refer it to the just sulṭān. However, when 
there is no just sulṭān, people may refer to a jurist,148 who then acts in the capacity of a judge. 
Third, Āzarī Qummī and Shākūrī interpret texts to serve their ends. Āzarī Qummī, for example, 
seeing that the term sulṭān al-Islām refers to the jurists, takes a great leap by going on to define it 
as the sovereign or highest authority in a community. He concludes that the Shiite jurists must be 
the head of state, the sulṭān,149 while Shaykh Mufīd in truth does not give the title of sulṭān to the 
jurists in the sense of head of the state. Mufīd explicitly says that the Imams are the sulṭān of 
Islam, 150 but he does not give the same title to the hākims and amīrs who are appointed by them. 
Immediately following this statement, Mufīd specifies that the Shiite jurists are granted the 
authority to judge, which is specific, and not general. They possess only one part of the sulṭān’s 
powers, i.e., judgement. 
                                                 
146 Āzarī Qumī, “Vilāyat-i faqīh”, 55. 
147   Āzarī Qumī, “Vilāyat-i faqīh”, 59; Muntaẓirī, Mabānī-i fiqhī, 35.   
148   Mufid, al-Muqniah, 675. 
149   Āzarī Qumī, “Vilāyat-i faqīh”, 60. 
150   Mufid, al-Muqniʻah, 810. Āzarī Qumī also maintains that Mufīd did not give the title sulṭān al-




Key terms and concepts 
 
The Arabic terms sulṭān, nāʼib, ḥākim, amīr, wālī, nāẓir, and ʻāmil are key to 
understanding niyābah. Their meanings develop and even change between the “moments” of 
Deputyship highlighted in this work. These shifts are significant enough that they have facilitated 
quite different interpretations. As always with the dense juristic and theological texts, it is 
necessary to pay close attention to Arabic usage. Therefore in this and the next sections, I will 
analyze the terms used in some detail, leaving their analysis in light of Deputyship to a separate 
section.  
Nāʼib, the general sense of which is representative or deputy, has a technical meaning in 
Shiism of the person to whom the Imam deputizes his functions during his Occultation. In his 
chief legal work Muqniʻah, Mufīd utilizes the term nāʼib five times. In this early period, 
however, nāʼib is meant in a general and not in the specialized, technical sense we see later of 
Deputyship of the Imam. Al-Ṣadūq actually does not use the term at all in his four-volume legal 
compendium, Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh or in his al-Muqniʻ.151 In al-Fuṣūl al-mukhtārah, Mufīd 
calls Ali the Prophet’s nāiʼb in speaking about Ali’s great faith and virtues, and not in any 
technical sense.152  
The term sultān is used frequently in the Muqni’ah. It mostly conveys a general meaning, 
for example, the person who governs the community with comprehensive power or sovereignty, 
or the sovereign himself.153 In some places, it refers to the Shiite Imams. In others, it is used to 
speak of a judge, or the head of the community acting as the judge. It also appears in compound 
forms such as ‘just” or “right” sulṭān,154 “unjust sulṭān,”155 “sulṭān al-ẓulmah” (ruler of 
                                                 
151 Muhạmmad ibn ʻAlī Ibn Babawayh (al-Ṣadūq), Al-Muqniʻ; ed. Lajnat al-taḥqīq li-Muʼassasat al-
Imam al-Hādī (Qom: Muʼassasat al-Imām al-Hādī, 1415/1994); Ibn Bābawayh, Man lā yaḥduruhu al-
faqīh, ed. ‘Alī Akbar al-Ghaffārī (Qom: Jāmiʻat Mudarrisīn al-Ḥawzah al-ʻIlmīyah, 1363 sh. 1404q/ 
1983). 
152 Mufid, al-Fuṣūl al-mukhtārah, 278.  
153 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 220, 386, 614, 616, 652, 736, 739, 749, 781, 787, 788, 791, 792, 795, 800, 
804, 805, 826, 842.   
154 Mufīd, Al-Muqniʻah, 613, 649, 675, 676, 740. 
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darkness),’156 “sulṭān al-zamān” (ruler of the time),”157 “sulṭān al-ẓalāl,”158 and “sulṭān al-
Islam.”159 Mufīd calls the Imam sulṭān (obviously not meaning unjust sulṭān, sulṭān of darkness, 
or sulṭān al-ḍalāl). The Imam is the sulṭān al-Islām, appointed by God. Mufīd uses the terms 
umarāʼ and ḥukkām for political, judicial, or military delegates of the Imams. Who exactly are 
these personalities? In the Abbasid period in which Mufīd lived, amīr had quite a wide meaning. 
Al-umarāʼ, plural of amīr, meant commander, governor, prince, leader, advisor or counselor.160 
Lewis says that when the position of authority is hereditary such as in the Abbasid dynasty, the 
prince was called amīr.161 Prior to the Umayyads, amīr was equivalent to ‘āmil, “functionary”, 
including collectors of taxes.162 Levy suggests that in the lifetime of the Prophet, the ʻāmil 
(whose responsibility it was to collect alms-taxes) was separate from that of the amīr; however, 
they were sent together to newly occupied territories.163 Amīr also, of course, meant a military 
commander. Under the caliphate, the title “was bestowed on a ʻāmil (delegate) appointed with 
                                                                                                                                                              
155 Mufīd, Al-Muqniʻah, 349, 706, 740, 810, 811.  
156 Mufīd, Al-Muqniʻah, 706.  
157 Mufid, al-Muqniah, 537, 809.  
158 Mufid, al-Muqniah, 810, 811.  
159 Mufid, al-Muqniah, 648, 649, 810, 811.  
160 See, Nādīyā Bargnīsī, “Amīr,” in  Great Islamic Encyclopedia, retrieved:  
http://www.cgie.org.ir/fa/publication/entryview/4742; also, ‘Amīr’ in The Encyclopædia Iranica: 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/amir-commander-governor-prince-in-arabic; A. A. Duri, “Amīr,” in  
The Encyclopedia of Islam, volume Ӏ (London: Luzac &Co., 1960),  438-439; Hibba Eltigani Abugideiri,  
“Amīr,” in The Oxford encyclopedia of the Islamic World, 1st Vol., Editor in chief: John L. Esposito 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 137; Cyril Glassé, The new encyclopedia of Islam, 3rd 
edition (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 50. 
161 Bernard Lewis, The political language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 50. 
162 Great Islamic Encyclopedia, entry ‘Amīr’.  
163 Reuben Levy, The social structure of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 355.  
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the approval of the caliph”.164 In Abbasid times, political connotations were added to the military 
notion, so that amīr came to mean both a high ranking civil and military official. Amīr thus 
became the habitual title of a governor, ruler, or provincial military official holding political and 
military power together. 
The term ḥākim in Mufīd’s usage refers to an appointee of an Imams. Generally, it means 
sovereign, judge, or governor;165 thus it seems vaguer than amīr. Ḥākim in Mufīd‘s Muqniʻah 
means judge. Mufīd does call the ḥākim as the appointee of the sulṭān al-Islam, that is to say, the 
Imams. “The sulṭān al-Islam appointed by God, namely the guiding Imams from the Family of 
Muḥammad, and the amīrs and ḥākims whom they have appointed have the responsibility to 
execute the Quranic punisments.”166 However, following the statement just quoted, Mufīd clearly 
specifies that the jurist’s authority is limited to judgeship. Thus we must conclude that the jurists’ 
ḥukūmat, like that of the amīr’s emarate here also mentioned, is only part of that of the Imam. 
Only the Imam combines the two and is the sulṭān al-Islam.  
The term sulṭān is used in a general, non-technical sense also in Mufīd’s Kitāb al-irshād, 
where it refers to the holder of the highest level of power in a state, or the power itself.167 In the 
Irshād, we see the phrases sulṭān al-ṣaʻb,168 unjust ruler, and sulṭān al-risālah,169 meaning the 
Prophet. There is one instance in the Irshād where sulṭān denotes the Imam in its Imamī sense;170 
but on other occasions, Mufīd uses the expressions sulṭān al-zamān (sulṭān of the time) in a 
                                                 
164 Hibba Eltigani Abugideiri, “Amīr”, in John Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic 
World, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 137. 
165 Geneviève Gobillot, “Al-Ḥakīm”, in Esposito, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, 
362-3. 
166 Mufid, al-Muqniah, 810. 
167 Mufid, Kitāb Al-irshād: The Book of Guidance to the Lives of the Twelve Imams, vol. 1 (Qom: Dār 
Mufīd), 14, 166, 242, 245, 291, 309, 320. Vol. 2: 120, 121, 182, and 369.  
168 Mufid, Book of Guidance, vol. 1, 281.  
169 Mufid, Book of Guidance, vol. 1, 249. 
170 Mufid, Book of Guidance, vol. 2, 342. 
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general sense, for instance in reference to a contemporary Abbasid caliph that might be identified 
either as al-Muhtadi or al-Mu‘tamid.171  
Does Mufīd use the term sulṭān for the jurist? He defines the Imams as sulṭān al-Islam 
and then states that the amīrs and ḥākims appointed by the Imams have the same authority for 
execution of the Quranic punishments. It is the Shiite jurists who judge on behalf of the Imams 
for these punishments.172 So it does not mean that the jurist is a sovereign also holding political 
and military power.  
The term nāẓir (literally, supervisor) or nāẓir fi umūr al-muslimīn173 (supervisor of the 
Muslims’ affairs) refers to the sovereign person or judge; nāẓir in its general, non-technical 
meaning can be both judicial and political. However, in the Book of Quranic Punishments of 
Mufīd’s Muqniʻah, it takes on the specific meaning of judgment in relation to the jurists174 and 
has a political meaning only for amīrs.175 Shaykh Ṭūsī in his Nihāyah also terms the Imam nāẓir 
fi umūr al-muslimīn. He explains that when the Imam is not present, the just and knowledgeable 
Imamī jurists play his role in the case of someone dying without an executor for his will by 
appointing the executor for him.176 This is clearly a judicial function, and a rather narrow one at 
that. Kamali asserts that the mujtahid is competent in both judicial affairs and supervising “the 
affairs of the Muslims”. In reference to Mufīd, Sayyid Murtaḍā, Ṭūsī, and the leading mujtahid 
Shaykh Anṣārī (d. 1281/1864), Kamali says that […] a fully qualified mujtahid (one qualified to 
exercise independent reasoning) is a representative (nāʼib) of the imam regarding judgement and 
administration of the people affairs”.177 Kamālī’s statement, I would assert, applies to the second 
                                                 
171 Mufid, Book of Guidance, vol. 2, 336 and 337.  
172 Mufid, al-Muqni‘ah, 810. 
173 Mufid, al-Muqni‘ah, 669, 673, 675. 
174 Mufid, al-Muqni‘ah, 810. 
175 Mufid, al-Muqni‘ah, 812. 
176 Muhạmmad ibn al-Hạsan Ṭūsī, al-Nihāyah (Qum: al-Muʼassasah, 1412 [1991]), 607. 
177 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Law and Society: The Interpretation of Revelation and Reason in 
the Shariah,” in John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford History of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 116-117. The author has called those three Shiite figure mujtahids, although in their time the use of 
79 
 
and third moments of niyābah, and not to the first. There is no clear evidence in Mufīd’s writings 
that he regarded the jurists as possessing both the power to judge in the community and to 
administer the affairs of its members. There is no doubt that he considered the first valid; but for 
the second, which is crucial to the issue of politics, much clearer evidence is required.  
The Imam’s amīrs, hākims, and wālīs  
 
Shiite legal literature in Mufīd’s time does not present specifically Shiite definitions of 
the terms ḥākim, wālī and amīr. They are used in a manner very close to that seen in Sunnite 
literature. This is probably why Sourdel translates wulāt as “agents” rather than giving it a 
political sense.178 In the Sunnite political hierarchy in the early centuries of Islam, authority was 
transferred from the Prophet to the caliphs, with the sulṭān gaining power after. Amīrs included a 
variety of figures with lesser powers than the caliphs, from princes in the caliphal family to 
provincial governors and military commanders. Bernard Lewis places sulṭān lower than amīr, 
dating its official appearance to the year 428/1037 under the Great Seljuqs.179 I would assert, 
however, that before the Seljuqs, the Ghaznavids, who were contemporary to Mufīd, called 
themselves sulṭān and held the titles amīr and sulṭān simultaneously. 
Despite the parallel vocabulary, Shiite reality was very different from that of the Sunnites. 
In Mufīd’s time, the model of political hierarchy seen among the Sunnites did not exist. Mufīd 
nevertheless uses the terms sulṭān, amīr, ḥākim, nāẓir, and wulāt. Different from the Sunnite 
construction, he defines the Imams as sulṭāns of Islam, that is to say the main authority, equal to 
the caliph for the Sunnites. The Imam’s source of authority is God, because he is appointed by 
Him. The amīrs and ḥākims appointed by the Imams also hold the title of sulṭān. Mufīd says, 
“The Imams of Guidance are sulṭān of Islam, appointed by God, and the amīrs and ḥākims they 
appoint are the sulṭān of Islam as well.”180 
                                                                                                                                                              
this title was not current. He also mentions the date of death of Mufīd as 1044 and that of al-Murtaḍā as 
1060. The correct dates are 1022 and 1044.   
178 See, Sourdel, L’Imâmisme, 61.   
179 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, 52-53. 
180 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 810. 
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 Let us look first at the theoretical side of Mufīd’s construction. Instead of the caliph, the 
Imam is the successor to the Prophet, and thus the head of the community. The amīrs and ḥākims 
are the Imam’s appointees, possessing, theoretically, the same authority as the Imam. It is 
necessary, however, to understand that they are entirely different figures from a theological point 
of view. Mufīd considers the possibility that the Imam’s agents have the same characteristics as 
the Imam, but he decides in every case that this is not so. It is not necessary for appointees to be 
infallible or specifically designated (naṣṣ). They must be more knowledgeable than others, but 
their knowledge does not have to be equal to that of the Imam.  
Mufīd’s construction of a political system, it should be understood, was mostly 
imaginary. Although he speaks about amīrs appointed by the Imam, none actually existed. 
Though the terms amīr, ḥākim, and walī have political, military and administrative meaning, they 
were not relevant even during the time of the Shiite Imams, who made no such appointments, 
save for the first Imam ʻAlī. The purely judicial title of ḥākim, however, did have a reality.  
The jurists and judgeship 
 
In Mufīd’s theology, all power belongs to God, the Prophet, and the Imams, one after the 
other. Though the Imam has disappeared, he still is the holder of supreme power. The Imam 
does, however, delegate judicial power. Although Mufīd does not use the term niyābah in his 
Muqniʻah, the general concept of Deputyship is present when he discusses the question of the 
jurists taking charge of judicial affairs involving Quranic punishments (iqāmat al- ḥudūd).181 
Why are judicial affairs the subject of delegation? Traditions according to which the jurists were 
granted authority to judge belong to a time when the Imams were not only distant from political 
leadership, but also extremely reluctant to mount any political claims. In a situation in which 
there was a lack of actual power, delegation of most powers was irreal. What was left was legal 
                                                 
181 Mufid, al-Muqniah, 810, 811. If we go back to al-Ṣadūq, we will see that he asks the Shiites not to 
refer to non-Shiite jurists for judgement of litigation. Instead, they are ordered to refer to a Shiite man 
(rajul) with some legal knowledge – not, as Mufīd says, jurists. There is no doubt that for al-Ṣadūq, ḥukm 
means judgeship and ḥākim is equal to Judge (qāḍī): Man lā yaḥduruhu al-faqīh, 3. At the same time, al-
Ṣadūq warns his followers not to accept position of judgeship, because it belongs to the Imam who knows 
judgeship and is just toward Muslims, as the Prophet and his successors the Imams did (ibid., 5).  
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rulings and judgeship. Emphasis on these was pivotal for the Shiite community, for it kept the 
unofficial Shiite judiciary system alive and helped to preserve the identity of a politically 
marginalized community. The Quranic punishments in particular are mentioned because, as I 
have already suggested, their operation stood as a symbol of the continued existence of Shiite 
law. Unlike private law, they also suggested real power, which the jurists and their system of law 
were, in reality, deprived of. Mufīd’s detailed discussion of the ḥudūd should be understood in 
light of these realities.   
Mufīd’s view is that the Imam has granted the Shiite jurists authority during the Greater 
Occultation to apply the Quranic punishments, if possible. The Quranic punishments include the 
amputation of the hand for thieves, lashing for adulterers, and retaliation for murderers. The 
responsibility is, in technical terms, farḍ ʻalā al-kifāyah, a duty that, even if it does not have to be 
carried out by all members of the community, must be carried out by someone; as well as farḍ 
ʻalā al-ṭāʻah, a duty that can be carried out by a few, for instance some or one of the jurists, but 
only if it does not involve danger to one’s life, property, and religion. Thus administration of the 
punishments ceases to be obligatory for the jurists if they fear the unjust ruler or threats from 
other groups.182 Mufīd calls on the Shiite jurists to apply the Quranic punishments at least among 
their family members and servants, and then expand it to their relatives and other community 
groups, as far as conditions, especially safety, allow.  
Obviously, the scope for judicial activity among Shiites was quite limited. Mufīd also, 
however, allows the jurists to act as judges while serving as functionaries appointed by an 
“unjust” ruler. Mufīd writes, 
 
If a Shiite jurist is appointed by a non-Shiite ruler to administer the Quranic 
punishments (ḥudūd) among a group of the ruler’s subjects, the jurist will be 
personally obliged (farḍ mutaʻayyan) to accept it, because of the outwardly apparent 
(zahir) power of the ruler. Then the jurist shall execute the prescribed punishments, 
enforce the ordinances, command the good and forbid the evil, and fight non-Muslims 
[referring to jihad] and iniquitous persons. In this case, it is obligatory for his Shiite 
brothers to support him whenever he requests help; of course, as long as he [the jurist] 
                                                 
182 Al-Mufīd, al-Muqni‘ah, 810.  
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does not exceed the limits of faith and does not obey the “sulṭān of darkness” when he 
acts against God’s orders.183 
 
This statement conveys important information. We see that working for an unjust ruler if 
asked and even obedience to such a ruler is obligatory, at least as far as accepting a judgeship 
goes.  In addition, Mufīd makes it obligatory for other Shiites to support such jurists whenever 
they need aid and as long as they follow “truth” (ḥaqq, i.e., Shiite law). If the jurists do not fulfill 
these conditions, support is forbidden.184 Mufīd is quite concerned about how to justify working 
for an unjust ruler, in light of the apparent prohibition in Shiite thought. This question will be 
tackled later in the chapter, but it is useful here to review it briefly. According to Mufīd, if a 
Shiite jurist working in a non-Shiite judicial system judges on the basis of Shiite law, his 
cooperation with the unjust system is allowed or even necessary. He stresses that neither the 
Shiite jurists nor those who are appointed by the oppressive sulṭān are allowed to judge against 
the permanent principles of Shiism, save in a time of great pressure when it might be necessary 
to practice dissimilation (taqiyah) for fear of losing faith and life. Even at such a time, however, 
deliberate shedding of Shiite blood is not in any way permissible.185 Clearly, serving Shiite 
interests is the reason for permissibility of working with an unjust ruler.  
Thus, to review, the doctrine of niyābah for Mufīd is limited to judgeship. He explicitly 
says that the Imams granted Shiite jurists the authority to judge. The scholars must carry out all 
responsibilities given to judges in Shiite law. Mufīd says much the same in his Amālī: Whenever 
God wishes good for His servants, He has righteous individuals govern them, jurists judge 
among them, and places property in the hands of the generous.186  
One last point: Although Mufīd permits the Shiite jurist to play a role as a political 
authority if he is appointed to such a position by an unjust ruler, but he only talks about this in 
                                                 
183 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 810.  
184 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 810. 
185 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 811. 
186 Mufīd, Kitab al-amālī (Qum: al-Maṭbaʻah al-Islāmīyah, 1403 [1982]), 97. Here Mufīd 
distinguishes between those who govern and those who judge. He emphasizes that the best society is that 
in which the jurists judge (not where they govern or rule as statesmen).  
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connection with authority over Sunnites.187 It seems to me possible that this rather odd omission 
of Shiites might be due to taqiyah, i.e., strategic dissimulation. Mufīd is silent on the jurist’s 
political authority over Shiites because he does not want to put himself or the community in a 
dangerous position with the Abbasids by suggesting that the jurist could have independent 
political power. Even, however, if we admit that Mufīd permits the jurists to own political 
leadership – for which we really do not have solid evidence – he never represents it as a 
monopolistic and obligatory “guardianship” (wilāyah) of the jurists. So once again, we must 
conclude that Deputyship for Mufīd is limited to judgeship, and that its actual functioning during 
his time was rather narrow.  
The jurists and leadership of Friday prayer 
 
Leadership of the Friday prayer has been much debated by Shiite scholars. There has 
been a connection in Islam overall between leadership of the Friday prayer and political power, 
as the Prophet, Rightly-Guided Caliphs, and Umayyad and the Abbasid caliphs led the prayer. In 
Shiism, leading the congregational Friday prayer has been the exclusive task and right of the 
Imam, the spiritual and political leader of the school. What then is the situation in the absence of 
the Imam?  
Mufīd was born seven or nine years after the beginning of the Greater Occultation in 
329/941, so that his views throw light on how Friday prayer was treated among the early Shiite 
community. Let us first, however, see what the historical sources can tell us. History records 
observance of the congregational Friday prayer before and after Mufīd’s time. According to al-
Khaṭīb al-Baghdadi (463/1071), the Shiites of Baghdad had a mosque for Friday prayer in 
Burāthā; the mosque was destroyed by the Abbasid caliph al-Muqtadir when it was reported to 
him that the congregants were cursing the Prophet’s Companions and disobeying the ruling 
caliph. In 324/936, Amīr Bajkam Mākānī, Commander of the Commanders in Baghdad, ordered 
the mosque rebuilt, and the caliph al-Rāḍī’s name was inscribed upon it.188 The mosque was 
                                                 
187 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 810-12. 
188 Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʻAlī Kātib al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād aw madīnat al-salām (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah, 1997/1417), 123-124. 
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rebuilt by 329/940 and Friday prayer was held there until 450/1058.189 Ibn Athīr (630/1233) 
reveals that the congregational Friday prayer continued in Burāthā during the Shiite-Sunnite 
clashes occurring in Baghdad in 349/960 even while it was stopped in other mosques in areas in 
which Shiites were a majority.190  
In short, the prayer did take place, despite the dominant theoretical view dictating that 
leading the Friday prayer is the exclusive right of the Imam. Who, we may ask, led the prayers, 
and what was the position of Shiite scholars? It was very probably the Shiite ‘ulamāʼ themselves 
who led the prayer, due to lack of any Shiite political leader, though we finally do not have this 
information or any indication if Mufīd would have participated.  
Mufīd begins his discussion of the Friday prayer in his Muqniʻah by saying that it is 
obligatory (wājib) and should be held in congregation.191 The obligation, however, depends on 
the presence of the Imam. Mufīd does not say clearly if that means the infallible Imam such that 
the prayer becomes obligatory only during his presence, or any imam, that is to say, a generic 
prayer leader. When Mufīd talks about the physical and moral qualities of an imam leading the 
Friday prayer, saying that such a person must be pious, free, of legitimate birth, adult, and so 
on,192 it does seem evident that he is referring to a fallible (ordinary or generic) imam. Nor does 
he list among the attributes of the imam the quality of being a jurist or faqīh, as he says in the 
case of judgeship. This leads one to conclude that the Friday congregational prayer in Mufīd’s 
view does not depend on the infallible Imam leading it. Some Shiite scholars after Mufīd say that 
                                                 
189 Yāqūt ibn ʻAbd Allāh al-Hạmawī, Muʻjam al-buldān, vol. 2 (Beriut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-
‘Arabī, 1399/1979), 362-363. Yāqūt considers that it was al-Rāḍī who ordered the mosque be demolished, 
not al-Muqtadir.  
190 ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, Tārīkh kāmil, tr. Ḥamīd Riḍā Āzhīr, vol. 12 (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Asāṭīr, 
1383 [2004]), 5074.    
191 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 163. The Quranic foundation for the necessity (wujūb) of assembly prayer is 
the ninth verse of 62 surah [al-Jumʻa] of the Quran, which says: Oh you believers! When the call is 
proclaimed to prayer on Friday, hasten earnestly to the remembrance of Allah and leave off business. That 
is best for you if you knew.   
192 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 163-4. These qualities are being free, adult, of legitimate birth, free from 
vitiligo and leprosy, Muslim, Shiite, and observing the prayers at the proper times.  
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the prayer during the Occultation is not licit, while others say that it is permissible but not 
obligatory. It appears that Mufīd, different from those after him, considers Friday prayer actually 
obligatory during the Occultation, with the only condition being a qualified imam (of any kind) 
and at least four other persons to form the congregation. Otherwise, it becomes merely 
permissible. Thus, it seems, prayer leadership is not one of a jurist’s deputized duties.  
Mufīd’s students Sallār al-Daylamī (448/1056)193 and al-Murtaḍā 194 say that the Friday 
prayer is obligatory only when the Imam or his (specific) appointee is present, and not during the 
Occultation as Mufīd says. It seems that it may even be prohibited during the Occultation in their 
view. In his al-Nihāyah, Ṭūsī (460/1068) expresses the same opinion about prayer before the 
Occultation, but he also says that all kinds prayer – thus presumably including Friday prayer – 
are permitted and may be led by the jurist during the Occultation.195 Mufīd, in contrast, limits the 
role of the scholars and jurists in prayer to daily prayer, the Eid prayers, prayers upon the eclipses 
of the sun and moon, and prayer for rain.196  
The argument of Bayhom-Daou197 and some other modern scholars that Mufīd held that 
the Shiite jurists could serve as leaders of Friday prayer because they were granted that authority 
by the Imam is clearly incorrect. This can also be seen by referring Mufīd’s students Daylamī 
                                                 
193 Hạmzah ibn ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz Sallār, al-Marāsim al-ʻAlawīyah fī al-aḥkām al-nabawīyah, ed. al-
Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīnī (Qum: al-Muʻāwiniyyah al-Thaqāfīyyah lil-Majmaʻ al-ʻĀlamī li-Ahl al-bayt, 
1414/1993), 77. On page 264, Sallār adds that the Shiite jurists can lead prayers of the feasts and rain, but 
not Friday prayer.  
194 Al-Murtaḍā says that Friday prayer is valid only with a just Imam or with his appointee, so for the 
Occultation, people perform the midday instead of Friday prayer. See ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Sharīf al-
Murtadạ̄ ʻAlam al-Hudā, Rasāʼil al-Sharīf al-Murtadạ̄, ed. al-Sayyid Ahṃad al-Hụsaynī, vol. 1 (Qum: 
Dār al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, 1405/1985), 272.  
195 Ṭusī, al-Nihāyah, 103, 302. Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥilli criticizes al-Ṭūsī and supports al-Murtaḍā and Sallār. 
For more information about Ibn Idrīs’ view, see Muhạmmad ibn Aḥmad ibn Idrīs Ḥillī, Kitāb al-sarāʼir 
al-hạ̄wī li-tahṛīr al-fatāwī, vol. 1 (Qum: al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1410 [1991]), 290-292. 
196 Mufīd, Al-Muqni'ah, 811.  
197 Tamima Bayhom-Daou, Shaykh Mufīd (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 127. The author has not 
provided any reference for this claim.  
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and al-Murtaḍā. As I have shown. Mufīd maintains that the Imams have delegated their judicial 
authority to the jurists, and not more. He does not, unfortunately, say why he excludes Friday 
prayer from the list of different prayers given above.   
Deputyship and jihād  
 
Though jihad has always been significant in the minds of the Muslims, particularly in 
early and medieval Islam, the political deprivation suffered by Shiites excluded them from 
leading it. This had economic consequences, for jihad was also a source of income. The Shiite 
khums tax was a likely response to this political-economic deprivation.  
This may explain why Mufīd does not pay much attention to jihad. In the Muqniʻah, the 
term jihad is mentioned only eleven times in noun form and three times in the form of a verb.198 
Mufīd does not allocate an independent section of the Muqniʻah to jihad, as became the practice 
after him. He instead puts it in a section with the topics of commanding good and forbidding evil 
and Quranic punishments. Even here, one can find the word jihad only three times: once in the 
title of the book, and twice in the body of the text.199 In his Al-fuṣūl al-ʻasharah, in answer to 
objections raised by opponents of the Shiites about the disappearance of the Imam, Mufīd does 
say that religious duties and principles, including jihad, do not cease during the Imam’s absence 
but are fulfilled by his wulāt, ʻāmils, or amīrs.200 He does not, however, provide substantial 
information about who these figures might be and how they could carry out jihad from within a 
non-Shiite system. 
Mufīd does not discuss jihad because it was declared by the political authority, while the 
Shiite Imam was not present and had not designated a political deputy. Nevertheless, jihad in the 
sense of war against infidels does occur once in the Muqniʻah. This concerns the jurist engaging 
in jihad when he works for an unjust sulṭān,201 which was a reality in the time of Mufīd since the 
                                                 
198 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 231, 241 (two times), 288, 469 (noun and verb), 477 (noun and verb), 483 
(noun and verb), 808, 810, 812.  
199 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 808, 810, 812.  
200 Mufīd, al-Fuṣūl al-‘asharah fī al-ghaybah, ed. Shaykh Fāris Ḥassūn (Qom: al-Muʼtamar al-
ʻĀlamī li- alfīyat al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1413 [1992]), 105-106. 
201 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 810. 
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Abbasids were still fighting against non-Muslims. On one occasion, the word jihad is also used to 
describe fighting against non-Shiite Muslims, whom Mufīd calls “misguided and wrongly 
acting” (ahl al-ḍalāl wa-al-khilāf). He calls this type of jihad “grand” (a‘ẓam) jihad. Jihad in this 
case means the jurist using his position under the unjust ruler to harm non-Shiites.202 The key 
point, in any case, is that jihad is not among the responsibilities granted the Shiite jurist, in 
Mufīd’s view.  
Commanding good and forbidding evil 
 
Mufīd affirms that commanding good and forbidding evil is compulsory. It takes two 
forms. The first is commanding good and forbidding evil by word or tongue. This is a collective 
duty. Wrongdoers violating the Shariah need to be admonished by some individuals, not by all 
members of the community. Using force against those who violate the law, the second level, is 
part of the competence of the sulṭān. Commanding good and forbidding evil becomes 
individually incumbent upon whomever been appointed or permitted by the sulṭān to perform 
that task.203 Note that it is not clear what Mufīd means by the term sulṭān204 here, whether the 
Imam or any dominant power. What is clear is that it is not the responsibility of the jurist.  
This is the material found in Mufīd’s Awā’il. In his Muqniʻah, he names three levels of 
commanding good and forbidding evil: by heart, tongue, and finally hand, i.e., force. As in the 
Awāʼil, he stresses that carrying out this duty is obligatory for all Shiites—whom he calls ahl al-
imān or “people of true belief”—if they are able to do so. Those with little or no power are 
responsible for commanding good and forbidding evil through words and force, but without 
wounding or killing. If, however, such persons may suffer harm as a result, they should 
command and forbid only with their hearts, by showing displeasure. The third level, use of force 
involving killing or wounding, is exclusive to the sulṭān.205 Once again, it is not clear what Mufīd 
means by the term sulṭān, whether the Imam or any dominant power. And again we see that the 
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204 It is very probable the term has general meaning, i.e., sovereignty. Thus McDermott’s definition 
of the term as ‘the de facto holder of power’ (Theology, p. 279) seems reasonable.   
205 Mufīd, Al-Muqni'ah, 809-810. 
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one responsible for commanding good and forbidding evil through force is not the jurist – except, 
of course, like others in his capacity as an ordinary Muslim, where there is no fear of harm. Even 
if one assumes that by sulṭān of the time Mufīd means the Shiite Imam, we cannot consequently 
infer that this becomes the jurist during the Occultation.  
Deputyship and religious taxes 
 
 Religious taxes, especially the khums or one-fifth tax, have a significant place in Shiism. 
During the Occultation, it fell to the scholars not only to interpret the texts concerning religious 
taxes, but also, for the most part, to practically manage them.206  
One cannot, however, infer that it was intended that the jurists be heads of state simply 
because they received these taxes. Mufīd affirms that the alms-tax (zakāt) must be given over to 
the jurists, but not because of political leadership. He says that the alms first go to the Prophet; 
then to his successor, the Imam; and then in the absence of the Imam to his appointed delegates 
(sufarā’, i.e., the Imam’s representatives during the Minor Occultation); and finally to 
trustworthy Shiite jurists when there is no such delegate. Certainly Mufīd views the jurists as a 
distinct group placed over others in the Shiite community; but this special position comes not 
from Deputyship, but knowledge, as he says that the tax should be given to the jurists since they 
“know better than others where to spend zakāt”.207  
Based on statements from Mufīd and later scholars, Bayhom-Daou concludes that early 
Shiite jurists regarded themselves as the representatives of tax donors, rather than of the Imam.208 
I have already established that the jurists were not the Imam’s delegates in the management of 
khums; I must add that the notion that they were deputized by donors of zakāt is also not 
supported by available evidence. I repeat: Mufīd makes payment of zakāt to the jurists mandatory 
not on the basis of any delegated power, whether from the Imam or those paying tax, but for the 
simple reason that they know best how to spend it. They do not have a formal position or 
function, but merely, in effect, provide a service. 
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207 Mufīd, Al-Muqniʻah, 252.  
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Mufīd defines khums as an obligatory (wājib) tax, levied on all types of properties and 
incomes accruing to Shiites, whether through ordinary economic efforts or military action.209 The 
way the khums was to be collected and distributed deserves our attention, since this speaks to the 
jurists’ authority and helps us to know if such functions were part of a Deputyship. Mufīd 
mentions several approaches to administration of khums in the absence of the Imam. These are: 
either discontinuing it, since the Imam is not present, distributing it among descendants of the 
Prophet and also poor Shiites in general; burying it so that it can be given to the Imam when he 
returns;210 keeping it aside to be delivered to the Imam upon his return; and finally, as in the 
present dominant legal view, dividing it into two shares, one of which is to go to the Imam and 
the other to the needy among the Prophet’s offspring.211 Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī (d. 598/1202) cites a 
ruling of Mufīd that shows that he favoured the last approach. According to Ibn Idrīs, Mufīd 
replied to a community member asking about whom he should deliver his khums to that it should 
be divided into two portions, half for the needy among Muḥammad ’s descendants (specifically, 
orphans, the poor, and needy travelers), and half for the Imam. The donor according to Mufīd is 
responsible for delivering the first portion and also for giving the Imam’s share to the Imam 
himself, if he is able to reach him. If the Imam is not to be found, the donor should ask a 
trustworthy person to deliver the tax to the Imam on his behalf.212 Thus according to both 
Mufīd’s Muqniʻah and Ibn Idrīs’s Kitāb al-sarāʼir, Shiite authorities do not play a role in 
managing the khums. Payment and delivery of the tax is the duty of the donor.  
In Mufīd’s account, nevertheless, a Shiite working for a non-Shiite governmental system 
may collect khums. He considers this function one of the conditions of working for a non-Shiite 
ruler, as he says: 
 
One who is appointed by iniquitous (fāsiq) persons [i.e., rulers] for administering 
societies and territories must help and protect the Shiites and pay khums on all 
                                                 
209 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 276. 
210 Burying is justified on the basis of a tradition saying that the earth will display its treasures when 
Mahdī returns. See, Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 285-286. 
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properties and booty he gains through his governorship . Otherwise, his working for 
that non-Shiite ruler is not permissible.213  
 
This case is discussed in detail below. Let us think here about who the “one appointed” 
might be. There are two possibilities: the appointee is either a jurist, or an amīr, a commander. 
Appointing a jurist for non-judicial positions was not current practice in the period we are talking 
about, so that is unlikely, leading us to conclude that the appointee being discussed is in reality 
an amīr. In what capacity did this personality pay his taxes? Here again there are two 
possibilities. One may say that the donor is the person in authority himself, that is, he is to pay 
khums from his own income earned from working as the agent of the state.214 It is more logical, 
however, to imagine the donor of khums not as real person but rather a legal one. What is meant 
is that that, as in early Islam, the person in authority is obliged to collect khums from his subjects 
(whether Shiite or Sunnite) and send it to the seat of the caliphate. Otherwise, the statement is 
redundant, since all Shiites in their personal capacity have to pay their khums. Thus we may 
conclude that gathering and distributing khums here is the responsibility not of someone 
functioning as a jurist, but a political authority. The personality concerned may indeed be a jurist, 
but his work for the ruler is nevertheless in the capacity of an amīr.  
It is good to recall here that Mufīd, as I have shown, also does not say that zakat, the 
other religious tax in addition to khums, is to be managed by the jurists as part of their 
Deputyship. He states that zakāt must be paid to the trustworthy jurists (al-fuqahā’ al-
ma’mūnūn), but only says, as I mentioned, that this is to be done because the jurists know better 
how to spend it.  
Mufīd also briefly discusses the land tax (kharāj). The whole discussion is related to the 
period of the Imams’ presence during which they are the religio-political leaders of the 
community. Kharāj according to Mufīd is of several kinds. While the cultivated lands of those 
who accepted Islam voluntarily belong to the original owners, uncultivated lands are public 
property, to be given by the Imam to persons willing to cultivate them and return one tenth or 
one-twentieth of the income to the Imam. Land conquered by force belongs to the Muslims in 
general, and those who contract with the Imam to develop it give the Imam half, two thirds or 
                                                 
213 Mufīd, al-Muqni'ah, 811-812. 
214 Muntaẓirī, Mabānī-i fiqhī, 34. 
91 
 
one third of the produce. Non-Muslims who submit to the Imam keep their land and pay the poll-
tax (jizyah), to be specified by the Imam. According to Mufīd, lands gifted to the Imam or lands 
from which the inhabitants have fled belong absolutely to the person of the Imam.215 Mufīd 
draws on ‘Alī’s example to show show how kharāj should be managed. Despite this detailed 
account of what should theoretically happen during the time the Imams are present, Mufīd is 
completely silent about kharāj during the Occultation and possible role of the ‘ulamāʼ. Clearly in 
this as in the previous cases, religious taxes were not part of juristic authority derived from 
Deputyship.  
The jurist as a charismatic figure 
 
Like other Shiite great scholars before and after him, Mufīd was a charismatic leader. The 
sources of charisma for such leaders are quite similar. To understand those sources, it is 
necessary to understand the charisma of the Imam himself from Mufīd’s perspective. I will 
review that briefly here, having already addressed the topic in Chapter One.  
Mufīd describes the Imams as the successors to the prophets [sic] for enforcing 
judgments, executing penalties, safeguarding the law, and educating humankind. Like the 
prophets, they are infallible; they do not commit even venial sins and are protected from error 
when teaching and issuing rulings.216 Mufīd allows that knowing all arts and languages, though 
not “necessary”, may be part of the Imams’ supernatural characteristics, although he does not go 
so far as to agree with the so-called Exaggerators (Ghulāt) that they know the Unseen (ghayb). 
He does hold that the Imams had the ability to see into the future. For him, that knowledge is also 
not a necessary attribute or a condition for their Imamate. Rather, such knowledge is granted: 
 
because God honored them and gave them that knowledge as a help [to the people] 
for obeying them and adhering to their imamate. [We know] they must have had that 
not by rational necessity, but because of revelation. As for asserting of them 
absolutely that they knew the unseen (al-ghaib), that is an obvious error. No one 
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deserves that qualification except Him who knows things by Himself, not by a 
knowledge bestowed upon Him. That is God alone.217 
 
The Imams, according to Mufīd, work miracles; although, again, this is not made necessary by 
reason but established by “mutually confirmatory and widespread traditions”.218  
Possession of such attributes by the Imams show that the chief sources of their charisma 
are blood and knowledge. And of course, recognition of the Imam by the Prophet or preceding 
Imam is also necessary. None of these characteristics is acquired. The supernatural abilities 
discussed by Mufīd are God-given and received through the blood, generation to generation. The 
Imams’ personal charisma, in contrast, consists of acquired characteristics such as bravery, 
resistance against injustice, and so on. Although theologically conferred, received elements take 
first place, personal, acquired charisma is certainly significant. It shows us that the theologians 
regarded the Imams as both supernatural and worldly figures. In one statement, Mufīd actually 
makes the distinction between divine favor and personal merit: he describes the Imamate as a 
favor from God (tafaḍḍul, luṭf) given to one whose characteristics He knows, but who also 
himself deserves honor, respect and obedience because of his determination to perform the duties 
God imposes on him.219 Though Mufīd’s view is not, as he claims, generally accepted, it is 
valuable data, as it affords a better understanding of the Imams’ charisma and consequently that 
of Shiite religious authorities during the Occultation.  
Having addressed the charisma of the Imam, we may turn to the Shiite jurists, the 
fuqahā’, whose charisma springs from that of the Imam. The jurists are followed because they 
are perceived to be the delegates - a term I will use here instead of Deputy, since Mufīd does not 
actually speak of a nā’ib - of the Imam. As we shall see, the delegates have accumulated 
authority over time, beginning with judgeship and culminating in the Imam-like sovereign faqīh 
of our times. Who are the delegates, according to Mufīd? What characteristics do they have? Are 
they infallible, like the Imams? How are they appointed? Mufīd briefly addresses the delegates in 
his Awāʼil al-maqālāt, although without identifying them:  
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The infallibility of the Imams’ wulāt (pl. of wālī) is not necessary (wājib), but what is 
necessary is knowledge of that over which they have authority and superiority over 
those subject to them, since it is impossible that those who are inferior command 
those who are superior [in terms of knowledge: li-istiḥālat riʼāsat al-mafḍūl ʻalā al-
fādil]. In addition, it is not necessary to believe that the wulāt are designated in 
advance by formal appointment, for example through a text (naṣṣ). They are 
appointed by choice of the infallible Imam.220 
 
We may infer from Mufīd’s text here that the charisma of the religious authorities 
basically has three elements during the Imam’s absence. It can be seen that each of these 
elements is parallel to a source of charisma in the Imam, from whom they ultimately receive 
them. First, the religious leaders, the jurists, possess the Imam’s knowledge, in the sense that 
they have studied and acquired knowledge of the sayings of the Imams. Second, they are 
appointed by the Imams (remembering that each of the Imams was appointed by the one before), 
by virtue of certain traditions and doctrines. And third, they have certain personal characteristics. 
The first two are possessed in similar forms by every well-educated jurist, while the third one is 
personal and differs from one jurist to another.  
Note that juristic charisma is not, however, at this point political. Mufīd does not consider 
the competence of the jurists to include politics, and the real-world situation also required that 
they keep their distance from politics. Restricting the scope of Deputyship, i.e., of powers 
delegated by the Imam, allowed the Shiite jurists to avoid being involved in the social and 
political expectations of their followers. Most jurists lacked political charisma because of their 
actual situation and activities. The few functions they fulfilled when in the employ of a ruler, 
such as judgeship and collecting of taxes, were not conducive to charisma. They were not in any 
way revolutionaries; they worked for establishment, not re-establishment, and were open to 
serving so-called “unjust” rulers. They certainly did not hold political office, where charisma 
might have been gained.  
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Mufīd, for instance, was not even a judge, but a very popular and leading figure in the 
Shiite community. It is not clear if Shiites had any expectations from their religious leaders while 
the community, as a minority sect, was under political and religious pressure. The leaders 
themselves were reluctant to act politically. Working as a judge under restrictions from a non-
Shiite ruler certainly encouraged quietism. In Mufīd’s time, there were incidents of religious 
conflict and violence, leading at one point to his exile by the Buyids from Baghdad. There is no 
evidence, however, to support the idea that he mobilized the community for political purposes. 
Nor was Mufīd the only Shiite religious authority whose political charisma remained dormant, 
for the same may be said of his students, al-Murtaḍā and al-Ṭūsī, who were both outstanding 
community leaders. In fact, al-Murtaḍā and Ṭūsī both maintained good relations with the 
Abbasid caliphs and worked as functionaries for them.  
Moreover, in the first moment of niyābah, the Shiite jurists did not dare to produce 
writings and doctrine on the basis of which the dominant Sunnite power might have been 
challenged or which would provide support for the Shiite amīrs who were looking to establish 
Shiite systems. This is in contrast to the activity in the second moment of niyābah of al-Shahīd 
al-Awwal (d. 786/1385), who composed his famous Kitāb al-lumʻah for the Sarbadārān of 
Khorasan, and Karakī, who worked for the Safavids. Thus in conclusion, the jurists in the first 
moment enjoyed office charisma derived from the Imam due to their scholarly activities, along 
with a measure of personal charisma springing from the general admiration of their followers. 
They did not derive charisma from a political stance or political activities.  
Deputyship from an unjust ruler is deputyship from the Imam 
 
The relationship of jurists with a non-Shiite political system deemed “unjust” has long 
been debated in Shiism. The root idea behind the problem is that sovereignty always belongs to 
God, the Prophet, and the Imams. Thus Shiites tried, both in theory and practice, to distance 
themselves from non-Shiite rulers and political systems. Reality, however, necessitated relations 
of some kind, giving rise to the intellectual problem of legitimating cooperation with an 
illegitimate state.  
Shiite treatment of the problem differed widely, ranging from prohibition on any type of 
collaboration with an unjust State (including a Shiite one), to permission for some degree of 
contact, to making it obligatory. Mufīd has his own view. He not only permits working for and 
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being delegated by a non-Shiite government, but also in some circumstances deems cooperation 
necessary. He brings up the issue both in relation to law and politics (imārah). His judicial views 
are discussed above in connection with judgeship. His approach to politics is as follows: 
 
And the Imamī who commands the people and has been appointed outwardly (zahir) 
by an unjust ruler to work for him is in reality (haqiqah) amir on behalf of the Imam, 
and not on behalf of the ruler of “the people of darkness”, because he has been 
permitted by the Imam.221  
  
Mufīd touches briefly on forms of cooperation with “unjust” political systems in his 
theological work Awāʼil. For Mufīd, lending aid to the unjust system in the right instance is 
permissible and sometimes obligatory; although it is not permitted if one willingly or deliberately 
assists in oppression and aggression.222 Such cooperation, however, is allowed only with the 
permission of the “Imam of the time”, and under certain conditions such as helping the Shiite 
community, judging according to Shiite law, and so on.223 Now, since cooperation with an unjust 
ruler is legitimated by the Imam, the authority of a Shiite scholar or jurist working for a ruler is 
as authentic as the authority of those who are appointed by the Imam to work in the Shiite 
community. Both, in effect, are appointed by the Imam. It is, however, necessary to keep in mind 
that the jurists working in the community function only as judges or persons performing religious 
rituals. They are not given political duties and do not lead the community in non-religious affairs.  
As mentioned above, textual and historical evidence tells us that Mufīd also envisioned 
non-jurists holding office. As for textual evidence, Mufīd uses the phrase tadbīr al-ʻibād wa-al-
bilād (administration of people and territories),224 a clear reference to administrative and political 
positions. The holders of such positions were not Shiite scholars. That is to say, they were not 
Shiite scholars if the reference to “administration of peoples and territories” refers to those 
functions over the Shiite community. If what is referred to is administration over all the Muslims 
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as a functionary of a Sunnite ruler, the office-holder could be a jurist. The matter is complicated 
by the equivocality of words and terms in Mufīd’s time, when specialized technical vocabulary 
was not much developed in Shiite or, for that matter, Sunnite legal literature. We do, in any case, 
have historical evidence: we know that in Mufīd’s time, two groups of Shiites worked for the 
Abbasid caliphs, those being the jurists and the amīrs.  
Having established that the office holders Mufīd talks about include jurists and non-
jurists, we must ask how in his view the Imam would give permission for the latter. It will be 
useful here to examine al-Murtaḍā’s approach toward the same issue. As we have seen, al-Sharīf 
al-Murtaḍā was the leading figure in the Shiite community in his time and an outstanding pupil 
of Mufīd, who worked, like his father and elder brother before him, for the Abbasid caliph as 
judge and naqīb (head of the corporation of descendants of the Prophet). Kazemi demonstrates 
that two other Shiite jurists, Abū al-Fatḥ al-Karājakī and Ibn al-Barrāj (al-Murtaḍā’s students) 
also worked as judges for Sunnite governments, so this was not an unusual situation.225 Al-
Murtaḍā, in fact, wrote a treatise on the subject, entitled On Working for the Government,226 two 
years after his teacher’s death.  
It is evident from comparing the views of Mufīd and al-Murtaḍā that their basic idea is 
similar: working for an illegitimate rulership is permissibile and even obligatory, with the 
permission of the Imam. Al-Murtaḍā, however, argues the issue more fully. He categorizes the 
ruler (and consequently, rulership) into two kinds: legitimate and just (muḥiqq ʻādil) or 
illegitimate, unjust and usurpatory (mubṭil, ẓālim, mutaghallib).227 For al-Murtaḍā, working for a 
just ruler is permissible and even obligatory (wājib) in some cases, such as when it would be in 
the interests of the Shiite community, and is thus beyond question. Working for an illegitimate or 
unjust ruler, however, may be obligatory, permissible, an object of caution (mahdhūr) evil 
(qabīḥ), or forbidden, Holding office on behalf of a ruler who is a usurper is obligatory when the 
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office holder either knows or strongly supposes (ẓann) that he will be capable of upholding the 
right (iqāmat al-ḥaqq), rejecting falsehood, ordering good and forbidding evil. It is permissible 
when the jurist fears for his personal wealth if he rejects the position. It is an object of caution if 
one is forced to accept the office and believes he will be killed if he does not accept. It will, on 
the other hand, be evil to accept the office if holding it is a cause of evil or the office-holder uses 
his office for his own worldly interests. Accepting the appointment is, exactly as Mufīd says, 
forbidden if it involves assisting an unjust ruler to disobey God.228  
 As a rationalist, al-Murtaḍā cites both rational and legal (sharʻī and ʻaqlī) proofs for his 
position.229 For instance, he cites ‘Alī’s caliphate as an example of being accepted by an unjust 
group (i.e., the various factions and persons who were in his favour following the murder of 
‘Uthmān), adding that there are other many cases in which scholars and pious men have accepted 
positions under an illegitimate ruler. The rational justification, which appears to be more 
important for al-Murtaḍā’s argument than the legal proof, concerns the interests Shiites derive 
from having one of their own in office.  
Thus we see that in the view of Mufīd as well as his students, jurists can work for so-
called “unjust” rulers, since they have been given permission to do so by the Imam. The jurist 
holding such position does not, however, work for the unjust ruler in his capacity as a Shiite 
jurist, but only as a functionary (whether as an amīr, or as a judge among Sunnites alone, since it 
is forbidden for Shiites to refer to an unjust power for judgement so that Shiites seeking 
judgement could refer to that jurist only privately). He does not have political power in his 
capacity as a Shiite jurist, even if he is encouraged to use his position to the advantage of the 
community.  We must conclude that Mufīd’s theory of deputyship is apolitical despite the 
permission to work for unjust rulers, since the jurists are not political figures in their own right.  
Analysis and conclusion 
 
In the first moment of Deputyship, the doctrine is clearly apolitical. Mufīd leaves no 
doubt that Shiite jurists are delegated by the Imam to judge and to execute the Quranic 
punishments, but Deputyship does not extend beyond that. This very limited construction reflects 
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the political circumstances of the Shiite community in Mufīd’s time. The Shiites were living as a 
minority under the Sunnite Abbasids, even though the Buwayhids and Twelver Shiite Hamdanids 
had gained power as well. In addition to political limitation, Deputyship was subject to 
theoretical limitation resulting from a conviction that any worldly power other than that of the 
Imams was illegitimate and that the Hidden Imam would return soon in any case. Due to these 
limitations, the jurists, though they were supposedly delegates of the Imam, were reluctant to 
play a political role even in religious duties.   
Even though Mufīd says that the Friday congregational prayer is obligatory, he does not 
include it among the various prayers led by the Shiite jurists. He does not say why this is so, but 
one can infer that a specific ground or qualification of the jurist for holding the Friday prayer is 
absent, though present for the other prayers. If we look at the history of the Friday prayer, it is 
clear that the leader of this prayer has had a relationship with political power.230 The Prophet 
Muḥammad instituted Friday prayers in Medina when he first gained political power, and holders 
or representatives of power among the first four caliphs, Umayyads, and Abbasids also used to 
lead the prayer. The Imams are both the religious and political leaders of the Shiites, even if they 
could not, with the exception of ‘Alī, actually exercise political power. Thus it is possible that 
Mufīd does not consider that leadership of the Friday prayer falls to the Shiite jurists because, for 
him, they are not politically the delegates of the Imam.231 
As for the khums, Mufīd, as explained above, believes that leading Shiites, whether jurists 
or not, who work for unjust rulers are to collect the khums tax. Let us now ask why that right or 
obligation falls to those persons and who distributes the funds. For Mufīd, the khums is divided 
into two parts: one belonging to the Imam, and the other reserved for needy descendants of the 
Prophet. Taxpayers are allowed to distribute the funds in person to the needy, but Mufīd does not 
tell us how the Imam’s share is to be delivered. It seems that in his view, no one has the right to 
spend the share of the political and religious leader of the community, the Imam. Nevertheless, 
Mufīd makes it clear that a Shiite figure functioning in the non-Shiite system must collect the 
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khums. Such a person has no more privileges than his counterpart within the Shiite community, 
except for his connection to the dominant political power. Even in the case of the jurist with 
connections to political power, Mufīd does not give any information about the agent who 
manages the tax; he does not make it clear if he collects khums for himself to manage it, for 
another jurist, or even for the state. He also does not explain if the agent is to spend the Imam’s 
share, bury it, or hand it over to a trustworthy person to give it to the Imam whenever he appears.  
As in the case of Friday prayer, it is probable that Mufīd refrains from addressing these details 
because of the connection between tax collection and political power. If tax collection were part 
of the jurists’ duties, Mufīd would have addressed the topic of jurists not possessing political 
power gathering the khums from their brethren. It is therefore actually not important if the Shiite 
figure holding office on behalf of the illegitimate ruler is a jurist, amīr, or some other figure. The 
significant point is that the collection and administration of khums is not part of delegation 
(Deputyship) at this time. Delegation is limited to judgeship, while khums is not a juristic 
function.  
Jihad presents a parallel case. Mufīd includes jihad among the tasks of a Shiite jurist 
functioning within a non-Shiite judicial system, but he does not mention it when discussing the 
tasks of judges not possessing political power and working within the Shiite community.  
Commanding good and forbidding evil is another parallel case. The Shiite jurists do not 
have the power to command good and forbid evil with force because they do not have any 
political power. Their responsibility in commanding good and forbidding evil is just the same as 
that of other Muslims. From the point of view of religious expertise they would have been the 
most appropriate persons to engage in that duty; but, first, they did not possess power, which is 
“a requirement in the fulfillment of this crucial obligation in the public interest”,232 and second, 
the obligation itself is not incumbent on every individual.  
Mufīd discussed the cooperation of Shiite scholars with unjust rulers in response to 
practical and theoretical limitations faced by Shiism. He looks for ways right might co-exist with 
wrong. To treat this problem, he takes both a macro- and micro-analytical view. On the macro 
level, seen in his theological works, he looks at the Sunnite system overall and condemns it not 
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only as unjust and false, but non-salvific.233 In the Awāʼil, for instance, he divides the Abodes 
(dār) into three: dār al-ḥarb (Abode of War), Abode of dār al-Islām (Abode of Islam), and dār 
al-īmān (Abode of True Belief).234 As Lambton writes, dār al- īmān “comprised those places in 
which the true faith, i.e., Ithnā ʻAsharī Shi'ism, prevailed, whereas the dār al-islām consisted of 
those places where Islam other than Ithnā ‘Asharī Shiism was followed.”235 In his juridical work, 
on the other hand, Mufīd works at the micro level where right can potentially co-exist with 
wrong. From a micro perspective, the non-Shiite political system, while not pure overall, 
represents a combination of aggression and justice, giving Shiite scholars the opportunity to 
choose just aspects and leave the wrong aside in assisting their community.  
How is justice to be distinguished from injustice? As I have explained, it is necessary to 
distinguish between two types of agents undertaking responsibilities in the so-called unjust 
system, the jurists (fuqahā’) and amirs (umarā’). Mufīd, it seems, left it to the jurists themselves 
to distinguish justice from injustice. The criteria for doing so are related to Shiism, since Shiism 
itself is considered to be “right” (ḥaqq). The most important criteria are the ability to judge in 
accord with Shiite law, looking out for the interests of the community, and preventing the 
shedding of Shiite blood.236 A jurist acting in the capacity of an amir applies the same criteria. 
Mufīd is silent, however, about the case of an amir who is not also a jurist.  
Why did Mufīd take the trouble to formulate such elaborate justifications for working for 
an unjust ruler? The answer is found in the nature of delegation as perceived in that period. 
Delegation in the first moment is limited to the law, without venturing into politics or military 
affairs. This very limited notion left the Shiites struggling with their political defeat. Living 
without any political power whatsoever was difficult and harmful. The only way out of this 
dilemma was to find a way to politically reconcile with the dominant system, which was done by 
Mufīd under the rubric of “working for the sulṭān”. This solution as detailed by Mufīd secured 
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the Shiites’ interests from one side, and avoided contradicting Shiite theology and the Shiite 
worldview on the other. Mufīd’s theory of “working for the sulṭān” does not represent 
accommodation, as some have asserted, but the opposite: the least compromise with politics 
possible, carefully fenced in by theory.  
As we have seen, a Shiite holder of office on behalf of an illegitimate ruler could be 
either a jurist or amīr. Though there were no Shiite amīrs after the Abbasid dynasty was 
extinguished, the Shiite Buyids and Hamdanids were contemporary with Mufīd. One would think 
that Mufīd would be interested in the sovereignty of such amīrs since for him, the jurist holding 
office on behalf of an unjust ruler is a step toward enforcing the ordinances of Shiite law. He asks 
the community to follow and support the office holder in order to enhance his legitimacy. Al-
Murtaḍā is very clearly interested in power. He says that without power, the obligatory 
enforcement of Shariah —for instance, enjoining good and forbidding evil – is not possible. 
Power, according to al-Murtaḍā, is consequently obligatory (wājib) because it is the means or is 
the premise of enforcement of Shariah.237  
Nonetheless, neither Mufīd nor al-Murtaḍā talks of building a Shiite sovereign power led 
by Shiites, whether jurists or amīrs. They did not regard the Buyids or Hamdanids as constituting 
such a power, since their legitimacy was derived from the Abbasid caliphs. The term “just 
sulṭān”, with whom cooperation is permissible or obligatory according to Mufīd and al-
Murtaḍā,238 means the Imam and no one else; it refers neither to the jurists nor the Shiite amīrs, 
because the amīrs working for the Abbasids were neither appointed by the Imam in person nor 
delegated through his decree. And the jurists, as I have said several times, were not the just 
sulṭān because the authority granted to them was limited to judgeship, so that they could not be 
heads of state.  
Thus it appears that the idea of working for an unjust ruler formulated by Mufīd and 
further developed by his student al-Murtaḍā is a response to severe limitations on delegation or 
Deputyship in its first phase. The goal was to prevent the ordinances of the Shariah (in the Shiite 
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version, of course) from being suspended. Because of the importance of this goal, the case of the 
unjust ruler would continue to be discussed after Mufīd and was followed in practice by many 
others. The idea of working for an unjust ruler has had a profound and lasting influence on Shiite 
thought, for it raised this question in the minds of the jurists: If working with a Sunnite sulṭān can 
be in the interests of Shiism and permitted by the Imam, might perhaps cooperating with a Shiite 
sulṭān or even establishing a jurist-run state be the best choice?   
In conclusion: Twelver Shiites between the 4th and 5th/ 11th and 12th centuries constituted 
a mostly apolitical community living under Abbasid rule. Some Shiite amīrs gained political and 
military power, but they were formally in the service of the Abbasids. The Twelver Shiite 
religious authorities remained out of the political structure, occupying themselves instead with 
teaching and writing. It should be remembered, however, that the Imamate itself was not 
apolitical. This is why Mufīd uses the term sulṭān al-Islām to describe the Imam. He is indeed the 
sulṭān, the sovereign power, with his sovereignty coming from none other than God.  
The Shiite jurists are in turn the sulṭān of Islam appointed by the Imam. Nevertheless, 
their sultanate is not equal to that of the Imam. The Imam excludes the jurists from being on the 
same level of authority with him, as they are granted only the authority to judge on his behalf as 
the sovereign. In other words, delegation in Mufīd’s formulation is apolitical. Despite the 
(theoretical) political authority of the Imam, it is clearly and explicitly limited to judgeship. That 
very limited delegation, furthermore, is conditional, as it depends on the jurist’s safety from 
potential harm from non-Shiite groups and powers.  
This explains why the jurists do not, in the view of Shaykh Mufīd, play many roles during 
the absence of the Imam. Their chief duties are purely religious, such as interpretation of the 
texts and teaching or preaching; and they are, like other members of the community, not 
permitted to enjoin good and forbid evil through force. The management of khums is not in the 
hands of the jurists in Mufīd’s view, a very great difference from the third moment of niyābah 
when it is understood by some to be a state tax needing to be administrated by an Islamic 
government. Mufīd’s full opinion on the Friday congregational prayer, which is also 
conventionally linked to politics, remains unclear. What is evident at least is that delegacy in his 
view does not include leadership of the Friday prayer; although he does not say why he excludes 
that prayer from the list of those that can be led by the jurists.  
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In the first moment of niyābah, the religious leaders of the Shiite community, i.e., the 
jurists, possess charisma, but not political charisma. The sources of their charisma are 
knowledge, their appointment by the Imams through certain traditions and doctrines, and their 
personal characteristics. The first two are found in every well-educated jurist, while the third 
differs from one to the other. It is not clear if the Shiites expected their religious leaders to be 
politically active, but the leaders themselves were certainly reluctant to play that role. Leading 
figures did have the ability to mobilize people, gather a following, and construct a political 
charisma, but they chose not to. This is in stark contrast to the third moment.  
Mufīd’s interpretation of niyābah has had two contradictory results in Shiite thought. On 
the one hand, he provided a privatized, apolitical interpretation of Shiism and consequently 
Deputyship, an interpretation that lasted a very long time. His influence has been tremendous. He 
focused on private affairs such as prayers, fasting, alms, and commercial law, while refraining 
from addressing public matters such as the state, army and so on. As a consequence, the Shiite 
‘ulamāʼ neither theorized nor claimed political authority through Deputyship in the early 
centuries of the Greater Occultation. On the other hand, Mufīd’s thought also opened the way for 
a political interpretation of Deputyship many centuries later. He justified working for a non-
Shiite political system using an atomistic approach, making it equivalent, when the terms were 
fulfilled, to working for the Imam himself. When the jurists found themselves in a better, less 
politically constricted situation, his formulation opened the way to them considering 
collaboration with a non-Shiite system or even establishing a state themselves. After Mufīd, 
many prominent figures such as al-Murtaḍā, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, ʻAllāmah Ḥillī, and Karakī and 
others under the Safavids associated with the state, both recognizing state authority and 
cooperating with it. Those who refused the idea that one can work with an “unjust” ruler 
belonged mostly to the quietist stream of the tradition, save some in modern Iran such as 
Khomeini who rejected working with those in power in order to establish a state themselves. 
Even Khomeini’s arguments for establishing an Islamic state are quite similar to those of Mufīd 
justifying working for an oppressive ruler. In Khomeini’s view, an Islamic state is needed for 
religious laws to be enforced and Muslim interests to be secured, while for Mufīd, the same 
considerations permit the jurists to collaborate with those he considers to be “oppressors”. What 
made figures subsequent to Mufīd, including Khomeini, different from him was the different 
contexts in which they lived, as we shall see in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Three: Karakī and niyābah: The 
dilemma of two sultans  
ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Karakī (d. 940/1533) played a key role in developing the doctrine of 
niyābah. We have seen that in the first phase or “moment” of niyābah, Deputyship was confined 
to judgeship and carrying out, in the very limited circumstances possible, of Quranic 
punishments. Karakī expanded Deputyship to the Friday congregational prayer and land tax 
(kharāj). He also left an indirect legacy in a line of strong religious leaders appearing after him 
during the Safavid and Qājār periods who continued to develop the doctrine of Deputyship. 
Karakī’s theory and practice mark a turning point in the relations of Shiite scholars with 
governmental power.  
The social and political environment in which Karakī acted was very different from that 
of Mufīd. Karakī’s re-definition of legal and political issues should be viewed in the context of 
his life and political developments in Iran. For instance, he keenly felt the pressure of Sunnism. 
Having experienced Ottoman enmity in his native Syria, he was imprisoned by the Ottoman 
governor of Baghdad, being freed only when Shah Ismā‘īl Ӏ captured the city in 1508. The 
Safavids whom Karakī served had established a political regime resting on a new Shiite ideology, 
and Karakī was given the opportunity to renovate aspects of Shiism to enhance that ideology.  
The Safavids recruited Karakī and gave him a high position in the Safavid religious 
corporation in order to ensure the stability of their power. Karakī’s own project was to draw on 
the legacy of Shiite learning and use the favourable conditions in which he found himself to look 
to the future of Shiism and the Shiite ‘ulamāʼ. This is not to say that he had a clear road in front 
of him, for even the issue of working for an unjust sulṭān was still subject to debate. Having 
gained power through his high position in the Safavid system, Karakī took two important 
measures not available to his predecessors. First, he expanded treatment of the political and 
social aspects of Shiite law in his writings.239 And second, he encouraged the Safavids to enforce 
Shiite law.  
Much more has been written on Karakī’s thought and environment than on the first 
moment of Deputyship, or more precisely, on Mufīd. Secondary sources, including in Western 
                                                 
239 See Gurjī, Tārīkh, 227, 233. 
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languages, treat his biography, legal scholarship, and Safavid institutions. Readers may refer for 
these to the bibliography. Karakī’s role in developing the concept of niyābah, however, has 
received almost no attention. The subject is discussed here under the headings of Friday prayer, 
judgeship, association with political powers, jihad, the principle of enjoining good and forbidding 
evil, and the khums, alms (zakāt), and land taxes. It should be noted that each of these subjects is 
addressed chiefly in connection with the issue of niyābah and juristic authority. The 
overwhelmingly private and non-political nature of Shiite law is still very much in evidence in 
Karakī’s writings.   
Life and times 
 
ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn ibn ʻAbd al-ʻĀlī Karakī, known as al-Muhạqqiq al-Thānī or “The 
Second Investigator” (the “First Investigator” being the famous 13th-century scholar al-Muhạqqiq 
al-Hịllī) was born in 870/1465, or according to one report, 868, in Karak Nūḥ in present-day 
South Lebanon. He was called by some Sunnites, not in a favourable sense, “The Creator of 
Shiism (Mukhtariʻ al-Shīʻah).240 Apart from his birthplace, Karakī studied in Damascus, Mecca, 
Jerusalem, and Cairo, finally settling in the important shrine town of Najaf, Iraq.241 Having 
received an invitation from the founder of the Safavid dynasty Shāh Ismāʻīl Ӏ, Karakī migrated to 
Iran in 916/1511, dwelling there for some time before returning to Iraq, and then coming back to 
Iran in 936/1530 during the rule of Shāh Ṭahmasp.  
Upon Shah Ṭahmāsp’s ascent to the throne, Karakī was given the unofficial title “deputy 
of the Imam” (nā’ib al-Imām). He was later installed in an official position as the Shaykh al-
Islam of the Safavid court.242 Karakī’s accomplishments were numerous. He appointed clerics in 
the various towns to teach the common people their religious duties and went on to found a 
number of seminaries. He shifted the direction of the qiblah in many areas in Iran to conform to 
                                                 
240 Hạsan Rūmlū, Kitāb-i ahṣan al-tavārīkh, tr. and ed. ʻAbd al-Ḥusayn Nawāīī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 
Asāṭīr, 1384/2005),1223-24; Muhạmmad Bāqir ibn Muhạmmad Taqī Majlisī, Bihạ̄r al-anwār, vol. 1 
(Beirut: Muʼassasat al-Wafāʼ, 1403/1983), 21; Muḥammad Bāqir al-Mūsavī al-Khwānsārī al-Iṣfahānī,  
Rawdạ̄t al-jannāt fī ahẉāl al-ʻulamāʼ wa-al-sādāt, vol. 4 (Beirut: Dār al-Islāmīyah, 1411/1991), 348.   
241 Muhạmmad Hạssūn, Ḥayāt al-Muhạqqiq Karakī wa-āthāruhu, vol. 2 ([Tehran]: Ihṭijāj, 1423 
[2002 or 2003]), 7-8. 
242 Hạssūn, Ḥayāt, 59-60. Ḥassūn states that Karakī went to Iran for the first time  no sooner than in 
916, and that it was in 936 that he returned (ibid, 86-87).  
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the Shiite instead of Sunnite calculation.243 Karakī also took on his shoulders the training of 
senior governmental personnel. The modern editor of Karakī’s Epistles deems him the “cause” 
and “renovator” of Shiism in Iran and founder of Shariah law for the Safavid state.244  
As a scholar in the circle of Shāh Ṭahmāsp, Karakī was granted the authority to control 
state affairs. According to the great 18th-century Akhbari scholar Baḥrānī, who describes Karakī 
as a “pure, excellent Uṣūlī and mujtahid”, Shah Ṭahmāsp had everyone under his rule obey 
Karakī because, it was declared, he was the real king and the deputy of the Imam. Consequently, 
Karakī wrote to Safavid territories ordering them to collect the land tax (kharāj).245 Al-Muhạqqiq 
al-Thānī ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Karakī died in 940/1534246 in Najaf, Iraq, leaving approximately 
sixty works including treatises, responsa, and various commentaries.247 His chief works are the 
legal compendium Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid, dedicated to Shah Ṭahmāsp, and his Rasāʼil (Epistles), also 
mostly addressing legal issues.  
The secondary literature acknowledges Karakī’s significance in relation to the Safavids 
and his lasting influence on Shiite thought. In distinguishing generations of Arab scholars 
established in Iran according to their home regions, Arjomand remarks that immigrants from 
Jabal ʻĀmil were predominant in the first one hundred and forty years of Safavid rule. Hourani 
argues that Karakī was the most influential of these, as his views were taken up by his scholarly 
descendants, students, and other ‘ulamāʼ in the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries.248 
According to Hourani, the Safavids felt compelled to recruit religious scholars from outside Iran 
partly because they did not have sufficient personnel themselves. The most significant factor in 
                                                 
243 Yūsuf ibn Aḥmad al- Bahṛānī, Luʼluʼāt al-Baḥrayn fī al-ijāzāt wa-tarājim rijāl al-hạdīth, ed. Muhạmmad Sạ̄diq 
Bahṛ al-ʻUlūm (Manamah [Bahrain]: Fakhrawi Book Shop, 1429/2008), 148. 
244 Muhammad Ḥassūn, “Muqaddamah al-Taḥqīq [Introduction to this inquiry],” in Rasāʼil al-
Muhạqqiq Karakī, by ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, Taḥqīq: Muhạmmad Hạssūn, 1st vol. (Qum: 
Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʻUzṃā al-Marʻashī al-Najafī, 1409- [1988 or 1989]), 28-30. Ḥassūn names 
fourteen mujtahids trained in Karakī’s schools (p. 33).  
245 Bahṛānī, Luʼluʼāt, 146-148. Al-Ḥurr al-ʻĀmilī also praises Karakī; see Muhạmmad ibn al-Hạsan 
Hụrr al-ʻĀmilī, Amal al-Āmil, 121.  
246 The majority of related sources support 940 /1533. See Yūsuf ibn Aḥmad al- Bahṛānī, Luʼluʼāt, 
149; Ḥassūn, Ḥayāt, 36. However, 937/1530 has been mentioned by Ḥurr al-ʻĀmilī (Amal al-Āmil, 122). 
247 Ḥassūn names fifty-seven, see Ḥayāt, 33-36. 
248 Albert Houranī, “From Jabal 'Āmil to Iran,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1986), 137-138. 
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Hourani’s view, however, was that the foreign scholars were outsiders, “without roots in Iranian 
urban society”249 and thus less likely to cause trouble. Even for Newman and Stewart, who 
challenge the notion that a large number of Arab Twelver scholars migrated to Iran to assist the 
Safavids in strengthening Shiism, Karakī is an exception.250 Newman states that Karakī’s legacy 
of support for the Safavid program for Shiism was continued during the second half of Safavid 
rule by Iranian and Arab scholars trained in Isfahan and other centers in Iran,251 while clerics 
hailing from Bahrain predominated only in the last fifty years.252 The Safavids granted the 
ʻĀmilīs significant positions such as amīr, Shaykh al-Islām, and muftī.253 
Several Iranian scholars have critiqued the approach taken by Newman in his seminal 
article “The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran”, arguing that the fact that the 
number of Arab scholars who migrated to Iran is not large does not speak to their actual 
influence. Influence, in fact, did not even depend on residence, as some Arab scholars who did 
not go to Iran also affected Safavid religious discourse. For instance, the Akhbārī movement 
which became active in the second half of Safavid rule has roots in ʻĀmilī legal tradition.254 As 
for Karakī, his influence is evident in the establishment of a strong hierocracy (marjaʻīyah), the 
                                                 
249 Houranī, “From Jabal 'Āmil to Iran”, 137.  
250 Devin J. Stewart, “Notes on the Migration of ʿĀmilī Scholars to Safavid Iran,” Journal of Near 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), 82. 
251 Andrew J. Newman, “The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition 
to ʿAlī Karakī and Safawid Shiism,”  in Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 33, Issue 1 (Apr., 1993), 
111-112. In this article, Newman questions three issues: the migration of large number of Arab Twelver 
clerics to Safavid Iran, Ottoman pressure on their Shiites subjects, and the broad consent of Arab Shiite 
clerics of Safavid Shiism. However, none of these critiques are supported by Karakī’s own case.  Karakī 
was an immigrant to Iran, he supported the Safavids enthusiastically, and he was anti-Sunnite and 
consequently under pressure from the Ottomans.  
252 Said Amir Arjomand, the Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and 
Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
129.   
253 Muhammad Ḥassūn, “Muqaddamat al-Taḥqīq [Introduction to this Rasāʼil],” in Rasāʼil al-
Muhạqqiq Karakī, by ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, Taḥqīq: Muhạmmad Hạssūn, 1st vol. (Qum: 
Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʻUzṃá al-Marʻashī al-Najafī, 1409- [1988 or 1989]), 28. 
254 Ṣādiq Āenehwand, et al., “Taḥawwulhāī Dīnī ʻAṣr Ṣafaviyyah wa-Naqsh ʻAlimān ʻAmilī: 
Muṭāliʻah Mawridī Muḥaqqiq-i Karakī va-Shahīd-i Thānī,” in Justārhāī Tarīkhī, Pujūhishgāh ʻulūm-i 
Insānī va-Muṭāliʻāt-i Farhangī, 1st year, Vol. 2nd (1389/2011), 2.   
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predominance of legal over theological and philosophical discourse in Iran, a lasting legacy of 
writings, above all in law, and the training of a whole generation of Iranian scholars.255 
In this chapter, we will concentrate on Karakī’s influence, particularly in regard to 
Deputyship, leaving aside the question of origin. As an Uṣūlī promoting the doctrine of niyābah 
and broad authority for religious scholars as well as the legitimacy of the Safavid system, Karakī 
is an important figure without doubt. As Stewart notes, “The fact that al-Muḥaqqiq Karakī was 
recognized as the leading jurist in the Empire with authority over all other scholars seems to 
indicate not only his personal charisma or relationship with the Shah but also the esteem held for 
his origin and training.”256  
Key terms and concepts 
 
The second moment of niyābah sees development of a stable technical vocabulary. The 
term mujtahid, for instance, is used instead of simply faqih (jurist), the word we see in Mufīd’s 
writings, is a jurist who meets the conditions for issuing responsa.257 Mujtahid is a more 
specialized term for a jurist of higher accomplishment; here we see a sign of professionalization 
and perhaps the beginning of a formal hierarchy.  
We saw that the term nāʼib is used only four times in Mufīd’s Muqniʻah, only in a 
general sense, and not at all by al-Ṣadūq in his Man lā yaḥduruhu al-faqīh. As illustrated in 
Figure One below, in the second moment it is given a technical sense, denoting a mujtahid 
possessing the knowledge necessary for issuing responsa, who is consequently delegated by the 
Imam to guide Shiites during his Occultation. Karakī utilizes the term nāʼib frequently in his 
works, either in a technical or general sense depending on the subject being discussed. For 
instance, in his treatises on Friday prayer and jihad, the sense is clearly technical (see Figure 
One). Karakī’s main legal work Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid is a commentary on the Qawāʻid al-aḥkām of 
ʻAllāmah Ḥillī (726/1325), who belonged to the third or fourth generation of the Ḥillah School, 
                                                 
255 Ṣādiq Āenehwand, et al, “Taḥawwulhā’ī Dīnī”, 3.  
256 Stewart, “Migration”, 83-84. 
257 ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, “Risālah al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil al-Muhạqqiq 
Karakī, ed. Muhạmmad Hạssūn, vol. 1 (Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʻUzṃā al-Marʻashī al-Najafī, 
1409- [1988 or 1989]), 142. 
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and the term nāʼib had already been in use in that school. ‘Allāmah Ḥillī’s Qawāʻid 258 makes use 
of the term nāʼib both in the general259 and technical meaning. He uses it in a technical sense, 
however, only to refer to the Imam’s deputy during the Imam’s own time. The ‘Allāmah’s 
treatment of the distribution of zakāt,260 obligation of jihad,261 fighting against or concluding a 
truce with rebels (bughāt), administration of Quranic punishments,262 judgeship,263 and dealing 
with the deputy’s deputy264 demonstrates that the concept of nāʼib in his understanding does not 
apply to the time of Occultation. This is completely different from Karakī. 
Karakī divides the term nāʼib into the categories specific (khāss) and general (‘āmm). The 
specific delegate is a particular person appointed by the Imam to serve him in his time for a 
specific period or specific task, or both together; while the general nāʼib is any person qualified 
                                                 
258 Before ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, Jaʻfar ibn al-Ḥasan Muḥaqiq Ḥillī used the term nāʼib while discussing 
the Friday prayer; but only in a general and not technical sense. See for instance his al-Muʻtabar fi sharḥ 
al-mukhtaṣar, vol. 1 (Qom: Muʼassasat Sayyid al-Shuhadā’), 279. 
259 al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Ibn al-Mutạhhar al- Hịllī, Qawāʻid al-aḥkām fī maʻrafat al-ḥalāl wa al-
ḥarām, Vol. I, 283, 405, 408, 410, 411, 414, 445, 447; ibid, vol. II, 210, 249, 471, 567; ibid, Vol. III, 
424,425, 436.  
260 ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, Qawāʻid al-aḥkām fī maʻrifat al-ḥalāl wa-al-ḥarām, vol. 1, 360. ʻAllāmah 
believes that the donor distributes the zakāt. It is recommended that either the Imam or his nāʼib do it, but 
during the Occultation, it is better that the jurist undertake the task, which makes it clear that the tern 
nāʼib is used for the time of the Imam’s presence.   
261 ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, Qawāʻid, vol. 1, 478. ʻAllāmah says that jihad is obligatory with the presence 
of the Imam or his nāʼib; and it is individually incumbent when the Imam or his nāʼib orders it.   
262 ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, Qawāʻid, vol. 1, 525. Concerning execution of legal punishments, ʻAllāmah 
distinguishes the time of presence of the Imam from that of the Occultation. He notes that the 
administration of punishments is specific to the Imam or those to whom he has given permission. During 
the Occultation, it is the Shiite jurists who accomplish this task.   
263 ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, Qawāʻid, vol. 3, 419. As in the enforcement of Quranic punishments, from 
ʻAllāmah’s perspective, judgeship is the Imam’s exclusive right or that of his nāʼib. He then immediately 
adds that during the Occcultation, judgeship is with “the jurist with comprehensive conditions for issuing 
legal opinion”. Whoever refers to an unjust judge instead of that jurist is a sinner.  
264 ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, Qawāʻid, vol. 3, 424. Here he argues whenever an Imam’s delegate loses his 
authority either through dismissal by the Imam or for other cause such as impiety, his delegates (delegates 
of the dismissed person) are also discharged.   
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to issue legal responsa and legal rulings - i.e., the mujtahids - appointed by the Imam to take care 
of the affairs that are delegated to them during the Occultation.265   
 
Figure One: Occurrences of the term nāʼib 
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Karakī uses the term ḥākim in a categorical and conditioned sense. Ḥākim in the 
categorical sense refers to the infallible Imam or his specific deputy (nāʼib khāṣṣ, i.e., a 
particular, named person functioning during the Imam’s life), as well as his general deputy (nāʼib 
‘āmm), understood to be a jurist fully qualified to issue responsa during the Occultation.266 
Karakī makes it clear that the simple term ḥākim during the Occultation always means “leading 
                                                 
265 ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī al-Karakī, Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid fi sharḥ al-qawāʻid, vol. 11 
(Qom: Muʼassasat Āl al-Bayt li-Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth, 1408-11 [1988-91]), 266-67.  
266 Karakī, Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid vol. 11, 266; vol. 12, 96. In volume 8, 193-4, Karakī says that the ḥākim 
is the Imam or his appointee. 
111 
 
jurist”. 267 Hākim in a conditioned (compound) expression refers to other personalities; for 
instance, al-ḥākim al-sharʻī” or al-ḥākim al-sharʻī al-sharīf268 are rulers who correctly apply the 
Shariah – in fact, Shiite rulers – while the “oppressive” ḥākim (al-ḥākim al-jāʼir)269 refers to an 
unjust, probably Sunnite ruler. Karakī’s application of the word ḥākim is finally broader than that 
of al-Ṣadūq and Mufīd, since according to the latter two, it means judge and the word ḥukm 
(legal ruling) is confined to the field of law, while for Karakī it also includes certain other aspects 
of religious life (discussed below). 270 The ḥākim, however, is still not involved in political 
affairs.  
According to Karakī, sulṭān is the highest power in a political hierarchy. Once again, he 
uses the term in either a categorical or conditioned sense, although he does not make it clear if 
the categorical sense means the highest Shiite jurist, as he affirms in the case of ḥākim. 
Conditioned expressions include sulṭān al-jawr or al-sulṭān al-jāʼir (ruler of oppression, 
oppressive ruler),271 referring, obviously, to non-Shiite rulers; sulṭān al-Islam (the sovereign of 
Islam, referent not specified);272 and al-sulṭān al-ʻādil, “the just sovereign”, meaning the 
infallible Imam or his deputy. Karakī does not say here who that deputy is, but the consensus of 
Shiite scholars points to the possibility of it being either the nāʼib appointed by the Imam while 
he is still present, his general nāʼib, or his delegate in the Friday prayers.273  
                                                 
267 Karakī, Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid vol. 11, 267. 
268 Karakī, Rasāʼil al-Muhạqqiq Karakī, ed. Muhạmmad Hạssūn, vol. 3 (Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh 
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Hạssūn, 1st vol. (Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʻUzṃá al-Marʻashī al-Najafī, 1409- [1988 or 1989]), 142-
143. 
271 ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, Rasāʼil al-Muhạqqiq Karakī, Taḥqīq: Muhạmmad 
Hạssūn, vol. I (Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʻUzṃá al-Marʻashī al-Najafī, 1409- [1988 or 1989]), 257, 
276, 282, 285; Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid fi sharḥ al-qawāʻid, volume III, 22; volume VII, 11. 
272 ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid fi sharḥ al-qawāʻid, volume VI (Qom: 
Muʼassasat Āl al-bayt li Iḥyāʼ al-turāth, 1408-11 [1988-91]), 176. 
273  ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, Rasāʼil al-Muhạqqiq Karakī, Taḥqīq: Muhạmmad 
Hạssūn, vol. I (Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʻUzṃá al-Marʻashī al-Najafī, 1409- [1988 or 1989]), 158; 
Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid fi sharḥ al-qawāʻid, volume II (Qom: Muʼassasat Āl al-bayt li Iḥyāʼ al-turāth, 1408-11 
[1988-91]), 371.  
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Karakī’s ḥākim becomes, in effect, what was for Mufīd the sulṭān al-Islām. For Mufīd, 
the Imams are sulṭān of Islam, but for Karakī, they are ḥākim. Karakī remarks at one point that 
the ḥākim is subordinate to the sulṭān, since the ḥākim is the sulṭān’s delegate (nāʼib) and in his 
service.274 This may seem contradictory, since for Karakī the Imams and their delegates are both 
sulṭān al-Islam and ḥākim; but when he ranks ḥākim below sulṭān, ḥākim has the sense of one 
who is a judge and in charge of religious affairs.275 
In early Shiism, the term sulṭān ʻādil meant the infallible Imam. The Imam is the just 
ruler, and all others are unjust. Mufīd and al-Murtaḍā use the phrase in this sense (although, as 
noted in the previous chapter, this is not entirely clear in every occurrence). Beginning in the 
5th/11th century, the title began to be given to rulers other than the Imam. In these occurrences, 
the term loses its original theological meaning and takes on a political colour. In the 5th/11th 
century, Ṭūsī contributes a rather novel definition. Instead of the theological criterion according 
to which only the Imam is the right and just ruler, Ṭūsī takes into account acts and policies. 
Accordingly, the sulṭān who orders good and forbids evil and “put things in their correct places” 
may be considered just.276 In the School of Ḥillah, al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī uses the expression al-
sulṭān al-ʻādil277 and ʻAllāmah Ḥillī sulṭān al-ḥaqq278 to describe rulers other than the infallible 
Imams. Ḥillī remarks that accepting a position of authority from such a sulṭān ʻādil is permissible 
and even sometimes obligatory, just as if one were to be appointed by the Imam, especially if 
carrying out the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil is dependent upon working with that 
sulṭān.279 Ṭūsī and Ḥillī, it should be noted, merely apply the term in a practical way. They were 
describing rulers they worked for and did not actually alter their theology. An idea did eventually 
                                                 
274 ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid fi sharḥ al-qawāʻid, vol. XI (Qom: 
Muʼassasat Āl al-bayt li Iḥyāʼ al-turāth, 1408-11 [1988-91]), 267.  
275 ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid fi sharḥ al-qawāʻid, vol. XI (Qom: 
Muʼassasat Āl al-bayt li Iḥyāʼ al-turāth, 1408-11 [1988-91]), 267. 
276 Ṭusī, al-Nihayah fī mujarrad al-fiqh wa-al-fatawa (Qum: Intishārāt-I Quds, n.d.), 356. 
277 Jaʻfar ibn al-Hạsan Muhạqqiq al-Hịllī, Sharāʼiʻ al-Islām fī masāʼil al-hạlāl wa-al-hạrām, vol. 2 
(Tehran: Istiqlāl, 1409/1988), 266.  
278 al-Hạsan ibn Yūsuf Ibn al-Mutạhhar al- Ḥillī̄, Taḥrīr al-aḥkām al-sharʻīyah, ed. Ibrāhīm al-
Bahādurī, vol. 2 (Qom: Muʼassasat al-Imām al-Ṣādiq, 1420/[1999], 270.  
279 Al-Muhạqqiq al-Hịllī, Sharāʼiʻ al-Islām, vol. 2, 266.  
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emerge, as explained by Jafariyan,280 that a well-qualified mujtahid who is the deputy of the 
Imam can appoint a sulṭān who may then be regarded as just by virtue of that appointment. This 
view, however, was established in the last period of Safavid rule well over a century after Karaki, 
and then relied upon again by the Qājārs. Karaki himself did not hold the view that the jurist 
appoints the sulṭān and there is no evidence that he regarded the Safavid Shah as being 
legitimated by the Imam.281 Newman asserts that Karakī used the phrases al-sulṭān al-ʻādil and 
al-Imam al-ʻādil to refer to the Shah Ismāʻīl and even encouraged “the shāh's exploitation of the 
ambiguity of meaning of these terms to bolster the shāh's claim to the Imamate”;282 but I see no 
evidence in Karakī’s writings to support Newman’s contention, which he apparently bases on his 
endorsement of the policies of the Safavid monarchs. Karakī remained within the framework of 
Shiite theology dominant by his time, in which only the Imam is acknowledged as a just ruler. I 
do, on the other hand, agree with the contemporary biographer of Karakī, Muḥammad Ḥassūn, 
who maintains that Karakī regarded Safavid rule as unjust and tyrannical but nevertheless 
worked with the Shahs in the interests of religion. Ḥassūn believes that Karakī was well aware 
that the Safavids installed him in high positions in order to use him for religious legitimation to 
counter the Ottomans, who had claimed that they were the sole legitimate rulers of Muslims.283  
Niyābah as construed by Karakī does not include political power. While the Imams were 
present, not only jurists but also amīrs could be their delegates or agents, but during the 
Occultation, the amīrs could no longer be deputized because the texts (i.e., traditions from the 
                                                 
280 Rasūl Ja‘fariyān, Ṣafawiyyah, 119; also see Rasūl Ja’fariyān, Dīn va siyāsat dar dawrah-ʼi Sạfavī 
(Qum: Ansạ̄riyān, 1370 [1991 or 1992]), 31.  
281 In fact, Ja‘fariyān has based his statement on Kashmīrī’s account of the relations between the 
Shah and mujtahids under the later Safavids. Kashmīrī says that the country (mulk) belongs to the Mahdī, 
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Sulṭān Ḥusayn (Muhạmmad ʻAlī Āzād Kashmīrī, Nujūm al-samāʼ fī tarājum al-ʻulamāʼ: sharh-̣i hạ̄l-i 
ʻulamā-yi Shīʻah-i qarnʹhā-yi yāzdahum va davāzdahum va sīzdahum-i Hijrī Qamarī, ed. Mīr Hāshim 
Muhạddith [Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1382 (2003)], 111).. This is a large change in niyābah without doubt, but 
it happened during the second half of the Safavid period, and not in the first. It is obvious Karakī’s 
interpretation is different.    
282  Newman, “Myth”, 80. The author stresses that with Karakī’s endorsement, Shāh Ismāʻīl 
characterized himself as the as the ultimate arbiter of the faith's doctrines and practices. See also ibid, 84.   
283 Muḥammad Hạssūn, Ḥayāt al-Muhạqqiq Karakī wa-āthāruhu, vol. I ([Tehran]: Ihṭijāj, 1423 
[2002 or 2003]), 482. 
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Imams and the ‘ulamāʼ’s interpretations of them) refer to Deputyship of the jurists. Neither 
Mufīd’s nor Karakī’s interpretation of Deputyship extends it to politics. For Mufīd, as we have 
seen, Deputyship is limited to judicial affairs, while for Karakī, it covers both judicial affairs and 
“all religious affairs” (jamī‘ al-umūr al-shar‘īyah). Neither Mufīd nor Karakī suggests that the 
jurists as deputy of the Imam possesses the legal authority to intervene in areas outside this 
mandate.  
Certainly there is a notion of “general Deputyship”, but this has been not been understood 
accurately. The term has been taken to mean that, in addition to the Imam deputizing the jurists 
in general (i.e., as a group) rather than specific, named personalities as during the Lesser 
Occultation, he gave them permission to handle on his behalf not just certain deputized affairs, 
but affairs in general. The very fact that the jurists debated which areas they had permission to 
handle shows that this cannot be correct. Stewart, nevertheless, appears to make the same error in 
the following passage. 
 
Together with ʻAlī b. ʻAbd al-ʻĀlī Karakī, al-Shahīd al-Thānī was one of the first 
jurists in the tradition to endorse the theory of niyābah ʻāmmah (general Deputyship), 
whereby the mujtahid, or the class of mujtahids as a whole, is said to be “general 
representative” (nāʼib ʻāmm) of the Twelfth Imam. This claim justifies the mujtahids’ 
exclusive authority, holding that they stand in the place of the Imam during the 
Greater Occultation. They are thus entitled to serve a number of functions normally 
reserved for the control of the Imam himself, such as the appointment of judges, the 
performance of ḥudūd punishments, and the collection and distribution of khums 
funds.284  
Stewart seems to have back-projected a later development in which jurists coming well 
after Karakī who wished to give political meaning to niyābah imagined that it meant Deputyship 
over affairs in general and thus, as he says “standing in the place of the Imam”. I rather contend 
that from Mufīd to the time of Karakī the jurists enjoyed a limited Deputyship, confined first to 
                                                 
284 Devin J. Stewart, “The Genesis of the Akhbārī Revival,” in Safavid Iran and Her Neighbors, 
edited by Michel Mazzaoui (Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 2003), 179-180. 
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judgeship and then, in the time of Karakī, religious affairs, while the tendency to understand 
Deputyship as a very broad mandate including even politics appeared only long after.  
Scope of the mujtahid’s niyābah  
 
The mujtahid’s authority is key to understanding Karakī’s role in developing the concept 
of Deputyship or niyābah. In this section I intend to demonstrate that, contrary to the dominant 
view, the mujtahid’s authority according to Karakī is limited to religious or legal (Shariah) 
affairs. The deputy of the Imams during the Occultation is according to Karakī a just jurist 
qualified to issue legal responsa, that is to say, a mujtahid, who also handles certain other 
religious affairs. Karakī believes the mujtahid’s Deputyship to be, though quite broad, still 
limited to specific functions, which he lists in the following passage near the beginning of his 
treatise on Friday prayer:285  
 
It is obligatory to the people to refer to him [the mujtahid] in legal cases and obey his 
judgments. He has the authority to sell the properties of those who refuse to pay their 
debts, to manage absentee property, children [without guardians], the insane, and 
bankrupts, as well as to seize the goods of individuals who are forbidden to possess 
their own properties. He finally possesses all the authority that the agent (ḥākim) 
appointed by the Imam himself has when he is present.286 
 
 Understanding of Deputyship from Mufīd to Karakī was based on a tradition from the 
sixth Imam al-Ṣādiq related through his Companion ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah in which the jurists 
were appointed as ḥākim or judge. Karakī bases his broader understanding of niyābah on this 
same tradition:  
 
Seek out from among yourselves one who narrates our traditions, heeds our 
injunctions and prohibitions, and knows our ordinances (s. ḥukm). You must consent 
to his judgment, because I have made him your ḥākim. Whenever he judges according 
                                                 
285 ʻAlī ibn al-Hụsayn Muhạqqiq al-Thānī, “Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil al-Muhạqqiq 
Karakī, vol. 1, 142-3. 
286 Karakī, “Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil, vol. 1, 143. 
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to our law and his judgement is not accepted, that is underestimation of God’s 
command and denial of us, which amounts to denying God and accepting association 
[of other things with God, i.e., shirk].287  
 
The two key terms in the tradition are ḥākim and ḥukm. Karakī defines these more 
broadly than Mufīd. For Mufīd, ḥākim is equal to judge; the ḥākim is a personality who is part of 
an administrative system theoretically existing under the Imams. In Mufīd’s understanding of 
Deputyship, the jurist is also one who also has the authority, at least in theory, to execute the 
Quranic punishments. For Karakī, on the other hand, the ḥākim has power over all religious 
affairs – although not including politics. As for ḥukm, for Mufīd it means the judgement of the 
ḥākim, i.e., of a judge; whereas for Karakī, it means any ruling of the mujtahids concerning 
religious affairs, for instance a ḥukm occurring in a responsum. Again, this does not extend to 
governance. Karakī does, however, feel that the mujtahid should be obeyed, and thus quotes the 
part of the tradition translated above that says that disobeying involves underestimation of God’s 
command, denial of the Imams, and shirk. Mufīd does not quote that part.  
What is Karakī’s view on the scope of the authority of the jurist? The different mandates 
given to the mujtahid he enumerates in the passage quoted above finally all concern judgment. 
This is similar to Mufīd's view. Karakī also adds, as I discuss below, the Friday prayer as one of 
the principal tasks of a jurist288 along with collection of taxes. The authority of the jurist is thus 
broader in Karakī’s thinking than in that of Mufīd.289 This wider competence has led Sachedina 
to conclude that in Karakī’s view, “the jurist possessed all the necessary qualifications for 
assuming the position of al-Imam al-ʻādil (the just ruler) when the twelfth Imam is in 
concealment.”290 Sachedina’s assessment, I believe, is too sweeping as it includes the political 
capacity of the Imam, which Karakī definitely does not include. Karakī only argues on the basis 
                                                 
287 Karakī, “Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil, vol. 1, 143. In the same source (p. 153) Karakī 
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289 Karakī, “Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil, vol. 1, 142. 
290 Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, the Just Ruler in Shiite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority 
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of the tradition from ‘Umar ibn Ḥanẓalah that Deputyship is granted to the jurists “in a general 
manner” (isti’nābah ʻalā wajh kullī), because the Imam says that he has appointed him “your 
ḥākim” (fa-innī qad jaʻaltu-hu ʻalaykum ḥākim).291 Ḥassūn makes a similar error, but he is 
clearly influenced to do so by his sympathy for the modern notion of Guardianship of the Jurist, 
as he argues that the word ḥākim as used by Karakī means “general governance” (al-ḥukūmah al-
ʻāmmah), which, he claims, means not only judgeship, but is identical with Guardianship of the 
Jurist.292  
It may be useful to further argue the point that Karakī does not include politics in the 
competence of the jurist, since the idea that it is included seems to be widespread. Three points 
should make this clear. The first concerns Karakī’s treatise on Friday prayer where he says that 
the jurist is ḥākim “in all religious affairs” (fī jamīʻ al-umūr al-sharʻiyah).293 Karakī’s chief 
concern in the treatise is, of course, Friday prayer; his goal is to establish the legitimacy of the 
Friday congregational prayer led by a qualified jurist. This is not possible without expanding the 
jurist’s authority to all religious affairs. Thus he writes: “It must not be said that the jurist is 
meant to judge and issue legal opinions and that prayer is not among these things, because we 
say that the authority of the jurist (faqīh) covers all revealed (sharʻī) affairs.”294 This is not an 
endorsement of absolute authority, but merely a remark justifying prayer leadership. Karakī, in 
any case, does not make clear what “all religious affairs” means so that we cannot say for certain 
if political affairs are included or not. Second, Ṭūsī brings up the ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah tradition 
in,295 in which he deals with exclusively with legal, and not political, issues. The action of the 
report takes place in the context of a legal disagreement between two Shiites who are about to 
refer their dispute to the administration of an unjust ruler. The Imam prevents them from doing 
so, ordering them to carry their dispute before a Shiite jurist instead. As in the case of Karakī’s 
statement, examined above concerning Friday prayer, it is really too much to transfer authority 
from the particular instance being considered to leadership, especially since leadership is much 
wider and more general than the topic (judgeship) under consideration. As an accomplished 
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jurist, Ṭūsī would not have made such transference. Nor were Shiites in the time of the sixth 
Imam in any position to claim political power, in which case ḥākim cannot have meant anything 
more than a judge. Those who connect statements such as that of Karakī referring to “all 
religious affairs” with political leadership have plucked texts from their context and tried to give 
them a modern meaning. And third and perhaps most telling, Karakī did not claim such an 
absolute authority for himself, while in the Safavid decrees (s. farmān), the authority of the 
jurists is confined to religious affairs.296 If the Shahs had actually allowed that Karakī and other 
mujtahids were the Deputy of the Hidden Imam in a political sense, they would have completely 
undermined their own authority, since that would have entitled the Deputy and no one else to 
rule! 
Karakī’s application of the authority of the jurists to “all revealed affairs” makes him 
different than both Mufīd and Khomeini, placing him, in fact, between the two. For Mufīd, the 
jurist’s authority is limited to judgeship, while Khomeini considers the jurist to be the religious 
and political head of society. In Karakī’s view, the jurist’s authority covers not just judgeship, 
but all religious affairs; although it does not extend to politics. In any case, the jurist was 
obviously not the political head of the community under the Safavids, so this fact alone tells us 
that Karakī distinguished between religious and political affairs. In spite of his high religious 
status, he did not own independent authority in the Safavid court. He was rather a functionary. It 
would be Shiite ‘ulamāʼ in the distant future, especially Mullā Aḥmad al-Narāqī and Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who combined religion and politics to theorize a jurist-led Shiite state and then 
establish a state in practice.  
We will now turn to the details of the mujtahid’s Deputyship in the thought of Karakī, 
under the headings of Friday prayer, judgeship, working for an unjust ruler, enjoining good and 
forbidding evil, and finally, management of religious taxes. These affairs are currently 
considered to be part of what is often called fiqh al-hukumah (in Persian, fiqh-i hukumati), i.e., 
“governmental jurisprudence”; although, note well, this is a modern expression that was not 
employed in Karakī’s time.  
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The jurists and Friday prayer 
 
The Friday congregational prayer was very important under the Safavids. Large crowds 
attended the prayer and the sermon included in it. The Friday prayer has been associated with 
politics since the early days of Islam, since the head of the community appointed the prayer 
leader. Under the Safavids, the Friday prayer served to legitimate the Shiite dynasty.297 A crucial 
moment occurred when the mujtahid, the chief of the religious institution who led the prayer, 
praised the sovereign in his sermon. As a ritual, the prayer joined religious with political power 
and united the three elements of religion, state, and the masses.  
The Safavid Friday prayer also bolstered the authority of the ‘ulamāʼ. In addition to 
enhancing their status, prayer leadership was a source of patronage and income, leading to 
competition. This competition or conflict is significant for our study of legal views pertaining to 
niyābah, as I will explain in the analysis below. 
Karakī penned Risālat ṣalāt al-jumʻah, his first treatise on the Friday congregational 
prayer, in 921/1515 during his association with the Safavids. His writings constituted the chief 
support for Safavid state ideology and practice in regard to the prayer.298 Unlike Mufīd, who was 
silent on the subject of Friday prayer during the Occultation, Karakī declared it to be takhyīrī, 
that is, “subject to personal choice”, i.e., believers can choose to go to the congregational prayer 
or pray alone. This was, in fact, the view of the Hillah School. Karakī, however, adds that if a 
pious jurist is available to lead the prayer, it becomes incumbent (wājib). This condition 
obviously adds to the jurists’ power. As in the case of the land-tax, Karakī’s work on Friday 
prayer prompted other scholars to write on the same subject. Approximately one hundred and 
sixty separate books and treatises have been devoted to congregational prayer from the Safavids 
up to the present, demonstrating that it is still considered important. Most authors, however, have 
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concluded that such prayer is optional, without Karakī’s proviso that it becomes incumbent with 
the availability of a pious jurist. 299  
Karakī’s treatise gives us insight into how the people of his time regarded the Friday 
prayer. He admits that the masses doubted its legitimacy. They were perplexed that it was being 
performed and at a loss as what to do. As disagreement mounted, the situation became critical.300 
Karakī’s treatise was intended to convince the masses that the prayer was obligatory.301 Holding 
the prayer depends on the presence of the Imam or his deputy, according to Shiite consensus; but 
there is the question of whether the deputy of the Imam is appointed specially, i.e., as a specific 
person while the Imams are present or during the Minor Occultation, or generally, i.e any 
qualified mujtahid during the Greater Occultation. Karakī states that the majority of the Shiite 
‘ulamāʼ support general Deputyship,302 with which he agrees. That position, of course, served to 
promote the holding of the Friday prayer and the jurists’ leadership of it. Karakī also, as 
mentioned above, took the practical measure of appointing Friday prayer leaders. Nevertheless, 
he does not say that the Friday prayer is actually obligatory for individuals during the Occultation 
(except if there is a pious mujtahid available to lead it), apparently because he wanted to avoid 
open conflict with those who disagreed because they deemed the congregational prayer solely the 
prerogative of the Imam or because they considered it entirely optional.303 Karakī, though 
powerful, was not as all-powerful as modern authors such as Jafariyan, Hassun, and Abisaab 
make him out to be.  
Thus in sum, the issue of the legitimacy of the Friday prayer gave Karakī an opportunity 
to take a further step in establishing the mujtahid’s authority. He states that the Friday prayer is 
obligatory only when a jurist fully qualified in the religious law (mujtahid jāmiʻ al-sharā’iṭ) is 
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301 Karakī, “Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil, vol. 1, 139. 
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302 Modarressi, Kharāj in Islamic Law, 165. 
303 Karakī, “Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil, vol. 1, 148. 
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present and leads the prayer.304 Though others disagree with him, he claims a consensus for this 
position.305 Karakī argues that the qualified jurist is the Imam’s appointee through general 
appointment and who is in charge of all religious affiars, which includes the Friday prayer.306 
Making the obligation of the Friday prayer conditional on the presence of the mujtahid 
acting as the deputy of the Imam enhanced the status and authority of the jurists under the 
Safavids.307 The political significance of the prayer, it seems, finally exceeded its religious 
importance. The Safavids were rivals of the Ottomans, who boasted a highly developed 
institution in charge of religious affairs, including the congregational prayer. This, it seems, 
prompted the Safavids to mount the same rituals - with a Shiite character, of course - in order to 
                                                 
304 Karakī, “Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil, vol. 1, 158; Karakī, Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid vol. 2, 379.  
Devin Stewart maintains that according to Karakī the legality of Friday prayer while the Imam is occulted 
depends on his representative (the jurist) designating someone to conduct the prayer. In other words, it is 
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leadership (“Polemics and patronage”, 429, 440, 457.). Based on this perception, Stewart concludes that 
Karakī’s view led to accumulation of power in the hands of mujtahids. It was, Stewart says, “somewhat 
risky for Shah Ṭahmāsp to accede to Karakī’s’ position at this juncture, for the authority of the leading 
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Friday prayer - neither in Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid nor in Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah – does he talk about the 
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305 This claim of Karakī about the consensus is criticized by other Shiite ‘ulamāʼ before and after 
him. For instance, he himself names some Shiite leading jurists in the past who did not consider Friday 
prayer obligatory in the absence of the Imam, such as al-Murtaḍā, al-Sallār, al-Ṭūsī (in his Khilāf), Ibn 
Idrīs, and ʻAllāmah (in his Muntahā). After Karakī also, many prominent Shiite scholars do not recognize 
the consensus he claims. Those scholars condition the obligation of Friday prayer on the presence of the 
Imam’s or of his agent, which is not possible during the Occultation. To get around this problem, Karakī 
emphasizes that the jurist is the Imam’s appointee, in a general manner In fact, the consensus he refers to 
concerns the presence of the infallible Imam or his nāʼib, not role of the jurist during the Occultation. 
Nevertheless, Karakī expands it to the time of the Occultation to facilitate his view of the Deputyship of 
the jurists and their role in Friday prayer.  
306 Karakī, “Risālat al-ṣalāt al-jumʻah,” in Rasāʼil, vol. 1, 159-160, 163. 
307 Jaʻfariyān, Dawāzdah, 12. 
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keep up appearances for themselves, their subjects, and other Muslims. Karakī found a solution 
to the problem of how to mount and display the ritual despite the absence of the Imam in the 
notion of an optional obligation depending on the presence of the mujtahid. If Karakī had not 
been associated with the Safavids, he would not have formulated such a doctrine.  
The jurists and judgeship  
 
Arjomand (referring to Calder) claims that Karakī does not in his chief legal work Jāmiʻ 
al-maqāṣid use the phrase “general delegate” of the Hidden Imam in relation to religious taxes, 
implementation of the ḥudūd, or jihad.308 It is true that Karakī, like other jurists, does not give the 
mujtahid any part in jihad, but he certainly does address mujtahid authority in Quranic 
punishments and religious taxes. Regarding Quranic punishments, for instance, he distinguishes, 
as Mufīd does, between executing legal punishments among one’s family circle and the public, 
asserting that the master may, on the basis of what he characterizes as “almost a consensus”, 
punish his slave, but in his capacity as a master and not as a jurist. Karakī also takes the authority 
of the jurist in Quranic punishments a small step further than Mufīd by maintaining that one has 
to be a jurist to enforce judgments on one’s children or wife.309 We may say in general that 
Karakī prefers that the ‘ulamāʼ judge during the Occultation. 
The issue of judgeship is intimately connected with that of working for an unjust ruler, so 
that Shiite scholars generally discuss working for an unjust ruler under the heading of Quranic 
punishments. Karakī does the same, particularly following ʻAllāmah Ḥillī, on whose work he 
comments. The ʻAllāmah, however, has a view of the issue that is even more restrictive than that 
of Mufīd. He believes that the legality of a jurist appointed as a judge by an unjust ruler 
enforcing the Quranic punishments is doubtful. That jurist (contrary to Mufīd’s view) does not 
have the permission of the Imam. Working for an unjust ruler is permissible only when the jurist 
is forced to serve or his life is threatened by the ruler - although not even in those circumstances 
if the judge is compelled to shed Shiite blood illicitly, in which case he may no longer 
dissimilate, i.e., practice taqiyah. 310  
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This view of ʻAllāmah Ḥillī was evidently unfavourable to Karakī’s desire to work with 
the Safavids. He tries to refute it by suggesting that ʻAllāmah’s caution refers to non-jurists and 
asserting that he “very certainly states” (qad jazama) that the jurist who is a deputy of the Imam 
can judge during the Occultation. 311 This, however, is simply not true. The discussions of 
ʻAllāmah and of Mufīd both use the terms ḥukm and ḥākim, which refer, as I have shown above, 
to judgeship and the judge, and clearly concern a person who is qualified to judge for an 
oppressive ruler, i.e., a jurist. ʻAllāmah, for instance, discusses three roles for the jurist during the 
Occultation. First, (exactly as Mufīd says) the jurists judge among the people (ḥukm bayn al-
nās), provided they are secure from governmental pressure or danger. Second, they collect and 
distribute zakāt and khums (the latter of which Mufīd denies); and third, they issue responsa 
(which Mufīd probably assumes, although he does not use the technical term iftā’, as ʻAllāmah 
does) provided they are qualified to do so. Karakī’s very weak interpretation of ʻAllāmah vividly 
illustrates the lengths a Shiite scholar had to go to in these times to expand juristic authority in 
the face of a tradition that tended to limit it. Nevertheless Karakī, continuing in his commentary 
on ʻAllāmah, goes on to declare that Shiites must support the jurists and refer to them for 
judgeship. If they refer their legal problems instead to an unjust ḥākim (judge), they are sinful.312 
Niyābah from the Imam and working with an unjust ruler  
 
Karakī accepted high-ranking posts from the Safavid Shahs, including that of Shaykh al-
Islām, i.e., overseer of religious affairs in the kingdom. His position in the court and as Shaykh 
al-Islām was not, however, the basis of his religious authority per se. His authority as a leading 
jurist was rather derived from deputization by the Imam. As heir to the Uṣūlī tradition, Karakī 
regarded the Safavids as “unjust” rulers and considered that he was permitted to work with them 
only under certain conditions, stated by Mufīd and others. Karakī was nevertheless eager to be 
associated with the Safavid court, beginning with the reign of Shāh Ismāʻīl Ӏ in 916/1510, when, 
as Abisaab says, says, he was “officially recognized as the Safavids’ religious scholar in Iraq and 
received monetary funds from Shāh Ismāʻīl I, to the great indignation of numerous 
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theologians.”313 Indignation, since the permissibility of accepting a position and wealth from a 
so-called unjust ruler was still widely debated in Shiism. Karakī himself did not openly call the 
Safavid Shahs “unjust”.  He actually praises them on a few occasions and dedicates his magnum 
opus Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid to them, giving the dynasty a series of lofty titles. Conspicuously, 
however, he does not include the adjective (‘ādil).314 He also effectively implies that the Safavids 
were unjust by taking the trouble to argue for certain permissions, for instance the permissiblity 
of receiving land-tax and other financial support from the state in his treatise on land-tax 
(kharāj). He decides in favor of these, not surprisingly since he wished to legalize dealing with 
the political powers in view of his close relationship with the Safavid court.  
Apart from these additional permissions, how did Karakī legitimate his position on the 
basis of the Shiite theological and legal doctrine he received, which does not easily admit the 
legitimacy of a ruler other than the Imam? Emphasis on the term mujtahid provided an additional 
small opening. Mufīd says that the Imam’s delegate is a jurist, while according to Karakī, the 
Imam’s delegate is a mujtahid, i.e., an exceptionally well qualified jurist entitled to issue 
responsa. While both figures are legitimated in the same way by Mufīd and Karakī and Mufīd 
probably also considered that a jurist working for the government would issue responsa, Mufīd is 
not explicit about this (and the term mujtahid was not used in his time). Karakī, on the other 
hand, greatly emphasizes the high qualifications of the mujtahid -jurist and his ability to issue 
responsa, so that such activity is more clearly represented as being legitimate while working for 
the sultan. Karakī could conceivably also have gone back to Mufīd to draw on his discussion of 
delegation of the Imam’s authority to amirs in order to legitimate the Safavids and thus his own 
activities; but he does not do this, probably because the discussion had died out after Mufīd.  
Thus we see that, despite having the opportunity of dwelling in a powerful Shiite kingdom rather 
than amidst a predominantly hostile Sunnite majority like Shiite scholars before him, Karakī did 
not succeed in devising a framework and terminology suitable for the different circumstances. He 
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was unable to, as Abisaab aptly puts it, “extract Shiism from its scholastic puritanism”.315 Karakī 
failed to re-cast the key concepts of a just ruler (sulṭān ʻādil) and unjust or oppressive (jā’ir) ruler 
to fit new conditions, continuing instead with the old usage constructed in the context of 
opposition between the Shiite Imams and Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs. Even the theory 
Ja‘fariyān (see above) attributes to the seventeenth–century Safavid scholars Āghā Ḥusayn 
Khwānsārī and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī that a sulṭān appointed by a well-qualified mujtahid 
who is the deputy of the Imam may be considered just, does not lead to the conclusion that the 
sulṭān and his actions are just in themselves. All this is surprising when one considers that the 
Safavids built their rule on Shiism and that Shiite scholars such as Karakī associated with them. 
It is as if Ṭūsī’s definition of the just and unjust sulṭān and dealings of the scholars of the School 
of al-Ḥillah with the Mongols had created a template that could not be altered.  
Although the constricted theory of Deputyship was not basically changed, the status and 
power of the religious class did increase in practice. It was these changes taking place on the 
levels of society and history that finally prepared the ground for much more expansive views of 
Deputyship in the Qajar and post-Qajar periods.  
Under the Safavids, power gradually became divided between religious and non-religious 
(ʻurfi) groups, i.e., the scholar-jurists on the other hand and the Shāh, military, bureaucracy and 
landowners on the other.316 The Safavids regarded the jurists as a legitimating force, including 
against their foreign enemies. As for the jurists, their motivations for collaboration with a 
supposedly unjust rulership were both religious and, to a lesser extent, related to personal gain. 
Being welcomed in the court constituted recognition of the ‘ulamāʼ’s power and social influence. 
I have mentioned the titles given to Karakī. Shāh Ṭahmasp’s decree bestowing on him the title of 
Deputy of the Imam, issued on 16 Dhu al-Ḥijjah1939/ July 9, 1533, is worth special 
consideration. The text as translated by Arjomand is as follows:  
 
[…] the highly positioned seal of the mujtahidīn, Heir to the science of the Lord of the 
messengers, Protecter of the Religion of Commander of the Faithful […], the Kibla of 
the pious faithful, the Exemplar of expert ʻ’ulamāʼ’, the Proof of Islam (ḥujjat al-
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Islām) and of the Muslims who direct the people unto the clear path, Erector of the 
banners of the indelible Law (sharīʻa) who is obeyed by the great governors in all 
times, and Guide (muqtadā) of all the people of the time, the Clarifier of the 
permissible and the forbidden, the Deputy of the Imam (nāʼib al-Imam)—peace be 
upon Him—who has clarified the difficulties of the rules of the community of the 
believers and the rightful laws; may he not come to an end, like his elevated 
victorious namesake, ʻAlī. The highly positioned ʻ’ulamāʼ’ of all quarters have bowed 
their heads in humility at the threshold of his sciences and are honored by what they 
acquire from the rays of his beneficent lamp through the use of sciences. Furthermore, 
the lords and nobles of the time obey and follow the orders and prohibitions of that 
guide and consider submission to his commands the cause of salvation. They all 
devote their lofty will and honorable intent to the rising of the position and elevation 
of the rank of that Excellency.317    
 
From a religious and theological perspective, these many titles bestowed on ʻAlī ibn al-
Hụsayn Karakī by the highest political power of Persia add nothing to his authority. As a jurist, 
Karakī was already the deputy (nāʼib) of the Imam, so that Shāh Tahmāsp’s elaborate formulas 
only emphasize and enhance his power and that of the ‘ulamāʼ in general. The order to the nobles 
and administration to obey Karakī on pain of punishment did, on the other hand, have significant 
economic and political implications. The very length of the decree - three of today’s printed 
pages - is due to the economic benefits detailed:  
 
We have also decreed that agricultural estate of Kabīsa and Dawālīb … adjacent to the 
river of holy Najaf … and the cultivated lands of Umm al-ʻAzamāt and the Kāhīn al-
Waʻd of Ramāḥiyya that he has brought into cultivation be made an endowment (waqf) 
for him, and for his descendants after him, according to the correct procedure of the 
Sacred Law as specified in the deed of endowment. […] [the above] to be removed 
from the tax registry of the Arab Iraq, excluded from the revenue and expenditure 
accounts, be considered His Holy Excellency’s endowment and entitlement, and be 
exempted from all future orders affecting requisition, division, replacement and change 
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of the suyūrghāls and land grants. Furthermore, the sum of ten Tabrīzī tūmans from the 
mint od Ḥilla is established as suyūrghal for His Excellency instead of the tar of Ḥārhīt 
and Ḥilla which has been His Excellency’s suyūrghal in the sum of eight hundred 
tūmāns but which he has given up willingly owing to the difficulty of transportation. 
The officials must give the above sum priority over all other receipts and drafts and not 
pay a single dīnār to anyone until it has reached his deputies (wukalā) from the mint. 
[…] we ordered that Barqāniyya and its surroundings be recognized as the 
suyūrghal of the above-mentioned Seal of the Mujtahidīn from the beginning of the 
year ʼilān ʼil [sic] and be handed over to his deputies. All its produce for that year is to 
be handed over to his agents without excuse and without any reduction. … 
The respected tax accountants, agents, and bureaucrats must remove all the 
above from the tax registry and exempt them from all dues, especially … the tithe … 
the stamp due, the due of vozarā, the due of ṣidāra, etc. … The officials of the tax 
bureau of the Arab Iraq must remove their pen from these estates and not set foot in 
them … not inspect them, … not impose fines and if a fine is issued, leave it to the 
agents … and consider all the receipts fully due to the above-mentioned Shaykh al-
Islām and exempt from taxation as his other suyūrghals.  
As the world-incumbent order has been issued prohibiting the central dushlakāt 
bureau from imposing the dushlakāt, the dushlakāt bureau of the Arab Iraq should 
similarly consider itself prohibited.318 
 
As the document illustrates, Karakī was granted land grants, fiscal rights, and tax 
immunities. Through his association with the Safavids, he opened the way for employment of the 
‘ulamāʼ and clerical estate in the government, including high positions such as that of Ṣadr 
(employee of the Shah responsible for administering religious affairs and supervision of pious 
endowments), Shaykh al-Islām, judgeship, prayer leadership, and so on. This access allowed the 
‘ulamāʼ not only to improve their economic situation, but even to become major landowners and 
holders of wealth. As for the political implications of Shāh Ṭahmāsp’s honouring of Karakī, the 
presence in the court of a religious authority with such a high reputation led to administrative 
problems. It was difficult to contain him in the court structure. This is why, as Arjomand points 
out, the Safavid king’s attempt to institutionalize the Mujtahid of the Age as the supreme 
religious authority failed, delaying that development to future generations of ‘ulamāʼ.319 Using 
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his position in the court, Karakī organized religious centers and prepared the ground for the 
powerful emergence of thos future generations.  
What we are left with is an apparent contradiction. In Karakī’s theological view, the 
Safavid state was illegitimate and its monarchs unjust, as we will see in his treatise on the land-
tax. At the same time, however, he worked for and maintained close relations with the court 
while accepting land grants and other fiscal advantages. A well-qualified mujtahid is the deputy 
of the just ruler, the Imam, in the law and all religious affairs. Even while working for and 
gaining advantage from the Safavids, Karakī remained, in Mufīd’s words, sulṭān al-Islam in 
sharʻī affairs, and the Safavid kings continued to be regarded theoretically as unjust. 
Deputization by the Imam allowed Karakī, as it had since the time of Mufīd, to associate with the 
court and function within it, in the areas theological and juridical theory had always permitted. 
Receiving the title of Deputy of the Imam from Shāh Ṭahmāsp did not help Karakī to claim 
political Deputyship as well. It had no implications for political leadership. Karakī remained the 
Deputy of the just sulṭān – meaning, of course, the Imam – and a functionary (i.e., a position 
involving no independent political power) of an unjust ruler, even though his efforts greatly 
increased the influence of the ‘ulamāʼ in practice, finally giving them the confidence to change 
theory. Despite Karakī’s own limited or contradictory position, the economic and political power 
he opened to the clerical estate finally proved to be a bridge, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
to the articulation of niyābah in its absolute form. 
Enjoining good and forbidding evil and jihad  
 
The role the leading jurist plays in enjoining good and forbidding evil reflects his position 
in executing the law. Karakī discusses the issue very briefly, without offering anything new. He 
considers enjoining good and forbidding evil incumbent on individuals (wājib ʻaynī), meaning 
that every adult Muslim is obliged to participate. Like Mufīd, he distinguishes three levels, i.e., 
enjoining good and forbidding evil by the heart, tongue, and hand (force). In his al-Risālah al-
najmīyah, Karakī makes enjoining good and forbidding evil obligatory for every adult, on the 
condition that one knows what s/he orders or prohibits, is aware of the impact, and is secure from 
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harm.320 The jurists do not play a special role, in enjoining good and forbidding evil in their 
capacity as jurists and the Imam’s deputy. 321 Enjoining good and forbidding evil is only a 
personal duty, as for other Muslims.  
Jihad is another topic closely connected with power. For Karakī, jihad is conditional on 
the presence of the Imam or his specific (khāṣṣ) and not general (‘āmm) deputy.322 He equates the 
warrior killed while fighting against rebels (bughāt, i.e., Muslims who oppose the Imam) with 
those killed in war against infidels.323 These are not novel views, and Karakī does not say much 
about jihad altogether, leading us to conclude that he did not do anything to develop the doctrine.  
The jurists and religio-political taxes 
 
Religious taxes, especially the one-fifth tax called khums and zakāt or alms-tax have an 
important place in Shiism. During the Occultation, it is the jurists who interpret the texts 
pertaining to religious taxes and who manage it for the most part. The scholars held two different 
views on taxes in the time of the Greater Occultation: one that the taxes should be paid to the 
jurists, and the other that they should be managed by the donors themselves.  
Concerning the one-fifth tax, Karakī holds that the jurist is responsible for receiving and 
spending the one-half constituting the Imam’s share. He says that the Imam can appoint someone 
in his place to distribute his share to those who are entitled to receive it, since deputization is 
legally allowed in such a matter, and the Imam has in fact deputized the jurists. According to 
Karakī, the jurists also have the right to specify the recipients of the tax, since the Imam’s share 
is the property of a missing (ghāʼib) person and it is the duty of the jurists to handle the property 
of such persons.324 This is a great change from the first moment of Deputyship in which the 
jurists according to Mufid are responsible neither for the gathering nor distribution of taxes. 
Clearly, the change increased the power of the religious class. Karakī does not actually make it 
clear who the recipients are, and there is no evidence showing how he managed the khums in his 
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time, but this does not indicate that the power was not used, as we would not expect these details 
to be addressed in a system that was essentially informal. Decrees from Shāh Sulaymān 
appointing the Shaykh al-Islām of Tabriz in 1093/1682 and Mashhad in 1079/1669 tell us 
definitely that the collection and distribution of khums was the responsibility of that 
personnage,325 even though these also do not throw any light on practice.  
As for zakāt, though Mufīd deems it obligatory (wājib) to pay the alms-tax to the jurists 
during the Occultation, Karakī says that it is only recommended (mandūb).326 This difference, 
however, does not imply a decrease in the power of the jurists. It only indicates the much greater 
importance of khums in this time, a situation that continues to the present day in Shiism.  
From a Shiite perspective, the land tax or kharāj belongs to the Imam, who then spends it 
in the interests of the Muslims. There is no dispute about this during the Imam’s presence. In his 
absence, however, there is much debate about the permissibility of paying kharāj to an unjust 
ruler and accepting it from that ruler. Among the religious taxes, Karakī pays the most attention 
to kharāj. It may be that the subject was important for him because it was related to the support 
he received from the Safavids. He remarks that if the Shahs were to withdraw their support, “the 
cause of the ‘‘ulamāʼ’ would be weakened and their centers of learning would become deserted 
and spiritless.”327  
Thus Karakī, unlike Mufīd, produced an independent treatise on the land-tax, entitled 
Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj fī taḥqīq ḥill al-kharāj (Putting an End to Obstinant Resistance to the Licitness of 
Kharaj).328 Composed in answer to opponents who included ‘ulamāʼ not connected with the 
Safavid state,329 Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj treats the much-debated issue in Shiite law of the disposition of 
kharāj. This had implications both for the Safavid Shahs and ‘ulamāʼ. The Safavids wanted to 
encourage their subjects to submit the land tax to them, despite hesitations that paying the tax 
would imply legitimation of an unjust ruler. As for Karakī and his fellows, they needed their 
receipt of government grants from the kharāj to be legitimized, since this was a significant 
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329 Karakī, Rasāʼil, vol. 1, 237. 
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source of income both for their religious projects and their own benefit. Karakī was actually not 
the first leading Shiite jurist to receive such support, but he became a target of criticism by some 
jurists because Shah Ṭahmāsp had bestowed on him particularly large land grants in the region of 
Najaf, in the form of a waqf or hereditary religious endowment.330  
What was Karakī’s argument? He maintained that, as during the reign of ‘Alī, cultivable 
lands taken during the Muslim conquests “by force” (maftūḥ al-ʻanwah), of which there was 
much in Iraq and Iran, belong to the entire Muslim community and not to the conquering 
warriors alone. (The exception is uncultivated land or wastelands, called arḍ mawāt, which 
belong to the Imam when he is present331 but may be renovated and cultivated without the 
permission of the Imam during the Occultation and are exempt from tax.332) It is thus the Imam 
who has authority to levy kharāj upon lands and spend it in the Muslims’ interests, for instance 
on the army, administration, and so on. Karakī then goes on to contend that the jurists receive the 
kharāj in the Imam’s interest, for although the lands and taxes from them may have been illegally 
seized by unjust governments, they remain the property of the just ruler, i.e., the Imam. The 
Imam, moreover, granted permission to his Shiites to spend the kharāj, so its control by 
government does not make it illegal to take it. Paying the land tax to an unjust ruler is not 
forbidden, for payment is a lawful duty obligatory for those who occupy land which is not their 
own property, while the ruler receiving the taxes is spending it for the community.333 Thus, 
Karakī says, the Shiites in general—whether rich or poor, jurist or non-jurist—are permitted by 
the Imams during the Occultation to receive kharāj from an unjust ruler (or from jurists if the 
jurists are collecting it), just as the pious ‘ulamāʼ in the past received it from unjust rulers without 
hesitation.334 
                                                 
330 Wilferd Madelung,  “Shiite Discussions on the Legality of the Kharāj.” in Proceedings of the 
Ninth Congress of the Union eurpéenne des arabisants et islamisants, ed. Rudolph Peters (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1981), 201. In this paper, Madelung states that the kharāj and land tenure in Shiite Imāmī law were 
classically defined in the 5th/eleventh century by al-Ṭūsī (ibid, 193). By this statement, he neglects 
Mufid’s role in development of the topic; see Modarressi, Kharāj in Islamic law, 50. 
331 Karakī, Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj, 37-8, 40, 70-72, 75. 
332 Karakī, Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj, 49, 53-5, 57-9. 
333 Karakī, Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj, 73; Jāmiʻ al-maqāṣid, vol. 3, 22. 
334 Karakī, Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj, 38.  
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Mufīd, in contrast, while also citing the practice of ‘Alī for management of the land-tax, 
is completely silent on kharāj during the Occultation and possible role the ‘ulamāʼ might play. 
Karakī’s doctrine seems to be novel, indicating, as Abisaab says, “a fundamental historical 
transformation in the economic and political conditions of the Shiite jurists.”335 Abisaab is 
correct as regards theory. Karakī is indeed the first scholar to discuss kharaj in detail and give 
permission for it to be delivered to and received from the ruler. In practice, however, many others 
before him received kharāj funds, as he himself goes on to say. Karakī confirms, in fact, that 
there is no explicit textual stipulation (naṣṣ) relating to the role of the ‘ulamāʼ in the kharāj 
during the absence of the Imam. Rather, he says, scholars who discuss the Deputyship of the 
jurists in Quranic punishments and so forth have preferred to add management of kharāj to those 
responsibilities of the ‘ulamāʼ, since people who have a right to kharāj exist in every age and it is 
less risky (because of their competence and knowledge) to give it to the jurists to distribute.336 
Karakī also cites the practice of past Shiite scholars from the 10th to the 14th century such as al-
Sharif al-Murtaḍā, 337 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī,338 and Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī339 (to which he could well 
have added ‘Allāmah Ḥillī), all of whom received land and grants from governments in their time 
without facing criticism or disagreement from other ‘ulamāʼ.340 On this basis he concludes that 
                                                 
335 Abisaab, Converting Persia, 23. 
336Karakī, Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj, 74. 
337 The family of al-Mūsawī includes Ḥusayn ibn Mūsā al-Mūsawī and his sons, al-Murtaḍā and al-
Raḍī. They worked for the Abbasids as Qāḍī (judge) and Naqīb (head of the corporation of descendants of 
the Prophet) and received considerable fiscal grants and support from the caliphate. Karakī (Qāṭiʻat al-
lajāj, 74) mentions that al-Raḍī had three provinces in his possession, while the other had eighty villages.  
338 Hulagu Khan appointed Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī as his advisor, and he also was in charge of religious 
endowments and affairs. He reckons kharāj as one of the income sources for Hulagu’s court (Qāṭiʻat al-
lajāj 86; see also M. Mīnuvī and V. Minorsky, “Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī on Finance,” Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1940], 759-761).  
339 ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, who dedicated his Minhāj al-karāmah fi ithbāt al-Imamah to the “Great 
Shāhanshāh” Sulṭān Muḥammad Khudā Bandah, was much respected in the Mogul court. He worked for 
the sulṭān and received grants and financial support from, along with many villages. See, Ḥillī, Minhāj al-
karāmah fi ithbāt al-Imāmah (Mumbai: n.p., 1294), 2 and Karakī, Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj, 86.  
340 Karakī, Qāṭiʻat al-lajāj, 74, 76, 88-89. In addition to the above-mentioned jurists, during the 
Minor Occultation, Abū Sahl Ismāʻīl Nawbakhtī (d. 311/923) worked for the Abbasids as a scribe (dabīr) 




taking land grants and taxes from unjust rulers is permissible for the jurists as it would be for 
Shiites in general to receive such taxes from the nāʼib of the Imam (i.e., the jurist) if he were the 
tax collector. Observe again how this argument begins from the assumption that the Safavids are 
unjust rulers. 
Karakī’s view was seriously contested by some of his contemporaries and others in the 
next generation of Safavid scholars. His chief critic was Shaykh Ibrāhīm ibn Sulaymān al-Qaṭīfī 
(d. ca 949/1543), who insisted that it was not only permissible but actually obligatory to abstain 
from paying kharāj to unjust rulers. Qaṭīfī uses strong language to condemn Karakī, 
characterizing his treatise as having “flimsy foundations” (wāhiyat al-mabānī) and “feeble 
meaning” (rakīkat al-maʻānī)341 and Karakī himself as “ignorant”.342 In Qaṭīfī’s view, accepting 
grants and financial support or remuneration from an unjust sulṭān is clearly unlawful.343 
According to Modarressi, Qaṭīfī’s perspective was 
  
[…] fully supported by al-Ardabīlī [Muhaqqiq Ardabili, leading Safavid jurist who 
died in 993/1585] who did not consider that an unjust ruler had any authority over 
Kharāj and Kharāj land, and he wondered why Karakī  and al-Shahīd al-Thānī had 
thought that people should pay their taxes to such rulers and not withhold their fiscal 
dues. He was also very surprised by his contemporaries who refrained from making 
use of the grants (iqṭāʻs) they had from Kharāj, and instead waited for the officials to 
divide the crop in order to receive their grants from the government’s share, thus in 
effect accepting that collection by the officials of an unjust government was valid and 
that Kharāj in such cases was legal. Al-Ardabīlī was strongly opposed to this view 
and insisted that the actions of unjust rulers and their officials did not have any legal 
validity and could not, thus, make anything lawful.344  
 
                                                 
341 Ibrāhīm ibn Sulayāan al-Qaṭīfī. al-Sirāj al-wahhāj li-dafʻ ʻajāj qāṭiʻat al-lajāj (Qom: Muʼassasat 
al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1413/[1992]), 128. 
342 Bahṛānī, Luʼluʼāt, 155. 
343 Modarressi, Kharāj in Islamic Law, 165.  
344 Modarressi, Kharāj in Islamic Law, 165-166. 
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Despite the strong disagreement seen here, Karakī’s perspective influenced the literature 
on kharāj and inspired a number of commentaries.345 This literature, however, focuses mostly on 
the permissibility or impermissibility of giving or receiving land-tax and other funds from an 
unjust ruler. It does not, surprisingly, address the role of the mujtahid in collection and spending 
of kharāj, something that was also important for Karakī. It is unclear why subsequent literature 
does not address this aspect, though it is possible that Karakī’s position as a functionary of an 
unjust ruler caused subsequent scholars to regard him as being co-opted by the state, so that 
arguing for the impermissibility or permissibility of receiving funds from an unjust ruler would 
also have covered that case.  
Thus we see that Karakī’s interpretation of kharāj and the literature that builds upon it did 
not bring additional theoretical authority to the ‘ulamāʼ. His view is based merely on the practice 
of early Shiite scholars, from al-Murtaḍā to the ‘ulamāʼ of the Ḥillah School, without effecting a 
change in the doctrine behind that practice. Karakī did, however, provide an argument for the 
legality of accepting grants from an unjust ruler that is clearer than that of his predecessors. 
Understanding Karakī’s influence in the field of Islamic taxes requires a distinction between 
these two aspects. On the one hand, he laid the foundation for a scholarly literature on kharāj and 
argued successfully (albeit in the face of opposition) for receiving grants from rulers. The 
number of jurists under the Safavids and Qājārs who received lands and other grants then greatly 
increased, as a consequence of which, as Abisaab says, the economic and political position of the 
Shiite ‘ulamāʼ changed. But on the other hand, Karakī did not manage to establish the practice of 
jurists collecting or being in charge of kharāj, and none of the Safavid ‘ulamāʼ after him did this.   
Analysis and conclusion  
 
Karakī’s expansion of the authority of the Shiite scholars was accomplished partly 
through reinterpretation of Shiite doctrine. Though development of a theoretical basis in theology 
and law was not, as I have said, the most significant factor in the rise of the ‘ulamāʼ under the 
Safavids, Karakī did manage to move theory into the era of Occultation by promoting the idea of 
general Deputyship , in the sense of Deputyship by all qualified mujtahids living in any age. This 
                                                 
345 See for instance, Karakī, et al., al-Kharājīyāt (Qom: Muʼassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1372/1993). 
This work includes five treatises on kharāj: Karakī’s piece, two from al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ardabīlī, Qaṭifī’s 
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135 
 
shift was accomplished partly through citing the tradition from Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq narrated by ʻUmar 
ibn Ḥanẓalah. As Karakī concludes from this ḥadīth that the authority granted to the mujtahids 
by the Hidden Imam is somewhat broad, it will be useful to review it here.   
In the text of the tradition preserved by Kulaynī in his al-Uṣūl min al-Kāfī, ʻUmar ibn 
Ḥanẓalah tells the story of two Shiites referring to a non-Shiite judge to solve their dispute, 
despite being forbidden by the Imams from resorting to an ungodly power (ṭāghūt).346 This 
tradition gives insight into an environment in which the Shiites, due to lack of political power, 
did not possess an official judicial institution. In the tradition, the sixth Imam Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq’s 
response is to command Shiites to find from among themselves one who can issue judgements 
who is familiar with Imamī laws and ḥadīths. Al-Ṣādiq legitimizes the authority of such a person 
by saying that he (the Imam) has appointed him to judge among the Shiites. He goes on to 
declare that he must judge in accord with Imāmī law and that not accepting his ruling is 
tantamount to refusing God’s command, rejecting the Imams, and associating (shirk) other things 
with God.347  
Karakī reinterpreted the ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah tradition principally by shifting the meaning 
of the term ḥākim (judge). Karakī, as we have seen, says that the jurist is ḥākim “in all religious 
affairs (jamī‘al-umūr al-shar‘īyah)”, so the application becomes wider than judgeship. That shift 
increased the jurists’ authority considerably, since previous scholars had limited application of 
the term to judicial affairs.348 I would actually translate ḥākim in the meaning Karakī gives it as 
“head of the community”. Note, however, that the figure Karakī constructs out of the tradition is 
not a political head of the community. As in the time of the Imams, his leadership remains 
apolitical. The tradition of ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah would continue to be important in the third 
moment of Deputyship (as, indeed, it was for Mufīd, although Mufīd simply understands it to 
mean judgeship). After the time of Karakī under the later Safavids and up to the present in Iran, 
                                                 
346 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 67.   
347 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 67. Al-Kulaynī’s view in this case is close to Mufīd’s opinion about the 
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the Imams; see his Muqni'ah, 810.     
348 Muḥsin Muhājirnīyah, ed., Andīshah’i siyāsī-i Muḥaqqiq Karakī, vol.  2 (Tehran: Puzhishgāh-i 
Farhang va- Andīsha’ih Islāmī, 1389/2010), 186.  
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scholars who wish to interpret the authority of the jurists in a political sense have depended 
increasingly on a statement in a Decree (tawqī‘) attributed to the Twelfth Imam in which he tells 
the faithful that they should when faced with “new cases that occur” refer to “those who transmit 
our traditions, for they are my proof (ḥujjah) for you as I am God’s proof for them”.349 This 
much vaguer tradition, though considered weaker than the “well-accepted” (maqbūlah) hadith 
transmitted from ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah, is more easily transferrable to the political realm.  
Material factors, however, were finally more important than developments in theory, 
proving once again that doctrinal shifts must always be understood in historical context. Working 
at this level of analysis, I have traced expansion of the authority of the ‘ulamāʼ under the 
Safavids to the establishment of a Shiite political order and concurrent emergence of a powerful 
clerical estate. The rest of this section is devoted to a third level of analysis, that of the 
personality of Karakī, which is more important, I believe, than usually supposed by scholars of 
Safavid history. At this level, we can see clearly the dynamics of juristic charisma theorized in 
Chapter One.  
Karakī is a charismatic religious authority, whose charisma is derived from two sources: 
Deputyship of the Imam and his personal qualities. We will deal here first with Deputyship. As a 
Shiite jurist and mujtahid, Karakī possessed Deputyship as all jurists do. He also widened the 
scope of Deputyship through expanding, as we have seen, the understanding of ḥukm and the 
jurists’ relation to land-tax (kharāj). Here we see the dialectical (feedback) relationship between 
charisma and the charisma holder discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation. The 
charismatic figure uses the charisma he inherits to define it more widely, which causes more 
charisma to accrue to the office, which in turn affords future holders the opportunity of defining 
it even more widely. Developments from Karakī to Khomeini clearly exhibit this dynamic. 
However, as we can see in Karakī’s writings, it had to struggle against the reality of the Imam’s 
charisma not being routinized in the office of the jurist. The Imam, though hidden, was always on 
the horizon, and broadening Deputyship was a real challenge, which Karakī was not much able to 
meet.  
What of the other source of Karakī's charisma, his personal qualities? There is no doubt 
that it was very important in Karakī's case; although, of course, if should be kept in mind that 
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personal charisma depends on the existence of office charisma, that is to say, the second is not 
relevant without the existence of the first, the potential of which it serves to activate.  
Referring to the theoretical frame of the thesis, we see that the personal charisma of the 
Shiite clerics is greatly enhanced by their alleviating the political deprivation suffered by the 
community. Safavid rule provided new political opportunities for the Shiite religious class, who 
were now able to think of formulating and advancing a religious program. Karakī as a pious 
mujtahid desiring the establishment of a Shiite state was quite eager to take advantage of this 
framework by associating with Shāh Ismāʻīl Ӏ.350 Happily for Karakī, Shāh Ismāʻīl’s son and 
successor Shāh Ṭahmāsp was also sympathetic with jurisprudential rather than philosophical or 
mystical Shiism.351 Interests between the Safavid political system and Shiite ‘ulamāʼ were mutual 
and finally influenced both sides. Karakī thus became a political realist in the line of al-Murtaḍā, 
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, and ʻAllāmah al-Ḥillī, all of whom associated with 
the governments of their time in the interests of religion and sometimes personal gain.   
A personally charismatic figure rises through support from his followers, the charismatic 
community that constructs his charisma. Karakī achieved his position not only by alleviating 
Shiite political deprivation through his influence in the Safavid state, but also effective 
mobilization. His use of the Friday prayer is a striking example of mobilization, along with 
creation of a clerical bureaucracy overseeing the propagation of Shiism, which he supervised. 
The titles given to him by the Shah, though adding nothing to his religious authority (i.e., office 
charisma) were an additional sign of his political influence and thus contributed to his personal 
charisma. Karakī also strengthened his personal charisma through his anti-Sunnite sectarianism. 
He was, indeed, radically anti-Sunnite.352 In his Nafaḥāt al-lāhut fi laʻn al-jibt wa-al-ṭāghūt - 
Divine Breaths Cursing the Idol and Tyrant - written in 917/1511 in Mashhad and dedicated to 
Shāh Ismāʻīl Ӏ, he argues for the permissibility of cursing the first and second caliphs Abū Bakr 
and ʻUmar.353 He attempts to demonstrate that the Quran, Sunnah and even some reliable Sunnite 
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sources prove that Abū Bakr and ʻUmar were pagans and thus properly subject to cursing. Karakī 
actually accompanied the Safavid king to his battles with Sunnites, from the Ottoman borders to 
Herat and central Asia. Karakī’s anti-Sunnism is not very new in Shiism, but novel for being so 
open, and thus surely gave the Shiite population a sense of some power. Note here how important 
historical context is to the making of charisma. Khomeini’s anti-sectarian rhetoric was a great 
factor in stoking his charisma not only among Shiites but Muslims in general because it 
represented an ideal response to the problems of his time (principally, Western imperialism). 
Through open anti-Sunnism demonstrated even by attendance in military campaigns, Karakī in 
the Safavid age similarly provided a response to the problems of Ottoman domination and 
legitimacy and need for confidence by an isolated Shiite state and society.  
Karakī’s willingness to be close to power was due not only to realism, but the personal 
characteristic of ambition or aspiration. As Madelung notes, he was ambitious and keen to claim 
religious leadership of the community.354 Such a characteristic can be important in gathering 
personal charisma, as we will see in the example of Khomeini. Ambition is often related to 
personal interest. Madelung is inclined to think that Karakī wrote his treatise on kharāj 
particularly to defend his wealth in Iraq,355 and Karakī’s legal opinions stating positive positions 
toward government seem to be in harmony with his work for and strong relationship with the 
court, from which he derived much wealth. In the view of Qaṭīfī, Karakī was an example of the 
jurist whose following in religious affairs has been forbidden by the Prophet because of 
association with kings.356 There is evidence for the later Safavid period showing how some 
religious scholars changed their views in order to gain positions in the Safavid administration.357  
                                                                                                                                                              
taghut/oclc/74813933&referer=brief_results). Karakī has surely adopted the title from Quran 4: 
51-52, where we find the two terms jibt and ṭāghūt rather than jubbat and ṭāghūt. 
354 Wilferd Madelung, “Shiite Discussions”, 194. 
355 Wilferd Madelung, “Shiite Discussions”, 196. 
356 Qaṭīfī, al-Sirāj al-wahhāj, 22-23, 128-129.    
357 Muḥsin Fayḍ al-Kāshānī (d. 1090/1680), a philosopher, traditionist, gnostic, and jurist of the 
Safavid period, was Friday prayer leader under Shāh ʻAbbās II. He held that Friday congregational prayer 
is individually incumbent during the Occultation. (Rasūl Jaʻfariyān, Dawāzdah risālat-i fiqhī dar bāra-ih 
namāz-i jumʻah az rūzgār-i Ṣafavī [Qom: Anṣāriyān, 1381/2003], 41, 43.). Information can be gleaned 
about the environment in which Safavid scholars altered their legal views from his treatise of “I‘tidhār yā 
Shikwāīyah” The treatise is written in response to a scholar from Khurāsān who asked Kāshānī to 
intercede with the Shāh to grant him the Friday prayer leadership in Mashhad or guardianship of the 
139 
 
Did charisma accrue to Karakī, as it did for Mufid, because he was an unusually great 
scholar or offered novel interpretations of the tradition? Here we must admit that Karakī’s 
exceptionality, to put it in Weberian terms, did not lie in his scholarly production, which really 
consists only of the commentary on Ḥillī (although it is thirteen volumes long) and a number of 
epistles. Rather, Karakī was exceptional and is remembered for the actions he undertook in the 
favourable environment provided by the Safavid state. He does, on the other hand, provide a few 
novel interpretations. Apart from changes in legal theory relating to the Friday prayer and land-
tax and a reinterpretation of the religious texts that proposed giving the high-ranking jurist or 
mujtahid supervision over “all religious affairs”, Karakī was the first Shiite scholar to compose 
an independent treatise on the necessity of following or “emulation” (taqlīd) of a living mujtahid. 
Though the treatise has been lost, Rasūl Ja‘fariyān has determined that its main arguments are 
preserved in Muḥaqqiq Ardabīlī’s work on the same subject (although Ardabīlī does not actually 
name Karakī). The first argument is that the legal opinion of a mujtahid loses validity at his 
death; the second is that the rationale a mujtahid provides is necessarily presumptive (ẓannī) and 
thus no longer valid after he dies; and the third is that since it is obligatory to follow (taqlīd) the 
opinions of the mujtahid who is most learned, one cannot follow a deceased mujtahid as it will 
no longer be possible to determine if he still is the best candidate.358 Karakī also emphasizes 
taqlīd of a living mujtahid in his treatise Sharḥ alfīyah, asserting that it enjoys the consenus of 
the Shiite scholars.359 I have delayed mentioning Karakī’s conspicuous role in establishing the 
principle that Shiites can do taqlīd only of a living mujtahid because of its relevance to personal 
charisma. With the rise of this doctrine, the chief mujtahids were able to more easily gather and 
                                                                                                                                                              
shrine of Imam Riḍā as a source of income for his family, and to prevent his rival from gaining those 
positions. Kāshānī, however, rejected his friend’s request.  He remarks that the scholars in Iṣfahān, whom 
he characterizes as capricious and world-seeking, were constantly in conflict.  Kāshānī divides them into 
four groups: one without religious status or political power; a second consisting of those calling 
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innovations into religion; a third, “satanic” group led by sin and violent revolt to deny the obligation of 
the Friday prayer; and a fourth consisting of persons indifferent to the observance or abandonment of 
obligation (Jaʻfariyān, Dawāzdah Risālat, 42 – 46).  
358 Al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ardabīlī, Kitāb hafdah risālat (Qum: Kungrah-i Muqaddas al-Ardabīlī, 
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ta’thīr-i ān dar andīshah-‘i sīyāsī-i Shī‘ah”, ‘Ulūm-i sīyāsī, Autumn 1383 [2004], Vol. 27, 176-177. 
359 Karakī, Rasāʼil, vol. 3, 176. 
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exert that charisma, since the faithful were directed to follow them personally instead of texts and 
figures from the past. The idea that the mujtahid whom one follows must be living made their 
personalities a focus of attention, as if it were designed to ensure that their personal qualities 
could activate the charisma dormant in their office. The doctrine of a living mujtahid also freed 
living clerics to some degree from the rulings of the past so that they were more easily able to 
produce novel and exceptional interpretations.  
Despite these juristic innovations, however, Karakī never went over the theological red 
lines of Shiism concerning unjust rule and the exclusive right of the Hidden Imam to political 
power. Theologically speaking, he did not even come close to legitimating Safavid rule. And he 
did not gain actual political charisma, for he confined the mujtahid’s authority to religious 
affairs. History does not tell us if Karakī was unwilling or simply unable to claim absolute 
religio-political authority for himself and the mujtahids. The upshot, in any case, is that his 
political charisma remained dormant, as it had for Mufīd. Like Mufīd’s students who associated 
with the Abbasids and then members of the School of Ḥillah who worked for the Mongols, 
Karakī lessened the political deprivation of the community through his association with and 
influence on the so-called unjust ruler; but he did not himself own or claim rulership and political 
power. Actual possession of political charisma, along with the much more exceptional 
mobilization and charismatic personality that accompanies it in Shiism, comes only in the third 




Chapter Four: Khomeini and the doctrine 
of wila yah: Reviving the Prophet’s 
authority  
This chapter explores the activist approach taken by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in a 
third moment of Deputyship in the 20th century. The theory and historico-social roots of this 
phase go back to Safavid and Qājār times. Under the Safavids and Qājārs, the jurists associated 
extensively with the state, religious centers flourished, and the economic level of the ‘ulamāʼ 
overall was raised. The latter decades of Qājār rule also saw the arrival of modern thought in Iran 
along with the intrusion of foreign powers. These developments stimulated participation of the 
‘ulamāʼ in social and political affairs.  
At this moment, we see Islam portrayed as a complete system embracing not only ritual 
and law, but economics and politics. Political aspects in particular are significant in this new 
ideology, to the extent that Islam comes to be equated with state and governance. In his treatise 
Guardianship of the Jurist (Vilāyat-i faqīh) written a decade before the 1979 Iranian Islamic 
Revolution,360 Khomeini warns that lack of Islamic government leaves the frontiers and 
territories of Islam defenseless and amounts to discontinuation of Islam altogether.361 The 
appearance of this idea should be understood in light of the Occultation. That event interrupted 
the continuity of the line of the Imamate, leaving, in effect, a leadership vacuum expected to be 
filled at a later, unknown date. Even before the Occultation, none of the Shiite Imams apart from 
the first Imam, ʻAlī, was able to establish a state (though that circumstance, of course, was not 
linked to leaving Islam defenseless or in danger of decline). Khomeini’s theory of Guardianship 
represented a bridging of this rupture through replacing the Imam by the jurist. Khomeini, 
however, goes further. He charges himself and his colleagues with a responsibility that most of 
                                                 
360 Khomeini began his discussions on Islamic government (Arabic wilāyat al-faqīh) in 1970 in 
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the Imams did not shoulder by declaring it the duty of the ‘ulamāʼ to work toward the 
establishment of an Islamic state: 
 
You must teach the people matters relating to worship, of course, but more important 
are the political, economic, and legal aspects of Islam. These are, or should be, the 
focus of our concern. It is our duty to begin exerting ourselves now in order to 
establish a truly Islamic government. We must propagate our cause to the people, 
instruct them in it, and convince them of its validity. We must generate a wave of 
intellectual awakening, to emerge as a current throughout society, and gradually, to 
take shape as an organized Islamic movement made up of the awakened, committed, 
and religious masses who will rise up and establish an Islamic government.362 
 
Nine years after the victory of revolution, Khomeini re-iterated that statehood or 
governance in his theory actually meant “Absolute Guardianship” (al-wilāyah al-mutlaqah lil-
faqīh) as granted to the Prophet Muḥammad by God. He deemed Absolute Guardianship the most 
important of religious imperatives or “rulings” (aḥkām), a fundamental or “primary” ruling that 
cannot ever be abridged by secondary rules (furū‘) including even prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage 
to Mecca, while the secondary can be abridged by the primary.363 The third moment of 
Deputyship examined here occurs a millennium after the first, but they share a common theme. 
Mufīd distances the ‘ulamāʼ from politics because he sees no proof that they are the political 
heirs of the Imams, while Khomeini argues in favor of a jurist-led state on the premise that the 
jurists are the Imam’s heirs. Governance, however, is the central concern for both. Both scholars 
are concerned with the leadership vacuum described above, even if their attitudes toward it are 
completely different. We will see in this chapter that Khomeini’s conception of Deputyship – for 
which he uses the term wilāyah rather than niyābah - includes political power, a very potent force 
in gathering personal charisma in Shiism.  
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Life and times  
 
Ruhollah Khomeini was born in 1902 in Khumayn, a small town in central Iran. His 
paternal grandfather came from India in the early 19th century first to Iraq and then to Iran. When 
he was only five month old, Ruhollah lost his father, Sayyid Muṣṭafā Mūsawī, leaving him in the 
care of his mother and aunt.364 Despite these tragedies, the family did not fall into poverty since it 
belonged to the religious nobility, with learned scholars in the line and both parents originating 
from land-owning families365 even though Khomeini’s forebears were not in the stratum of the 
great and wealthy landed ‘ulamāʼ.  
Khomeini completed his elementary studies in his birth town and then attended the rather 
small seminary in Arāk. In 1921 he arrived in Qum, the main seminary town in Iran at that time 
just as it is at the present. There he began to show his political tendencies by encouraging reform 
within the Qum religious institutions and curricula. In addition to the customary seminary studies 
of law, uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), Quranic sciences, ethics, Arabic literature, 
logic, and so on, Khomeini immersed himself in philosophy and mysticism. His main teachers in 
jurisprudence were Ayatollah Muḥammad Taqī Khwānsārī, Ayatollah ʻAbd al-Karīm Ḥā’irī 
Yazdī, and Ayatollah Burujirdī. None of these was politically active. Khomeini studied 
philosophy with Shaykh Muḥammad Riḍā Najafī Iṣfahānī, Mīrzā ʻAlī Akbar Ḥakīm Yazdī, and 
Abū al-Ḥasan Rafīʻī Qazwīnī, all leading teachers in the field. In the realm of Islamic mystical 
thought or “Gnosis” (‘irfān), his mentors were Mīrzā Jawād Malikī Tabrīzī and Ayatollah 
Muḥammad ʻAlī Shāhābādī, from whom Khomeini imbibed the mysticism and philosophy of Ibn 
ʻArabī and Mullā Ṣadrā.  A few words about ‘irfān are in order here, since Khomeini’s 
attachment to the subject was somewhat unusual among the ‘ulamāʼ at this time and some of his 
charismatic appeal was drawn from it.  Though Islamic mysticism contains many schools and 
branches, it may be said in general that it focuses on reaching unity with God and achieving a 
transcendent unity of being through direct, experiential knowledge (hence the word “Gnosis”) of 
the divine.  ‘Irfān, a term used especially in the Persian-speaking world and in Shiism, suggests a 
philosophical mysticism or theosophy.  Ibn ʻArabī (d. 638/1240), though not Shiite, is a seminal 
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figure in ‘irfān, as is the Shiite member of the Iran-centered Illuminationist (Ishrāqī) school and 
exponent of “Transcendent Wisdom” (ḥikmah muta‘āliyah), Mullā Ṣadrā (d.1050/1640). The 
influence of both figures on Khomeini may be judged by his mention of them  in a letter to 
Mikhail Gorbachev, in which he lauds the “Great Shaykh” (al-Shaykh al-Akbar, an epithet of Ibn 
‘Arabī) and invites Gorbachev to send Russian experts in Islamic mysticism to Qom to  learn 
more about him.366 
Khomeini started teaching when he was twenty-seven years old.367 Ethics was the first 
topic he taught, followed by ‘irfān. His first book, written during this same period, was Miṣbāḥ 
al-hidāyah ilā al-khilāfah wa-al-wilāyah (Lamp of Guidance to Caliphate and Guardianship), 
caliphate and guardianship being two concepts that would remain important through his life. 
Lamp of Guidance was published in 1931. In 1943, at the age of forty-one, Khomeini wrote his 
Kashf al-asrār (Revealing of Secrets), in which he voiced his opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty. 
The inexperienced young Pahlavi Shah, Mohammad Reza, recently placed on the throne by the 
British who had deposed his father Reza Shah, was in Khomeini’s estimation “a mere soldier” 
unworthy of power who had violated Islamic law and betrayed the country.368 Citing the 
infamous massacre of religious students in Mashhad at the Gawhar Shād Mosque in 1935 in 
which, according to Khomeini, thousands were killed, he denounces the government established 
by Reza Shah as “unjust” and “infidel”. He condemns the two Pahlavis rulers for their promotion 
of a Western lifestyle and declares that those who support them are worse than infidels.369 
Khomeini claims that the ‘ulamāʼ opposed Mohamed Shah’s rule from its inception because they 
considered continuation of his regime to be contrary to the interests of the country. The ‘ulamāʼ, 
he says, constitute the major obstacle to the Shah’s goals, as a result of which he suppresses them 
whenever he can, not stopping even at murder.370 The feeling of outrage on behalf of religion and 
country that would become characteristic of Khomeini’s writings and declarations is already 
fully displayed in this early work.  
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Khomeini’s entry into politics began in 1963 with his opposition to the policies of 
Mohamed Reza Shah, notably the social and land reform program begun in 1961 known as the 
White Revolution, In 1964, Khomeini bitterly condemned the granting of diplomatic immunity to 
American military personnel in a speech that has since become famous for its call to resistance:  
 
By God, whoever does not come out in protest is a sinner! By God, whoever 
does not express his outrage commits a major sin! 
Leaders of Islam, come to the aid of Islam!  
‘ulamāʼ of Najaf, come to the aid of Islam!  
‘ulamāʼ of Qum, come to the aid of Islam; Islam is destroyed!371 
 
The initial impetus for Khomeini’s bitter opposition to the immunity measure was a widely-
perceived capitulation of Iran’s autonomy to the United States. Behind this, however, his focus, 
as ever, was on Islam. His activism led to an uprising in Qum, following which he was arrested, 
imprisoned, and finally sent into exile in 1964, going first to Turkey, then in 1965 to Iraq, and 
finally after the Shah used his influence to have him expelled from Iraq, to France in 1978.372  
Upon his arrival in Iraq, Khomeini immediately began teaching in the chief seminary 
town of Najaf. The tone and emphasis of his writings completed in Iraq are more political than 
before his exile. In Iran apart from the book on Gnosticism, Khomeini, as mentioned above, had 
excoriated the Shah in his Revealing of Secrets. He had also touched on the role of the ‘ulamāʼ 
during the Occultation in a third entitled al-Ijtihād wa-al-taqlīd (Legal Reasoning and Following 
the Religio-legal Authority).The doctrine of Guardianship, however, is nowhere in evidence. In 
Revealing of Secrets, “guardianship and governance of the jurist” (vilāyat va-ḥukūmat-i faqīh) 
simply means that jurists can and should have the right to be members of parliament or part of an 
assembly appointing a king so that they can ensure Islamic law is not violated. The role for the 
jurists Khomeini envisions here is quite similar to that of the ‘ulamāʼ under the Qājārs and during 
the Constitutional Revolution. Khomeini’s al-Ijtihād wa-al-taqlīd, written at the age of forty-
seven, does seem to foreshadow his theory of Guardianship by describing the jurist as “he who 
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has guardianship (wilāyah) and a leading role (za‘āmah) in legal-political affairs (al-umūr al-
siyīsīyah al-shar‘īyah)373. As in Revealing of Secrets, however, he actually does not call for the 
overthrow of the Pahlavi regime.  
Khomeini’s first work completed in Iraq was the Taḥrīr al-wasīlah, a commentary on the 
Wasīlah of Isfahani (see below) in which he adds some political content to the traditionally 
apolitical subject of legal issues encountered by believers in everyday life. Khomeini’s other 
books compiled in Iraq, the Vilāyat-i faqīh: hụkūmat-i Islāmī - his famous Guardianship of the 
Jurist or Islamic Government - and Kitāb al-bayʻ (Book on Sales) are thoroughly political. 
Khomeini speaks openly and determinedly against the monarchy in Iran and outlines his theory 
of Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist (al-wilāyah al-muṭlaqah lil-faqīh). With his exile, the 
battle against the Pahlavī monarchy had begun in earnest.  
From the success of the revolution in 1979 to his death in 1989, Khomeini ceased writing, 
focusing instead on preserving the Islamic Republic. In his public declarations in this period, he 
equates the Islamic state with that of Prophet and thus support of and obedience to it a religious 
obligation.  
Key terms and concepts  
 
Key concepts appearing in the two previous moments of Deputyship change significantly 
in the third. Terms used by the ‘ulamāʼ in the past are given new meanings, and entirely new 
words are introduced. Expanding the authority of the jurists and declaring political leadership by 
them to be a religious imperative would not have been possible without a new vocabulary. 
Khomeini gives political meaning to words that were entirely non-political in the times of Mufīd 
and Karakī.   
As in the previous moment, the term deputy (nāʼib) means the deputy of the Imam. Mullā 
Aḥmad Narāqī (d. 1245/1829), the great jurist of the Qājār period who is known for issuing a 
fatwa declaring jihad against Russian encroachment, refers in his Profitable Points for Present 
Days, a treatise on government written at the request at Fatḥ ‘Alī Shāh, to both the specific and 
                                                 




general deputyship.374 Narāqī argues that the jurists have authority or “guardianship” (wilāyah) 
over all affairs in which the Prophet and Imams possessed guardianship – save that which is 
excluded by the consensus of religious scholars, the explicit texts (naṣṣ) and so on, as for 
instance minors whose fathers have died but still have other guardians375 – along with other 
affairs of the believers, whether religious or generally necessary for carrying on life in this 
world.376 As can be seen from this passage, Narāqī defines the competence of the jurist widely 
and then excludes certain specific matters; whereas Mufīd and Karakī’s approach is to list 
specific matters and confine the jurist’s authority to those. Khomeini takes an approach very 
similar to that of Narāqī. 
Khomeini does not actually employ the term nāʼib in its technical sense of deputy of the 
Imam in his main writings on Guardianship, al-Ijtihād wa-al-taqlīd (where he does, however, 
mention it once, but in a general sense377), Book of Sales, and Guardianship of the Jurist. In the 
Taḥrīr al-wasīlah, in contrast, he uses nāʼib eight times in discussing inheritance, Quranic 
punishments, judgeship, and signing a contract with a captive member of the People of the Book. 
Although he does not indicate explicitly if he means nāʼib in the general sense of any deputy or 
technical sense of Deputy of the Imam, he seems to have in mind in the three cases just 
mentioned378 and also in relation to judgeship, where he calls the judge “guardian of the 
Muslims, or their nāʼib”,379 specific Deputyship, i.e., the capacity of the four figures appointed 
successively by the Hidden Imam during the Minor Occultation. He does not seem to be referring 
to the general Deputyship of the Occultation.  
Thus there is a shift in terminology. Though Majlisī in the late Safavid period, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, appointed the Shah in his capacity as nāʼib of the Imam, he 
also speaks of the wilāyah of the jurists, jurist here meaning mujtahid. Narāqī mentions general 
Deputyship, but nevertheless prefers the term wilāyah. Khomeini leaves the terms nāʼib and 
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niyābah (in the technical sense of general Deputyship) behind and settles entirely on wilāyah. It 
appears that the two later scholars archived the words nāʼib and niyābah because they are less 
expansive than wilāyah, which can be understood as meaning leadership of the community. As 
the confidence of the jurists increased, they saw themselves as actual leaders; though the idea 
that they are deputized by the Imam was still, of course, in the background.   
Ḥākim and ḥukm are key terms in all three periods. Both Narāqī and Khomeini 
understand hākim and ḥukm as seen in the Shiite traditions to mean ruler or head of state and 
rule, whereas for Mufīd they meant the judge and judgement, and for Karakī, the mujtahid and 
handling of all religious affairs.380 With this new definition of ḥukm, the jurist is given 
competence in both judicial and executive affairs. In fact according to Khomeini, the ḥākim 
during the Occultation occupies the highest executive position and appoints all others as sub-
authorities in his government.  
Evolution in the terms ḥākim and ḥukm can be seen even the work of Khomeini. In the 
section on the fifth tax (khums) in his Taḥrīr al-wasīlah, he equates ḥākim with mujtahid, like 
Karakī. The statement made is that the share of the one-fifth tax due to the descendants of the 
Prophet should be paid to the ḥākim, as the safest course of action (ʻalā al-aḥwaṭ). 381 Ḥākim here 
evidently means a mujtahid qualified to issue responsa, especially since the expression al-ḥākim 
al-sharʻī, “legal ḥākim” is employed (Note that Khomeini’s Taḥrīr is actually based on the 
Wasīlat al-najāt of Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan Iṣfahānī (d, 1946), who was apolitical, so that Iṣfahānī’s 
original may have affected the usage and obscured Khomeini’s political bent).382 In the Book of 
Sales also written in Najaf, Ayatollah Khomeini also, again like Karakī, defines ḥākim as a 
“jurist qualified to issue legal opinions”, but then adds that he is responsible for “Islamic rulings 
in general, including as they extend to social affairs”. 383 Note that the section in which this 
statement appears is headed “the necessity of Islamic government” and discusses politics.  
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 Khomeini seems to realize the difficulty in turning the word ḥākim, so important for his 
theory of Guardianship, in a political direction. He is aware that he has to escape the restricted 
contexts in which the word is found in Shiite traditions in order to expand its application to 
politics. His treatment of the report of ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah (key for the term ḥākim and 
introduced in the previous chapters) in which the sixth Imam al-Ṣādiq forbids his followers to 
refer their disputes to non-Shiite authorities because they represent ungodly powers (ṭāghūt) is 
one example. The ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah tradition says that Shiites are to seek out qualified persons 
from among themselves to judge; the subject is obviously judges and judgeship. In the Book of 
Sales, however, he gives a political sense to the tradition by recruiting passages from the Quran 
and additional hadiths. For instance, in Quran 4:59, God commands the believers to “obey God 
and the Messenger, and those in authority from among you; then if you quarrel about anything, 
refer it to God and the Messenger, if you believe in God and the last day”. Khomeini points out 
that the verse gives three examples of power that must be obeyed, and then two of referees to 
whom disputes are to be referred. He argues that the presence of these together means that 
disputes are referred to the latter because they are, like the former, wālīs (governors), and not 
because they are judges.384 Among the Traditions Khomeini cites is one in which the jurists are 
called trustees (umanā’) of the prophets. He argues that since the Prophet of Islam had not only 
religious but also political responsibility, which clearly includes leadership of society and 
establishment of justice, the jurists, who are his trustees in all aspects of his prophethood, also 
have that responsibility. 385 On the basis of these additional texts, Khomeini concludes that ḥākim 
in the tradition of ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah, as (supposedly) in all others, includes both judgeship and 
political leadership, so that the ḥākim-jurist also owns political power.386  
Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpretation of this Tradition (very important for his theory of 
Guardianship even though he also cites eighteen others) is clearly ahistorical.  The context of the 
Tradition is the time of the Imām al-Ṣādiq. This raises two problems. First, the Imām tells the 
members of his community to resort to Shiite judges in his time. There is no indication that they 
are to continue this practice during the Occultation. Karakī had realized this difficulty and tried 
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to convince his readers that this it was not problematic at all, because the Imāms’ commandments 
are identical and thus do not change with time.387 The second, more serious problem arises when 
the term ḥākim or ḥukm is given a political sense, as Khomeini does in his theory of vilāyat-i 
faqīh. The idea that the judges referred to by Imām al-Ṣādiq have political power does not make 
sense, since there was no such power available at the time (and we have seen that Shiite scholars 
consequently understood ḥākim and ḥukm to mean judgeship).  
These same two points are made by two modern clerical critics of Khomeini’s theory of 
Guardianhip, Muḥsin Kadīvar (b. 1959) and Mahdī Hā’irī Yazdī (d. 1999). Kadīvar remarks in 
addition that applying the terms ḥākim and ḥukm to governance, as Khomeini does, is a 
transference from modern Persian usage to Arabic,388 while Hā’irī Yazdī believes that 
Khomeini’s “verbal fallacy” (mughālaṭ-i ishtirāk-i lafẓī) in adding political to judicial meaning 
originates with Narāqī and a few of his followers.389 While these particular findings coincide 
with my own, Kadīvar and Hā’irī Yazdī are, of course, working from inside the tradition as 
Shiite jurisprudents. Their goal is to prove that Khomeini is “wrong” in his assertions while 
they are “right”, and they have their own, creative and actually quite politicized views of 
juristic authority.  Since this dissertation, in contrast, approaches the tradition from outside 
the tradition, my goal is rather to analyze Khomeini’s views as one interpretation among 
others, as the product of evolution within a historical context just like prior interpretations.  
Khomeini’s usage of salṭanat (kingdom or political entity, related to the word sulṭān or 
political power) also evolves. We first see the word in his Revealing of Secrets. There he says 
that whenever a salṭanat was formed, wise individuals acknowledged its necessity. The ‘ulamāʼ 
never opposed it in essence, even though they may have criticized kings because of their 
policies.390 In his Guardianship of the Jurist, however, he absolutely denies salṭanat on the 
grounds that kingdoms and dynasties in Muslim territories are an illegitimate form of 
government created by the hated Umayyads on the model of ancient Egypt, Persia, and 
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[1988 or 1989]), 143. 
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Byzantium.391 In Khomeini’s al-Ijtihād wa-al-taqlīd, written twenty-eight years before the 
victory of the Islamic revolution, salṭanat no longer means kingdom and dynasty but the 
dominion of the Prophet and Imams. Without actually discussing the import of sulṭān as Mufīd 
and Karakī do, Khomeini calls the Prophet the “sulṭān” appointed by God as caliph and ḥākim 
over the community possessing absolute religious and political authority (al-ḥukūmah wa-al-
khilāfah al-muṭlaqah); and after the Prophet, he says, the Imams are the sulṭāns of Islam, 
possessing the same authority.392  
Khomeini and other proponents of the theory of Guardianship of the Jurist also give 
political meaning to the term walī, which in classical texts means guardian or custodian of 
minors, orphans, and the mentally and physically unfit. The jurist now becomes the walī of the 
Muslim community overall, because, as Narāqī puts it, non-jurists are “ignorant” (jāhil, i.e., not 
expert in Islamic law) and thus likely to go astray like orphans if left without guidance.393 Thus 
the jurist is walī and the walī is the leader of the community.  
The terms khilāfah (caliphate, succession) and caliph seldom appear in Shiite texts. Mufīd 
uses the term caliphate only once in his Muqniʻah to describe the succession to the Prophet394 
and once also in Awā’ilal-Maqālāt in mentioning the caliphate of the three first caliphs of 
Islam.395 He does on several occasions give the title caliph to the Imams in general, and ʻAlī or 
the Mahdī in particular.396 Karakī, similarly, speaks of the caliphate just once in the third volume 
of his Rasāʼil, again in connection with the caliphate following the Prophet.397 The term wilāyah 
is more common than khilāfah in Shiite literature, and seems to replace it in relation to the 
Imams. Khomeini, in contrast, utilizes the term caliphate frequently; no less than fifteen times, 
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for instance, in his Guardianship of the Jurist.398 In his discussions of Guardianship, khilāfah is 
equivalent to wilāyah. Khomeini makes even the very well-established phrases “creative 
authority” (wilāyah takwīnīyah) and “legislative authority” (wilāyah tashrīʻīyah) into creative 
caliphate (khilāfah ilāhīyah takwīnīyah) or great caliphate (al-khilāfah al-kubrā), and legislative, 
conventional caliphate (al-khilāfah al-iʻtibārī al-jaʻlī). (To clarify: creative or “creative divine” 
authority, al-khilāfah al-ilāhīyah al-takwīnīyah, is something belonging only to certain 
Messengers of God and the Imams, while “legislative authority” belongs to the Prophet, Imams, 
and then jurists.399) In the section on Guardianship of the Jurist in his Kitāb al-bayʻ, Khomeini 
also routinely writes khilāfah in place of wilāyah400 and calls the rule of the jurist both wilāyat al-
faqīh and khilāfat al-faqīh.401 In this way, wilāyah is pushed in a political direction; khilāfah 
(caliphate) means wilāyah and wilāyah thus more certainly means governance.402 It is interesting 
that Khomeini’s gnostic treatise on the authority of the Perfect Man written when he was only 
twenty-nine already combines khilāfah and wilāyah, as seen in its title, “Lamp of Guidance to 
Khilafah and Wilayah”.403 In his Guardianship of the Jurist or Islamic Government, wilāyah 
finally takes on its widest meaning of “governance, administering the country, and enforcing the 
laws of the holy Shariah”.404 Khomeini’s emphasis in Guardianship of the Jurist on wilāyah as a 
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critical and burdensome duty is worth mentioning.405 He seems to want to deflect the perception 
that he is seeking privilege and prestige for the jurists.  
Wālī (governor) according to Mufid means specifically an agent appointed by the Imam. 
Khomeini, however, understands the word in its general sense of a governing figure, i.e., head of 
the community. For Khomeini, wālī is equal to ḥākim. Khomeini uses the word in this broad 
sense to refer, in their capacity as legislative authorities, to the Prophet, Imams, and jurists.406 
During the Occultation, says Khomeini, the two qualifications for a wālī - here, obviously, a 
jurist - are knowledge of jurisprudence and justice, since both reason and the texts exclude the 
leadership of those who are ignorant and unjust.407 Khomeini believes knowledge of 
jurisprudence to be key to leadership. A just jurist is wālī (governor) of the Muslims because it is 
obligatory for a governor to be expert in jurisprudence.408 Khomeini thus first equates wālī with 
the head of state, and then says that only the jurist is qualified to hold that position. If the jurists 
are able to establish an Islamic state, they must do, because they are wālī. They should work 
together to do so, and if one of them manages it, the others should obey him. But even when the 
jurists are not in a position to set up a government, they are still wālī, possessing wilāyah over all 
the affairs of the community, including taxes, the treasury, execution of Quranic punishments, 
and the “lives of Muslims” (nufūs al-muslimīn) overall.409  
Khomeini politicized the meanings of ijtihād (independent legal reasoning) and mujtahid 
(one who does that reasoning). Already in the 1960s, religious scholars close to Khomeini had 
begun speaking of a marjiʻiyah (institution of the leading jurist whose legal opinions are 
followed by the laity) with religio-political aspects. The notions of ijtihād and mujtahid were 
further politicized by Khomeini after the Islamic Revolution. In Khomeini’s view, the mujtahid 
possesses the best knowledge of society and politics, which allows him to benefit the people 
most. On the basis of this conviction, he argues that the ijtihād currently practiced in the Shiite 
seminaries is not sufficient for being a mujtahid in social and political issues, even if the 
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mujtahid concerned is very learned in the subjects commonly studied. Such a person if not expert 
in social issues is unable to discern the public interest and thus cannot be the leader of society.410  
This politicized sense of ijtihād and mujtahid represents a major transition in ideas about 
who a mujtahid is, what his authority is, and what his followers expect him to be. Khomeini 
remarks that it was not acceptable in his time for the youth and even laity in general that their 
marjiʻ (leading mujtahid whose legal opinions are followed) not speak about political issues. 
People expect their mujtahid to be familiar with economics, international affairs, and so on. For 
Khomeini, a qualified mujtahid must be capable of leading a large society. Thus, in addition to 
piety, knowledge, and sincerity, a qualified jurist needs to know how to govern the country, since 
governance, in Khomeini’s view, is the core of jurisprudence and its practical philosophy.411  
Personal charisma through politicization 
 
The case of Khomeini is most productively analyzed at the level of his personality, 
including his scholarship. Khomeini was a charismatic figure, whose charisma came, as 
explained in the first chapter, from office charisma in the first instance and personal qualities in 
the second. While he possessed office charisma as all Shiite jurists do, his personal charisma was 
outstanding to an extent not seen in a millennium of Occultation. That charisma derived from his 
qualities and exceptional intellectual profile, but above all from his entry into politics. The thesis 
asserts that the Shiite jurists very effectively gather charisma and are able to mobilize followers 
whenever they are able to alleviate the political deprivation of the Shiite community, and 
Khomeini certainly did that.  
Historical circumstances in Khomeini’s case work differently than for Mufīd and Karakī. 
They are important chiefly in term of the Ayatollah’s perception of and reaction to them. It has 
been unusual for the Twelver Shiite ‘ulamāʼ to state their political views or claim power, due to 
the pressure they have been under from various rulers, whether Sunnite, Safavid, or Pahlavi. 
When they enjoyed relative freedom under the Safavids and Qājārs, they did reach for political 
influence to some extent (as well as rising in wealth and social standing), and this caused the 
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doctrine to take on a somewhat more political colour, as we see faintly in the case of Karakī and 
much more strikingly in Narāqī, who was able to tout the role of the clerics because he was 
actually asked by Fatḥ ‘Alī Shāh to do so. This dynamic or balance seems to be irrelevant to 
Khomeini, especially from the time of the 1963 Qum uprising when he decided to no longer go 
along with the quietest establishment. He drew on his charisma to proceed on an activist path 
regardless of the facts of lack of clerical power under the Pahlavī monarchy, Western 
domination, and so on. His personal charisma transcended material and historical circumstances, 
or rather, he was able with his charisma to make ingenious use of them.   
 Babak Rahimi and Ervand Abrahamian are two scholars who attribute Khomeini’s 
activism chiefly to his environment – in the first case, in Iran, and in the second in Iraq. Neither 
analysis, in my view, is sound. Rahimi asserts that the “central point” in “Khomeini's change of 
approach to political activism” was related “mainly to a shifting political situation that created 
conditions in which the ayatollah felt the need to initiate a new political philosophy, challenging 
centuries of traditional Shīʻī political thought.”412 Although it is true that the “shifting political 
situation”, as Rahimi puts it, influenced Khomeini in his understanding of Islam, it was only one 
factor among others. If political context was the main factor, one would have to ask why other 
leading religious figures contemporary with Khomeini did not feel a similar need to construct a 
new political jurisprudence and philosophy. That only Khomeini responded in this way confirms 
the importance of personal characteristics.  
Abrahamian focuses instead on the environment of Najaf. He observes that while 
Khomeini was “developing new ideas” in his Najaf exile, he was “conspicuously silent, rarely 
giving interviews, sermons, and pronouncements.”413 He concludes that the ultimate source of 
Khomeini’s political doctrine might then have been “Shīʻī theologians in Najaf who were forging 
new concepts while combating the Communist party, which at the time had many adherents 
among Iraqi Shīʻīs.”414 As for the importance of Najaf and impact of other jurists residing there, 
Abrahamian does not, unfortunately, tell us clearly who those might have been. As for Najaf 
being a starting point, Abrahamian fails to mention Khomeini’s al-Ijtihād wa-al-taqlīd, written at 
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the age of forty-seven in 1950 when he was embarking on his first round of teaching advanced 
principles of jurisprudence (khārij al-uṣūl) in Qum.415 Khomeini laid down the scholarly basis 
for his theory of Guardianship in this work thirteen to fourteen years before the Najaf exile, 
declaring, as he would again later in Guardianship of the Jurist, the jurist to be head of the 
community in a manner similar to the Prophet and the Imam. In Najaf, Khomeini compiled the 
Arabic Kitāb al-Bayʻ and Persian-language Vilāyat-i faqīh, both of which continued themes 
already found in al-Ijtihād wa-al-taqlīd.  
Ayatollah Khomeini’s charisma is analyzed here under the headings of education, 
methodology, and use of internal and external political situations of his time. In each instance, he 
gathers charisma – or his followers, the charismatic community, construct his charisma – due to 
political interpretations and actions of a novel and exceptional nature. Politicality, this thesis has 
argued, is a powerful magnet for the personal aspect of charisma in Shiism.  
As for education, Khomeini in addition to the common curriculum of the Shiite seminary 
schools studied philosophy and mysticism or Gnosticism (‘irfān). Gnosticism was very important 
in shaping his personal charisma. Through it, he became familiar with the concept of the Perfect 
Man (al-insān al-kāmil). Khomeini believed in the sovereignty (ḥākimīyah) of the Perfect Man 
first propounded by Muḥyi al-Dīn Ibn ʻArabī in the thirteenth century. Among the commentators 
on Ibn ʻArabī, Ᾱqā Muḥammad Reza Qumshaʼī (d. 1889), who was the teacher of Khomeini’s 
teacher Shāhābādī, related the Pefect Man to the Imamate and concluded that “a true ʻārif 
(gnostic), like an Imam, automatically has the right to lead and legislate”.416 Khomeini equates 
the true gnostic with the Perfect Man, writing that a spiritual traveler (sālik) after completing his 
voyage towards God and for God returns towards man in order to save the servants of God and 
develop the earth. He asks the people to go with him towards salvation and light. Khomeini 
draws particularly on the gnostic thought of the prominent Shiite theosopher Mullā Ṣadrā 
(1045/1640).417 Mullā Ṣadrā says that the spiritual traveler at the end of his journey returns as the 
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guide of the community towards a better life.418 The understanding of the spiritual man (ʻārif) as 
a guide means that people are imperfect, so they need to be perfected. Khomeini politicizes this 
idea by adding that the returned guide fulfills his mission by setting up a government. As 
Dabashi puts it, “The perfect man’ (Insan-e Kamel), as a mystical notion stipulating the ideal-
typical striving of man towards total identification with all the Divine attributes, is translated [by 
Khomeini] into political terms necessitating the active operation of an "Islamic government" 
leading people towards their own perfection.”419  
Khomeini actually uses both the phrases Perfect Man and Perfect Guardian (walī) to 
describe one who draws near to God to become, in the words of a well-known Tradition, “His 
tongue, eyes, and ears, while God in return is his tongue, eyes, and ears”.420 The Prophet 
Muḥammad for Khomeini as for Ibn ʻArabī represents the highest rank of the Perfect Man. 
Khomeini explains that Muḥammad is a manifestation (tajallī) of the Greatest Name of God, 
which is dominant over the other Greatest Names of God. Muḥammad is God’s caliph; the holder 
of the divine’s attributes and the reality (ḥaqīqah) of God’s Names.421 Khomeini describes his 
caliphate (i.e., political authority) as the source and origin of all caliphates in the world. It 
represents his emergence or manifestation as God’s “Greatest Names”, so that he and his 
caliphate are one.422 Khomeini is obliged to fit Ibn ʻArabī’s Perfect Man into a Shiite context in 
order to link it with the Imamate. He does this by declaring that Muḥammad’s caliphate and 
ʻAlī’s wilāyah are united in creation and truth; prophethood, he says, is the place where both 
caliphate and wilāyah manifest together, since they are both the inner reality (bāṭin) of 
prophethood.423  
How did this politicized Gnosticism impact Khomeini’s charisma in the community? 
Martin lists three steps: “the creation of a leader, the creation of a vanguard and through these 
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two mobilizing the people”.424 Martin is correct in the first two steps. Ideas connected with ʻirfan 
helped Khomeini to imagine himself as a charismatic leader. He believed he was the Perfect Man 
whose role was to guide the community towards a better life. It is true also that he formed a 
group of avant-garde students such as Muṭahharī, Muntaẓirī, and Bihishtī, who would later 
become Ayatollahs and very important in the Revolution. This circle constructed his charisma 
based on ‘irfan. As for the third step, however, Khomeini’s idea that he was the Perfect Man and 
even the discipline of ‘irfan was not welcome in the Shiite seminaries, so that he was reluctant to 
make the claim publicly, while the notion of a Perfect Man and philosophy of Gnosticism are not 
things that can be understood by the laity. It is therefore not likely, as Martin says, that Gnostic 
ideas “mobilized the people”. Rather, Khomeini’s students, being convinced of his special status, 
mediated between him and the community, mobilizing the people and managing the movement 
in his absence.   
For this purpose, the charismatic appeal of the Perfect Man was translated into a more 
palatable political jurisprudence, allowing Khomeini to appear in the acceptable guise of a 
mujtahid. In Khomeini’s jurisprudential works, which were compiled and published after his 
writings on Gnosticism, the Perfect Man is called the Guardian Jurist. In these writings he 
implies (although he does not say it openly) that the jurist is the Perfect Man, and thus a true 
traveler to God and manifestation of the Greatest Names of God possessing absolute authority to 
lead the community and improve humankind. In Shiite jurisprudence, the jurist holds the highest 
position, and Khomeini takes advantage of that status to equate him with the Perfect Man. 
 Therefore, in pushing Khomeini towards politicization of Shiite jurisprudence in Iran, 
various factors have played a role. Methodologically, Khomeini viewed Islam as a whole, as a 
comprehensive system, which includes a political system in addition to its religious dimension. 
With this perception of Islam, he then interpreted religious sources socially and politically. He 
also introduced Shiite jurisprudence as a dynamic phenomenon that reacts positively to its time 
and place. Rationally, he argued that the postponement of Mahdī’s return permits the ‘ulamāʼ to 
act to establish a state that enforces Islamic law; otherwise, it law remains unexecuted. Through 
historical narratives or even his own experience, he realized that the ground for enforcing the 
Shariah is not prepared through collaboration with the oppressor rulers- neither through the 
mechanism of the permission of the mujtahid of the time, which was current during the Safavids, 
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nor through the supervision of the jurists in the Constitutional revolution. The reason was clear 
for Khomeini; as long as the ‘ulamāʼ were not heads of state, they could not fulfill their role as 
executors of Islamic law. Moreover, the period in which Khomeini lived and grew up was a 
period of political ideologies, including political Islamism (in Arab countries), hegemony of 
Western culture, and penetration of Marxism into Islamic communities. These circumstances 
provided additional motivation for Khomeini to dream of a political project. In terms of personal 
characteristics, Khomeini was the most ambitious jurist claiming religious leadership not only in 
the Shiite community, but also in the Muslim community. He was a mystic believing in his 
capability and merit to guide the community, a belief that could be realized only with a political 
interpretation of Shiism and Islam.   
Methodology is very important in Shiite jurisprudence. Different approaches can lead to 
quite different results. As a mujtahid, Khomeini characteristically applied an approach that might 
be described as comprehensive. To arrive at a ruling, he looks at the totality of sources, not one 
or one isolated from others. The traditions he uses as proof-texts for his theory of Guardianship 
of the Jurist are, he admits, somewhat weak, but when all of them are put together, he is able to 
arrive at the desired result. Khomeini is also comprehensive in his approach in that he thinks of 
the devotions (‘ibādāt) and politics together. Thus in his view, the Friday prayer, other prayer 
gatherings, and the pilgrimage to Mecca all have political meaning. Devotions and politics are 
also linked to Islamic society; the goal of these religio-political rituals, he says, is to solve the 
social problems of the community as when people gather together in the prayer and pilgrimage to 
dialogue about common problems facing the ummah.425 
For Khomeini, Shiite jurisprudence is also dynamic, allowing the mujtahid to find new 
answers to both new and old issues. This quality is emphasized especially when Khomeini finds 
it is needed for the functioning of the Islamic Republic; it is precisely ten years after the 1979 
revolution and in response to a need to open the way for state legislation that Khomeini points to 
the importance of considering time (zamān) and place (makān) in jurisprudential methodology, 
declaring them to be crucial in the process of ijtihād. Khomeini maintained that the mujtahid who 
properly takes into account the political, social, and economic context and impact of an issue will 
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often find that the “subject” or crucial aspect of a situation requiring a ruling changes.426 With the 
establishment of an Islamic government, Khomeini sensed the challenges the infant state would 
be faced with, and he left a methodological legacy for his successors to help them deal with 
future challenges.  
As for Khomeini’s use of the political situation, he ably exploited crises in Iran and the 
Muslim world. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Iran underwent considerable and rapid 
change. The Shahs were determined to modernize the country based on a Western model. The 
waning of the influence of the religious class along with Westernization of education, the judicial 
system, and other sectors pressed Khomeini and his followers to challenge the secularizing 
Pahlavi government. This was an ideal opportunity for Khomeini’s activist, politically-inclined 
personality. The pressures exerted by the Pahlavi regime and penetration of Western culture did 
not prevent him from acting politically. On the contrary, they strengthened his approach and 
made it even more extreme, especially since he was an outsider not only to the regime but also 
did not have economic interest in the old order of the class of wealthy clerics.  
Khomeini attempted to eliminate the long-standing political deprivation of the Shiites that 
had weighed heavily on Mufid and even Karakī. One way he did this was by taking the novel 
step of attempting to transcend sectarian difference, by focusing in his writings on Islam overall 
rather than Shiism in particular. Especially in his later life close to the time of the Revolution, 
Khomeini promoted Muslim unity, or even the unity of all oppressed peoples of the world. This 
was a bid to eliminate political deprivation at its source, since the Shiites had traditionally been a 
small minority living under pressure from a Sunnite majority. Khomeini then further increased 
the sense of the community that they were politically potent by identifying the enemy as Western 
“colonialists” and their “internal agents” in Muslim territories.427 He strengthened his position 
and thus indirectly that of Shiites by showing himself to be a powerful person who understands 
the national and international problems of his times and the problems of Muslims in general. In 
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order to effectively operate in the political environment and turn apparently restrictive 
circumstances to his advantage, Khomeini also had to move beyond the traditional legal and 
theological language of the jurists and use a more appropriate, non-sectarian political vocabulary 
translating the traditional Shiite spirit of protest and struggle into a modern language. This 
included the language of the modern phenomenon of (Iranian) nationalism.  
Khomeini’s political theology  
 
This thesis asserts that the charisma of the Shiite jurists derives both from office 
charisma, the attributes of which are possessed by every jurist, and personal charisma, varying 
from one jurist to the other. In addition to gathering a rather spectacular personal charisma in the 
exceptional ways described in the previous section, Khomeini also presented a significantly 
different understanding of the jurists’ office (their Deputyship ), in the form of his theory of 
Guardianship of the Jurist. We have seen that each jurist possesses knowledge, justice, and piety. 
Khomeini broadened and re-defined these elements. For instance, juristic knowledge according 
to Khomeini must also include awareness of and expertise in socio-political affairs, since in his 
view, the individual or private and social-political aspects of Islam are inseparable. A mujtahid is 
consequently expert in politics along with religious sciences, and has authority over both.  
It is as if a new office – that of the Guardian-Jurist – had to be created to accommodate 
Khomeini’s very large vision and personality. Nevertheless, the Guardian-Jurist still does not 
represent routinization of the Imams’ charisma into that office (which, as I have explained in the 
first chapter, is not possible within the Twelver Shiite worldview). Though the jurist may rule a 
state, he is still a deputy of the Imam – in Khomeini’s parlance, a “guardian” – and Khomeini 
discusses him within that frame, including the various traditional concerns of working for an 
unjust ruler, collecting the khums tax, and so on, each of which is also addressed below.  
Ayatollah Khomeini founded the Islamic Republic of Iran on the basis of Guardianship of 
the Jurist, but he was not the inventor of that theory. Though the ‘ulamāʼ in the pre-modern 
period had never claimed power for themselves, even during the later Safavid period when they 
sometimes asserted the right of appointing the king,428 the early 19th century saw a very different 
doctrine constructed by Mullā Aḥmad al-Narāqī. Narāqī’s discussion of the guardianship of the 
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ḥākim (wilāyat al-ḥākim) in his Profitable Points already referred to above assigns guardianship 
to God, the Prophet, and his infallible successors the Imams, who are, he says, the sulṭāns, mulūk 
(sovereigns), wālīs, and ḥākims of the people. As a basic principle, he declares, persons other 
than the Prophet and Imams have no authority over the people, with the exception of those 
appointed (man walā-hu) to a defined field of authority by God, the Prophet, or the Imams.429 For 
Narāqī, this definitely means the jurist, who is the Imam’s nāʼib during the Occultation. Up to 
here, Narāqī’s views are not particularly unusual. He goes on however, to assert that the Deputies 
possess the same authority, as ḥākims, that the Imams and Prophet do (except, he says, where 
there is a specific exclusion, as, for instance, in jihad). Narāqī deploys a series of rational proofs 
and Traditions to support this novel assertion.430 As for rational proof, he argues that the 
necessity of government by the jurist is self-evident and leadership of non-jurists not in accord 
with reason because non-jurists are “ignorant” (jāhil) of Islamic law and thus likely to offer 
ineffective or damaging leadership (the view already touched on in the section on terms and 
concepts). Jurists, he says, are the best of the people after the Imams and the prophets and thus 
most fit to lead.431 These rational proofs are quite similar to those used by Khomeini, though less 
developed, and the Traditions Narāqī presents are exactly the same given by Khomeini and 
referred to below.  
Khomeini’s view of juristic authority thus clearly represents a further development of an 
idea of Deputyship proposed by Narāqī, even though Khomeini does not, like Narāqī, use the 
term na’ib. It would take him decades, however, to arrive at Guardianship of the Jurist. In 
Khomeini’s Revealing of Secrets,432 the doctrine of Guardianship is not yet apparent. When in 
Secrets Khomeini talks about guardianship and governance of the jurist (vilāyat va-ḥukūmat-i 
faqīh), he only means, as explained above, that the jurists must have the right to be members of 
parliament. Even though government based on divine justice and religious law (aḥkām) is the 
                                                 
429 Narāqī, ʻAwāʼid, 529. 
430 Narāqī, ʻAwāʼid, 530-543. 
431 Narāqī, ʻAwāʼid, 537,540, 543. 
432 Kashf al-asrār was written in 1322/1943 but published in 1323/1944 without its author’s name. It 
was compiled in reaction to Asrār Hazār Sālah written by ʼAlī Akbar Ḥakamī-zādah, son of Shaykh 
Mahdī Pāyīn-shahrī, a well-known religious scholar from Qom. In that short book, published in 36 pages 
as an appendix in the journal Parcham (N. 12), the author had criticized Shiism and its clerics.   
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best government, the jurists, says Khomeini, never opposed the Shah. Whenever they have 
opposed a sulṭān, it has been because of his unjust policies, and not because they were against 
monarchy in principle.433 Khomeini goes on to give examples of ‘ulamāʼ who worked for kings 
and supported them, even when they were under pressure from those kings. According to 
Khomeini, those who accuse the ‘ulamāʼ of opposing the state (salṭanat) want to ruin their 
relations, which is contrary to national interests.434 In his Revealing of Secrets, Khomeini is 
neither pro-salṭanat (in the sense of monarchy) nor, apparently, against it; the role he claims for 
the ‘ulamāʼ, as Martin states, is relatively modest, consisting of a supervisory function rather than 
government.435 
In Secrets, Khomeini cites only four Traditions to establish the authority of the jurists 
during the Occultation.436 These are the Tradition from ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah; the more broad or 
vague Decree of the Twelfth Imam; a Tradition saying that the ‘ulamāʼ are the “caliphs” of the 
Prophet; and another asserting that “affairs” (unspecified which kind) as well as religious rulings 
are “in the hands of the ‘ulamāʼ” (majārī al-umūr wa al-aḥkām ʻalā aydī al-’ulamāʼ). 437 He does 
not on the basis of these texts clearly or directly claim political authority for the jurists as he does 
in his later writings, even though he does in one instance use the phrase “government of the 
jurist” (ḥukūmat-i faqīh) and mention that the jurist should be obeyed.  
It is in his writings published after Secrets that Khomeini begins to develop his theory of 
Guardianship of the Jurist. In his Ijtihād wa-taqlīd, written in 1951 after Secrets but still twenty-
eight years before the Islamic revolution, Khomeini develops two ideas that later become key to 
his political thought. First, he says, the jurists’ authority covers “political-religious affairs” (al-
                                                 
433 Khomeini, Kashf al-asrār, 186. 
434 Khomeini, Kashf al-asrār, 187. 
435 Vanessa Martin, “Religion and State in Khomeini’s kashf al-asrār,” Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African studies, University of London, Vol. 56, No 1 (1993), 45. 
436 Khomeini, Kashf al-asrār, 188. 
437 In this ḥadīth cited from Tuḥaf al-ʻuqūl (The Gifts of Reasons), Imam Ḥusayn says that the 
conduct of all affairs is in the hands of the ‘ulamāʼ, who are God’s trustees in His permissible and 
forbidden issues.  See, Khomeini, Kashf al-asrār, 188. 
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umīr al-siyīsīyah al-shar‘īyah); and second, Islam covers all human needs, from political to 
social to individual affairs.438  
In the Tahṛīr al-wasīlah written some years after al-Ijtihād wa-taqlīd, Khomeini 
expresses the belief, also of course, held by his predecessors, that jurists qualified to issue 
responsa and judge are the “general deputies” of the Imam during the Occultation. The phrase is 
nuwwābu-hu al-‘āmmah, this being one of the few or possibly the only time Khomeini uses the 
word nā’ib (in connection with jihad; see below), possibly under the influence of Iṣfahānī. What 
makes his view different from that of most previous jurists is his emphasis on the politicality of 
Deputyship. According to Khomeini, mujtahids (jurists qualified to issue responsa and 
judgments) are also obliged to supervise and enforce political affairs in which the Imam before 
them possessed guardianship (wilāyah).439 This activist interpretation of Deputyship is 
nevertheless not too far removed from the non-political approach of Mufīd. According to 
Khomeini in the Tahṛīr, while carrying out the general Deputyship of the Imam is obligatory for 
the jurists, that obligation as well as the obligation of believers to help them in executing their 
Deputyship both in non-political and political affairs depends on security and availability of 
power.440 This restriction tells us that Khomeini is discussing Deputyship under circumstances in 
which a non-juristic or unjust authority is governing. He is not yet claiming political power or 
thinking of attempting to establish an Islamic state.  
Subsequently in his Guardianship of the Jurist or Islamic Government, Khomeini, very 
similar to Narāqī, says that Guardianship is self-evident (badīhī) from the point of view of 
reason. Anyone generally familiar with Islamic beliefs and ordinances will, he says, acknowledge 
the necessity of governance of the jurist.441 From the point of view of ideal practice, the Prophet 
and ʻAlī, who are religio-political models for Shiites, established government and did not confine 
themselves to private religion. Islamic laws, which pertain to both the private and public spheres, 
must be enforced.442 These are Khomeini’s arguments for the necessity of Islamic government 
                                                 
438 Khomeini, Ijtihād, 5, 22-23, 25.  
439 Khomeini, Tahṛīr al-wasīlah, vol. 1, 482. 
440 Khomeini, Tahṛīr al-wasīlah, vol. 1, 483. 
441 Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 5; Khomeini, Islam and revolution: writings and declarations, 27; 
Khomeini, Kitāb al-bayʻ, vol. 2, 627. 
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from reason, to which he also adds, as is customary in Shiite argument, proof texts from the 
Quran and Traditions.443 
 As for textual arguments confirming the conclusions of reason, Khomeini in 
Guardianship of the Jurist presents Traditions that say that the jurists are the successors 
(khulafāʼ) of the Prophets and Imams,444 that they are the heirs of the prophets,445 the fortress 
(ḥiṣn) of Islam,446 the Prophet’s trustees or vicegerents (umanāʼ and waṣī),447 and judges (ḥākim 
or qāḍīi),448 that they have the same position as Moses had among his people,449 and that they 
                                                 
443 Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 39-42. 
444 Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 64-70. In this Tradition, narrated by ʻAlī, the Prophet asks God to have 
pity on his successor, that is, those who come after him and transmit his Traditions and Sunnah. Khomeini 
concludes that the transmitters in this case are the jurists and that they are consequently the caliphs and 
successors of the Prophet.  
445 Khomeini discusses the well-authenticated tradition of Qaddāḥ (Ṣaḥīḥah of Qaddāḥ) and the weak 
narration (ḍaʻīfah) of Abū al-Bakhtarī, both narrated from al-Ṣādiq. These say that the ‘ulamāʼ are the 
heirs of the prophets. For Khomeini, the ‘ulamāʼ who are heirs of the prophets refers to the religious 
scholars and not the Imams, this being, he says, the common usage (ʻurf). Since Muḥammad is a prophet, 
the Shiite ‘ulamāʼ are his heirs. He emphasizes that the term “inheritance” includes both the Prophet’s 
knowledge and his political authority, again according to common usage. See Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 
111-122; Khomeini, Ijtihād, 32-33. 
446 Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 70-75. Khomeini argues on the basis of this Tradition that the jurists 
have to hold the political leadership; otherwise, they are unable to protect Islam as a fortress does for 
those residing in it.  
447 Al-Ṣādiq, transmitting from the Prophet, says that the jurists are the prophets’ trustees, whenever 
they do not follow the ruler’s power. To justify the rulership of the jurists, Khomeini discusses the 
sending Messengers by God and their duties by saying that the most significant duties of the prophets 
were to establish a just social and political system in order to execute the ordinances and laws. Since the 
jurists are the prophets’ trustees, they are responsible for fulfilling all of affairs the prophets were ordered 
to conduct. Thus they must also be the rulers of the community.  He also refers to ʻAlī’s saying confining 
judgeship to the Prophet or his trusted appointee. For him, the jurists are the Prophet’s second-level 
trustees, so they receive all of the competence he granted to the Imams. See Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 75-
77, 79, 82-86. 
448 The Tradition concerning the hakim is from al-Ṣādiq. He tells his followers not to judge, since 
judgeship belongs to the Imam, the Prophet, or his trustee. He demonstrates that during the Occultation, 
the jurist is the Prophet’s trustee and thus his successor, with the same authority in judging (Khomeini, 
Vilāyat-i faqīh, 86-88; Khomeini, Ijtihād, 21-22).  The Tradition concerning the judge is from Abū 
Khadījah, a Companion of al-Ṣādiq. It It is very close to the maqbūlah of ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah in terms of 
content, except that the term qāḍī is used instead of ḥākim. Khomeini, however, analyzes both in the same 
manner; he even defines the qāḍī as governor: “Thus the Muslim scholars (ʻulamā’) according to this 
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should be referred to for “new cases” (al-ḥawādith al-wāqiʻah),450 as well as all disputes in the 
community (the “accepted” Tradition of ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah already discussed).451 These 
Traditions are also cited by Narāqī, but Khomeini links them more explicitly to juristic authority. 
Both Narāqī and Khomeini are certain that the authority possessed by the Prophet and Imams is 
completely turned over to the jurists during the Occultation (except, as is always said, in areas 
specifically excluded in the sources).452 On the basis of a Tradition in al-Fiqh al-Raḍavī also 
cited by Narāqī, Khomeini compares the Shiite jurists to the prophets of Israel, for they – he said 
– also had guardianship over the people.453 While admitting on more than one occasion that some 
of the Traditions are weak, he claims certainty concerning Guardianship because of the collective 
force of the texts.454 
Finally in the Book of Sales (Kitāb al-bayʻ), appearing more than five years after 
Guardianship of the Jurist, Khomeini maintains that: 
 
The just jurist has everything that belongs to the Prophet and Imams pertaining to 
judgeship (ḥukūmah) and politics, and to distinguish between the two [i.e., judgeship 
and politics] is not in accord with reason. The two aspects cannot be separated 
                                                                                                                                                              
Tradition were appointed by the Imam for the positions of governance and judgeship, and these posts are 
for them forever” (Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 109-110; Khomeini, Ijtihād, 37). 
449 Khomeini used Narāqī’s ʻAwāʼid for this Tradition, in which the ‘ulamāʼ are compared with the 
prophets of the Jews. He concludes that the ‘ulamāʼ have the same authority as the Moses, for instance, 
had among his followers (Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 123; Narāqī, ʻAwāʼid, 532). 
450 In this Tradition, narrated by Isḥāq ibn Yaʻqūb, the Mahdī asks his Shiites for “new cases that 
occur” to “refer to the transmitters of our Traditions, for they are my ḥujjah (proof) onto you and I am 
God’s proof onto them.” Khomeini identifies the “transmitters of Traditions” as the jurists, as he does in 
other related Traditions. Then he says that “new cases” refers to social and not religious affairs 
(Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 88-92). 
451 In the Tradition of ʻUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah, al-Ṣādiq asks his followers to refrain from referring their 
litigation to the dominant non-Shiite system.  Instead, they are told to refer to those who narrate the 
Imam’s sayings, knows the ordinances, and is familiar with what is permissible and forbiddan. For 
Khomeini, the narrator of Traditions is the jurist and the ḥākim is a jurist-governor who deals with 
juridical and other aspects of social life (Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 100-105; Khomeini, Ijtihād, 26-28). 
452 Narāqī, ʻAwāʼid, 537; Khomeini, Vilāyat-i faqīh, 149. 
453 Khomeini, Kitāb al-bayʻ, vol. 2, 650. 
454 Khomeini, Kitāb al-bayʻ, vol. 2, 651; Khomeini, Ijtihād, 25.   
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because the head of a state (wālī) whoever he may be is the executor of Shariah laws, 
enforcer of Quranic punishments, collector of the land (kharāj) and other types of tax, 
and the one who spends taxes in the interests of the Muslims.455  
  
Khomeini asserts in his Book of Sales that the Imams and jurists receive their authority from the 
Prophet, because they are the Prophet’s khalīfahs (caliphs). He is careful, however, to distinguish 
between the Imams’ caliphate and that of the jurist. In terms of the theoretical frame of this 
thesis, he is careful not to say that the charisma of the Imams is routinized in the office of the 
jurist. The Prophet is caliph over all humanity, while the caliphate of the jurists, on the other 
hand, is “partial” (juz’īyah), in the sense that they are the caliph or successors of particular 
persons or in particular locales. In other words, an Imam is caliph over the Imam after him and 
all the others down the line, while a jurist can never be the caliph for the Imam. He is always an 
appointee, just, Khomeini says, as an amīr is the appointee of a sulṭān. Thus the two types of 
caliphate are not equal, even though from the point of view of guardianship (wilāyah) and 
sovereignty (salṭanah), that is to say in being head of a state, the authority of the Prophet, Imams, 
and jurists is at the same level.456  
Having established the equal political authority of the Prophet, Imams, and jurists, 
Khomeini goes on in the Book of Sales to discuss the just ruler (al-sulṭān al-ʻādil). His 
assessment of the justice or injustice of rulers is based on their relation to the Prophet or Imam, 
rather than the ruler’s intentions and actions.457 For Mufid, the Prophet and the Imam are the 
sulṭān of Islam (equal to “just ruler”), and the jurists as their appointees are also the sulṭān of 
Islam, even though the jurist has much less authority than the Imam and no political authority. 
For Khomeini, on the other hand, the fact that the jurists are the successors or “caliphs” of the 
Imam means that they are just rulers and sulṭān over the Muslim community, in a sense that 
includes political authority, like the Imam and the Prophet.458 Khomeini’s view here represents a 
shift in understanding of the just ruler (prefigured in the time of the Qājārs in the writings of 
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Shaykh Jaʻfar Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’ and his pupil Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥasan Najafī459). In previous 
thought, the jurist though he was equal to the just ruler could work for an unjust government, 
since he did not have political power. However, since the jurist in Khomeini’s view should if 
possible seize political power because he is the just sulṭān, he absolutely cannot cooperate with 
an unjust ruler.  In other words, he cannot work for another sulṭān, because he is himself the 
sulṭān. 
Working for an unjust ruler denied 
 
Khomeini is strongly opposed to working for unjust rulers, on the principle that it 
contradicts the interdiction against assisting oppressors in their cruelties. In his Book of Earnings 
(Kitāb al-Makāsib) written in 1960,460 he argues that since God granted guardianship or 
statesmanship (wilāyah) to Muḥammad, who then passed it on by God’s command to ʻAlī and 
his successors the Imams so that they are the sole legitimate rulers appointed by the Heaven, this 
automatically means that no-one but them has the right at any time to hold any authority, whether 
entirely or partially. Those who do so are usurper of a sovereignty (salṭanat) rightly belonging to 
others.461 He does not, however, mention the topic of working for an unjust ruler. In his Tahṛīr 
al-wasīlah written near the beginning of his residence in Najaf, 462 Khomeini is more specific. He 
denies that the jurist can work with oppressive, i.e., non-jurist, rulers in judicial and especially 
political affairs. If a jurist willingly accepts a position in an unjust system, he bears responsibility 
for all his actions taken while so employed, since his work is counted as a crime from the 
perspective of Shariah. Even if he is forced to accept the position, he cannot cooperate in 
shedding blood unjustly (which in Khomeini’s case probably means any innocent blood, rather 
than the blood of Shiites as in traditional discussions).  
                                                 
459 Muhạmmad Hạsan Najafī, Jawāhir al-kalām fī sharh ̣Sharāʼiʻ al-Islām (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-
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462 It is necessary to repeat that this work, Tahṛīr al-wasīlah, is a commentary on the work of the 
quietist Iṣfahānī, so that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the words of the commentator from the 
base text. I did not have access to Iṣfahānī’s Wasīlah to compare the two.   
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Khomeini does open a further window in his Tahṛīr - which, remember, appears before 
the time he decides that it is necessary to establish a jurist-led Islamic state - for the absolute 
(muṭlaq, i.e., fully qualified) mujtahid to work with an unjust ruler. An absolute mujtahid may 
cooperate with an unjust ruler in political and judicial affairs in order to secure the interest 
(maṣlaḥah) of the community. It is even obligatory for such a person to do so, in order to carry 
out the Quranic punishments and other judicial affairs in accord with Shariah standards. A partial 
(mutajazzī’) mujtahid, however, i.e., a jurist expert in only some affairs, is forbidden to work for 
an unjust system, just as ordinary persons are forbidden.463 Khomeini admits that assisting an 
oppressive ruler in permissible actions is allowed; although he still expresses concern about such 
aid increasing the oppressor’s strength and power.464 Although Khomeini does not make it clear 
why the absolute mujtahid in particular is allowed to collaborate, one may speculate that it is 
because this especially well-qualified person is thought to be able to wisely discern community 
interests. It may also be that Khomeini did not want to denigrate the great jurists of the past or 
those in his own time who were engaged in collaboration.  
Khomeini does not, however, discuss further permission to collaborate as the Shiite 
jurists traditionally had. He even goes on, while still in his pre-Guardianship phase, to address 
the sins of persons other than the jurists who work for the usurper sulṭān. Such agents, he says, 
while not actual usurpers, have taken possession of the salṭanat of another (taṣarruf fī sulṭān al-
ghayr) without permission.465 This is most serious for those holding high political and military 
positions, since their collaboration is additionally forbidden because of “aggressive possession” 
(al-taṣarruf al-ʻudwānī) and “innate interdiction” (al-ḥurmah al-dhātīyah), the latter meaning 
that their cooperation is the root of other kinds of corruption. The cooperation of lower-ranking 
agents is prohibited only because of their basic cooperation with the unjust ruler, which God has 
interdicted generally in any case.466 Khomeini’s goal seems to be undermining the position and 
legitimacy of prominent members in the Shah’s government. The idea seen in Mufīd that jurists 
and non-jurists can and actually should gain positions in an unjust system in order to benefit the 
community is entirely gone.  
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Khomeini prohibits all political, financial, and judicial connections with an unjust state. 
Similar to the early Shiite ‘ulamāʼ, he attempts to distance his followers or Shiites in general 
from referring to the unjust judicial system to mediate their legal disputes. But again, he goes 
further than the traditional position. Although he says in the Tahṛīr that he considers it incumbent 
for at least some of the ‘ulamāʼ to associate with the government to enforce good and forbid evil, 
the status of and respect for the ‘ulamāʼ represent for him a higher value.467 He forbids religious 
students from attending religious schools set up by government and receiving income from 
institutions supporting those schools, even if they need the support, because of its corrupting 
effects on Islam and society. The ‘ulamāʼ and mosque leaders according to Khomeini’s Tahṛīr 
are not permitted to either directly or indirectly administer religious schools on behalf of the 
unjust state. Khomeini deems religious scholars who administer or even attend state schools 
“unjust”, thus excluding them from prayer leadership, witness in divorce, and so on. Such 
persons are also not permitted to receive khums as long as they do not repent.468 In these 
provisions, we see a determination to condemn and isolate government ‘ulamāʼ. Even before he 
forms the idea of a theocracy, Khomeini has an activist and political drive that makes his 
discussion of the traditional subject of “working for an unjust ruler” very distinctive.  
Khums 
 
Khomeini’s political proclivities come out clearly in his discussion of the one-fifth tax, 
called khums. He focuses in his discussion on the relation of the tax to leadership. Differently 
from the ‘ulamāʼ before him, he asserts that khums was given by God to Muḥammad because he 
was the leader of the community and his family.469 Also uniquely, Khomeini replaces the third 
category of those to whom khums should be given, i.e., relatives of the Prophet, with the Imam. It 
is safest (aḥwaṭ) according to him to deliver the last three shares normally due to the descendants 
of the Prophet, orphans, poor, and travelers to the ḥākim, here meaning a high-ranking mujtahid, 
the marji‘ al-taqlīd (“Source of Emulation”).470 Many authorities in his time, in contrast, 
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considered that the taxpayer could hand over the funds to recipients directly. Khomeini obliges 
taxpayers to deliver the Imam’s share to the ḥākim, the jurist, as the only one who can 
legitimately administer it.471 Though this ḥākim is not necessarily one who holds actual power, 
the intent to give authority over khums to the ‘ulamāʼ exclusively and include it in a kind of 
governance is evident.  
Following his formulation of the theory of Guardianship of the Jurist, Khomeini ties 
khums directly to government. In his Book of Sales, he maintains that the whole of the khums, 
including the shares of the Imam and descendants of the Prophet, should be referred to the 
wālī.472 The Prophet’s descendants, he says, are not the actual owners of the khums, even though 
it must be spent for their needs. In Khomeini’s view, khums is a source of government revenue. 
The governor (Khomeini again uses the term wālī) is responsible for meeting the needs of the 
Prophet’s descendants from khums and spending the rest of that share for public services, while if 
the khums does not suffice, they must be provided for from other governmental funds.473  
Administration of khums in Khomeini’s novel formulation not only becomes part of 
governance, but it is also used to justify Islamic government and the authority of the jurist. We 
have seen that Khomeini uses the term wālī or governor when he talks about the authority to 
whom khums must be delivered. He also argues that the Prophet and Imams are neither 
conventionally nor ontologically (lā milkīyah al-iʻtibārīyah wa-lā al-takwinīyah) the personal 
owners of khums, but rather “best qualified to handle it” (awlā bi-al-taṣarruf). To put it 
differently, they are the owners of khums as leaders and not as legal entities in themselves (mālik 
min jihat al-riāʼsah, lā nafs al-raʼīs). Therefore, the Prophet has the authority to manage (wilāyat 
al-taṣarruf) the khums tax as an economic resource for government. 474 The point is driven home 
most economically in Khomeini’s Guardianship of the Jurist. There Khomeini argues that the 
very size and complexity of khums and other religious taxes shows that they are meant not 
merely “for the sake of providing subsistence to the poor or feeding the indigent among the 
descendants of the Prophet”, but in order to found “a great government and to assure its essential 
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Although Khomeini allows that Friday prayer during the Occultation is only optionally 
obligatory, that is, believers may choose between attending the congregational prayer or praying 
privately, he also says that the former is “better” (afḍal) and “safer” (aḥwaṭ). The reason, it 
seems, that he places more emphasis on the Friday prayer than those before him is because it 
presents a forum to discuss political topics. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, it is preferable 
that the Friday prayer leader and preacher of the associated sermon address not only religion but 
temporal affairs such as economics, independence from foreign powers, and warning about 
colonialist schemes.476 This emphasis was put into practice in the Islamic Republic of Iran as 
Khomeini as head of state appointed prayer leaders in all the major cities of Iran.  
Jihad  
 
Khomeini, like his predecessors, holds that mujtahids as the general deputies or nāʼibs of 
the Imam during the Occultation do not declare primary, that is offensive, jihad.477 He 
nevertheless emphasizes jihad and thus juristic activism by including in his definition of defence 
resistance against economic and cultural hegemony and political dependency. Since these 
involve humiliation of the Muslims, they are obliged to defend themselves through boycotts and 
other civil resistance. Defensive jihad, in other words, involves much more than simply war. If 
ruling powers, he adds, facilitate the political or economic influence of foreigners, they are 
traitors and it is obligatory on the people to remove them from power.478 
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Khomeini strengthens the authority of the jurists in zakāt. Whereas Mufīd made it 
obligatory to deliver zakāt to trustworthy jurists not on the basis any formal authority but simply 
because they know best how to distribute it, Khomeini makes it obligatory when a high-ranking 
jurist, i.e., marji‘ al-taqlīd, orders it in the “interest of the Muslims and Islam”, even for those 
who do not follow, i.e., do taqlīd of, that jurist. Even if a ranking jurist does not order the zakāt 
to be delivered to him, it is still “better” (afḍal) and “safer” (aḥwaṭ) to do so.479 Khomeini goes 
on to remark that those who turn over their zakāt to the jurist on the basis of him holding 
wilāyah, i.e., having a right to leadership of the community as a deputy of the Imam, are not 
personally liable if it is mistakenly given to ineligible recipients; but if they give their zakat to a 
jurist on the basis of him being merely a trustee (wakīl), i.e., someone to whom the funds are 
given simply because he is regarded as being well able to handle them, they will be liable for any 
misspending.480 Khomeini, in sum, gives jurists the right to administer zakāt during the 
Occultation because of their wilāyah. His statement that the jurist discerns and articulates the 
interests of Muslims also gives that authority a political colour.  
Enjoining good and forbidding evil 
 
Khomeini declares enjoining good and forbidding evil to be the noblest of the obligatory 
duties, since the upholding of other obligatory duties depends upon it. Enjoining good and 
forbidding evil is a necessary part of religion and those who deny it not Muslims, he says.481 
From the point of view of Islamic law, he says that it is “stronger” to consider enjoining good 
and forbidding evil collectively obligatory (wājib kifā’ī, that is, having to be carried out only by 
some members of the community) than obligatory on each individual. Most if not all jurists 
already consider the duty to be collectively obligatory, so what Khomeini is doing here is 
conforming to the accepted opinion while also hinting at the possibility of individual 
responsibility. Here we see a subtle shift, typical of Khomeini’s legal discourse, toward activism. 
Another shift toward activism concerns the condition that those who carry out the duty can do so 
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safely. Ayatollah Khomeini, like others before him, says that the duty of commanding good and 
forbidding evil is conditional on safety (along with knowing that one should do it, persistence of 
the sinners in their sins, and likelihood that commanding and forbidden them will have an 
effect).482 He also, however, says that safety should be measured against the importance of the 
issues involved, so that very important issues such as protection of the life and dignity of the 
community or of Islamic rituals such as the Hajj pilgrimage would remove the consideration.483  
Let us now turn to juristic authority as it relates to commanding good and forbidding evil. 
The ‘ulamāʼ naturally play a significant role. Khomeini calls on them to raise their voices 
without regard to their safety, personal interests, or likelihood of success. When the ‘ulamāʼ and 
religious leaders among them remain silent, the consequences are dire. Good and evil become 
confused, oppressive rulers become more powerful and dare to commit forbidden acts, and the 
status of the ‘ulamāʼ is harmed as they are accused of supporting oppression. Silence, Khomeini 
says, is categorically forbidden (ḥarām).484 This is what Khomeini has to say about the role of 
the ‘ulamāʼ in commanding good and forbidding evil at the level of “the tongue”, i.e., 
admonition. At the level of “the hand”, that is to say, force, he points to the role of the chief 
jurists as heads of the community. The tradition holds that believers require permission of the 
Imam for commanding good and forbidding evil by force, since it may result in injury or killing. 
Khomeini asserts that during the Occultation, there is strong evidence (aqwā) that permission for 
this very significant measure may come from the “qualified jurist” (al-faqīh al-jāmiʻ lil-sharāiʼṭ) 
as the Imam’s successor (qāma maqāma-hu).485 The jurist’s authority through Deputyship is here 
increased considerably.  
Non-litigious affairs 
 
Non-litigious affairs (al-umūr al-ḥisbiyah) pertain to legal situations with no normally 
responsible person to handle them, e.g. guardianship of orphans, disposition of property for 
which there are no heirs, and so on. Due to a strong belief that such matters should not be left 
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untreated, the jurists were called on to manage them, and it was also said that they could be 
managed by other pious and trustworthy persons if no jurist was able or available. There is 
consensus of the scholars that authority in non-litigious affairs is conferred on the jurists by 
Deputyship.  
Ayatollah Khomeini in his Book of Sales greatly emphasizes the authority (wilāyah) of 
the jurist in non-litigious affairs. Since non-litigious affairs were the responsibility of the Imam, 
they are, Khomeini says, also the responsibility of the jurist during the Occultation, for the jurist 
is in the same position with regard to wilāyah in such matters as the Imam. The jurist, he says, is 
guardian (walī) because of having wilāyah from the Imam. Even if this were not the case, he 
would still be responsible for non-litigious affairs because of his piety, knowledge, and 
trustworthiness; and though other pious and trustworthy persons can fill in when the jurist is 
unable or unavailable, this should always be done with the jurists’ permission.486  
Along with emphasizing the jurists’ control of non-litigious affairs, Khomeini greatly 
widens the definition of al-umūr al-ḥisbīyah include such things as defence of Islamic lands, 
protecting youth from corruption, and stopping anti-Islamic propaganda from spreading among 
Muslims.487 Expansion of the scope of non-litigious affairs to the public and political sphere 
implies a public office. This leads Khomeini to discussion of a “just Islamic state”. The just 
Islamic state, Khomeini says, must be led by “just jurists” whenever it is possible to establish 
such a state. Since affairs of state must be treated, it is also incumbent upon “just Muslims” to 
undertake those affairs, though that must be done with the permission of the jurists, either 
because of wilāyah, or because they are ḥākim, or because they are the most pious and 
trustworthy.488 Khomeini here seems to be speaking about a government of pious technocrats 
appointed by and under the executive rule of a jurist, just as in present-day Iran.  
It is good here to remember that the authority conferred by Deputyship belongs 
exclusively to the jurists (that is after Mufid, who also spoke of Deputyship of amīrs, as we have 
seen). It is agreed that the jurists have a monopoly on such authority, exactly as Khomeini 
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says.489 In this case, expanding the definition of a legal area in which it is universally accepted 
that the jurists own Deputyship is a clever move.  
 
Analysis and conclusion  
 
In the previous section, we saw how Khomeini broadened the office of the jurist to 
include politics. To knowledge, justice, and piety, the three traditionally recognized elements of 
office charisma, he added a fourth: political acumen – defined as knowledge of Shariah law, 
since Muslim life and the state must be conducted according to Shariah. As in the previous 
section, we will see that, though his interpretation is novel, it is still within the frame of 
Deputyship. To say as Khomeini does that the government of the jurist is the governance of the 
Prophet still means that the jurists derive their office and authority from deputization. The 
Guardian-Jurist, though undeniably powerful, stands in the shadow of the Imams’ political 
authority.  
The driving force, in fact, behind Ayatollah Khomeini’s very novel theory is not 
determination to make the jurist a head of state, but a desire to address the structural, theological 
gap caused by the absence of the Imam (or to put it differently, the jurist is made head of the state 
in order to fill a gap caused by absence of the Imam). Theologically according to the Shiites, an 
Imam must always exist, but with the absence of the Mahdī, the community found itself without 
an Imam. Thus Khomeini asks:  
 
From the time of the Lesser Occultation down to the present (a period of more than 
twelve centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia if it is not appropriate 
for the Occulted Imam to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast 
aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy 
prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three 
years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? 
Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser 
Occultation? Anyone who believes so, or voices such a belief, is worse situated than 
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the person who believes and proclaims that Islam has been superseded or abrogated 
by another supposed revelation.490  
 
Khomeini was inspired to pose this question by what he viewed as the unprecedented dire 
circumstances of Western domination and influence, which preoccupied him throughout his life, 
as well as what he saw as the unacceptable passivity of the ‘ulamāʼ in the face of those 
circumstances. His first thought and wish was then for an Islamic state that could restore the 
sovereignty and dignity of Muslims. The rule of the jurist, though important, is not his first aim, 
but a consequence of the drive for a state, since in Shiism, an Islamic state is by definition a state 
led by the Imam, making the jurist as the Imam’s deputy the only figure who can lead. The 
structure of Khomeini’s famous Guardianship of the Jurist or Islamic Government shows this 
logic clearly; the work begins with a chapter pointing out the “necessity of an Islamic state” and 
then goes on to describe the jurist who could lead that state. Despite its title – which was 
probably not devised by Khomeini himself – “Islamic government” is placed before 
“guardianship”, since it logically precedes it. Contemporary Sunnite theories of and attempts to 
establish Islamic states provide an instructive contrast. Sunnites do not focus very much on who 
will lead the state, since the leader does not have to be someone qualified to actually stand in for 
the Prophet, whose office has been routinized in those of the Sunnite jurists, caliph and other 
figures.  
The figure of the jurist necessarily had to be enlarged to enable this greater role. 
Khomeini accomplished the enlargement first in his personal capacity through a great personal 
charisma, gathered in the ways described in this chapter; and second through re-defining 
Deputyship, in a novel fashion but still under the traditional jurisprudential headings of the 
doctrine, as seen in the previous section.  
The one instance in which Khomeini goes outside traditional thought is in his insistence 
on a state. This, move, however, should still be understood in the context of Shiite thought. By 
“Islamic government” (ḥukūmat-i Islāmī), Khomeini does not mean only a state. The gap he was 
seeking to fill did not have to do with a lack of ordinary governance. The Imam himself, after all, 
did not have a government, and the Shiites did not feel it was necessary to install one. Like the 
                                                 




Prophet, the Imam controlled and guided his followers rather as an executor of law. That is what 
Khomeini wants to recover. By his assertion that the governance of the jurist is equal to the 
government of the Prophet, he does not mean that the jurist is equal to the Prophet and Imams – 
which he explicitly denies – but that they have the same function in executing Islamic law. The 
jurist per se cannot bridge the theological gap in Shiism, for he does not have the same qualities 
as the Prophet or Imam. Nor can Deputyship completely close the gap, even in Khomeini’s 
outsize formulation, for the deputy does not act on behalf of the Imam in all his functions. The 
gap is filled by restoring enforcement of Islamic law - for which a state is needed, and which 
requires as a consequence Guardianship of the Jurist.  
Khomeini’s theory of Guardianship of the Jurist puts an end to several key disputed 
points in Shiite thought that had lasted more than a thousand years. In Khomeini’s interpretation, 
the ruling jurist leads Friday prayer himself or appoints others as his agents to hold the 
congregational prayers. Not only is juristic rule not unjust, but obedience to it is incumbent upon 
believers, to the degree that it becomes more significant than the daily ritual prayer and 
pilgrimage to Mecca. Since the authority of the jurist as executor of Islamic law is equal to that 
of the Prophet and Imams, the expression “just sultan” might also be applied to him, and this, 
though not explicit in Khomeini’s writings, is certainly implied. Khomeini did not, however, 
envision restoration of the rule of Islamic law, along with the Islamic state and enlarged role of 
the jurist that it implies, as a permanent solution. Shiites would still be waiting for the full 
institution of Shariah, government, and justice at the hands of the Mahdī. The temporary or 
interim nature of the juristic Islamic state is clearly seen in its containment within a nation-state 
and Khomeini’s mixing of Shiite thought with what Dabashi characterizes as “Islamic 
nationalism.”491 As the revolution progressed, Khomeini “increasingly spoke of the Iranian 
fatherland, the Iranian nation, the Iranian patriot, and the honorable people of Iran.”492 
Nationalistic tendencies and the use of patriotic language continue to mount in the post-
Khomeini period.  
The goal of this dissertation has been to analyze Shiite juristic authority by presenting an 
intellectual history, the history of the idea of Deputyship in Twelver Uṣūlī Shiism, as well as an 
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account of the sociological process (charisma and its routinization) that helps to explain it. Both 
come into focus only in the long term. My work, as I have said more than once, is not about 
Ayatollah Khomeini, but rather Twelver Shiite juristic authority, the story of which begins long 
before Khomeini and will continue long after.  Much less is it about events and doings in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. The institutionalization of vilāyat-i faqīh, Khomeini’s version of 
Deputyship, does, however, throw additional light on Khomeini’s formulation.  
First let it be said that for Khomeini, Islamic government and the Islamic state are 
identical with Guardianship of the Jurist (vilāyat-i faqīh), as seen in the dual title of his famous 
Islamic Government or Guardianship of the Jurist (al-Ḥukūmah al-islāmīyah aw wilāyat al-
faqīh). Khomeini has no thought on governance other than Guardianship. The theory, moreover, 
was formulated by Khomeini well before the coming of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and 
Islamic Republic of Iran. As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, a good part of it is already in 
place in his al-Ijtihād wa-al-taqlīd, written at the age of forty-seven in 1950 while he was still in 
Qom and just beginning his advanced teaching career. The Arabic version of Khomeini’s 
originally Persian-language Islamic Government or Guardianship of the Jurist appeared in Najaf,  
Iraq in 1969, and his Book of Sales (Kitāb al-Bay‘), also important for the Guardianship theory,  
presents material delivered in Najaf between 1964 and 1971. From the time of the Revolution 
and even for some time before, Khomeini wrote nothing, and no development of the theory 
whatsoever is seen in his subsequent speeches and declarations. The historical context of the 
genesis of Khomeini’s politicized theory of Guardianship is therefore not the Islamic Revolution 
or Republic, but rather decades of Western domination in Iran and the Muslim world experienced 
by Khomeini in his long life before. 
Guardianship of the Jurist is decidedly not a modern theory of government. In fact, 
Khomeini in his Islamic Government explicitly enumerates the differences between the two in 
order to emphasize his preference for his system over other systems and ideologies. He loudly 
proclaims that his vilāyat-i faqīh is neither a democratic system (like Western democracies) nor a 
tyranny (apparently, like monarchies and other authoritarian regimes in the area). For Khomeini, 
Islamic government is purely the rule over humanity of Shariah, of the divine law:  
The fundamental difference between Islamic government, on the one hand, and 
constitutional monarchies and republics, on the other, is this: whereas the representatives 
of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in Islam the 
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legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. 
The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to 
legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator. It is for this 
reason that in an Islamic government, a simple planning body takes the place of the 
legislative assembly that is one of the three branches of government. This body draws up 
programs for the different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam and thereby 
determines how public services are to be provided across the country.493   
The rule of Shariah guaranteed by the Guardian-Jurist requires, as suggested in the 
previous quotation, no elaborate government machinery. Justice is delivered directly and, 
seemingly, automatically:   
Islamic government is not a form of monarchy, especially not an imperial one. In that 
type of government, the rulers are empowered over the property and persons of those 
they rule and may dispose of them entirely as they wish. Islam has not the slightest 
connection with this form and method of government. For this reason, we find that in 
Islamic government, unlike monarchial and imperial regimes, there is not the slightest 
trace of vast palaces, opulent buildings, servants and retainers, private equerries, 
adjutants to the heir apparent, and all the other appurtenances of monarchy that 
consume as much as half of the national budget.494 
It is clear that Khomeini was not motivated to establish a modern state, much less a 
democratic one. Khomeini’s Guardian-Jurist is empowered with absolute authority over all the 
affairs of the Muslims, including the public treasury, taxes, execution of Quranic punishments, 
and “lives of Muslims” (nufūs al-Muslimīn).495 According to the theory of Guardianship, no 
power or institution may act in disaccord with the jurist-leader’s authority. None of the 
conditions of democracy or indeed any modern state are met: the head of state is not appointed 
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by its citizens, sovereignty does not belong to the people, and the dominant law cannot change.  
One has to agree with Milani when he says that popular sovereignty, rationalism, and secularism 
are three points irreconcilable with Khomeini.496 Referring to Kant, Milani says that human 
thought and freedom are only possible under conditions of insecure and limited knowledge;497 
but Khomeini’s theory depends on divine knowledge and an expositor (the Guardian-Jurist) who 
is absolutely secure, for his theory is built on jurisprudential expertise and mystical perfection. 
My goal here is not to criticize Khomeini for being “undemocratic”, but rather to bring the point 
home, important for my analysis here, that he did not consider it necessary to modernize or 
combine his political theory with elements belonging to other schools coming from modern 
countries.  The theory of Guardianship, formulated before the state was even on the horizon, is 
considered self-sufficient, and it remains inert after the state is founded.  
Has Guardianship or the office of the Guardian been affected by Iranian nationalism at least? 
It is true that the Islamic Republic is contained within a country-state framework. In spite of its 
religious content, the state remained territorially confined to the land of Iran. The new leaders of 
the Republic, moreover, recognized the country-state system and respected the international law 
that is the basis of that system. As for Shiite Islam, it had been part of Persian or Iranian culture 
and identity for centuries before the establishment of the Islamic Republic, and the Iranian (more 
precisely, Fārs) nationalism promoted during the Pahlavī monarchy did maintain a strong 
presence in the new “Islamic” state both in culture and in law. As Ansari says, the dominant 
ruling groups in Iran made efforts to introduce their own definitions of nationalism, and one of 
these groups (in addition to the secular, leftist, and dynastic nationalists) included the men of 
religion.498 After all, nationalism, as Ansari says again, “has been the preserve of elites… eager 
to recruit the masses to their respective causes [and] jealously protect[ing] their rights to define 
the precise parameters of the particular nationalism they espouse.”499  Thus serious efforts were 
made by the proponents of an Islamic regime in Iran to redefine Iranian nationalism. For 
instance, the philosopher of the Revolution, Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (d. 1979), tried to reconcile 
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(Shiite) Islam with Iranian nationalism by asserting that, even if Islam was at first a foreign idea, 
it did not finally undermine Iranian identity but rather introduced new elements suitable to the 
Iranian context and consistent with that identity.500 Muṭahharī then effectively redefines 
nationalism by adding emphasis on the internationalism of Islam, suggesting that it be substituted 
for fanatical nationalism established solely on the basis of territory and ethnicity.501  
During the Islamic revolution, Khomeini appealed to Iranian nationalism to the extent that 
he “disqualified one of his staunch supporters from entering the 1980 presidential elections on 
the grounds that his father had been born in Afghanistan.”502 This action and the nationalist 
rhetoric referred to above are certainly at odds with the non-territorial, supra-ethnic, all-religious 
nature of Deputyship and Guardianship. In Abrahamian’s view, “nationalistic language together 
with the use of exclusively Shiite symbols and imagery helps explain why the Khomeinists have 
had limited success in exporting their revolution.”503 The Guardian-Jurist, especially after 
Khomeini, has become an Iranian national figure, limited in his influence not only by territory, 
but also nationality and sect. These developments, however, are external to the power he has 
within the Republic. Nationalism has not brought any shift in the theory of the Guardianship of 
the Jurist or changed the position the valī-faqīh himself.  
 The Islamic Republic of Iran – the word “Republic” itself is telling – seems much more 
modern than would be an entity ruled by Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic governance or ḥukūmat-i 
Islāmī as laid out in his writings. The appearance of modernity, however, comes from taking over 
already existing institutions, and not from anything in the theory of Guardianship. The theory and 
office do not represent a modernization of juristic theory; they are not “modern”, and are not 
intended to be. In addition to recognizing the framework of a nation-state and Iranian character 
of that state, the Iranian Islamic Republic, following its confirmation in a referendum in 1979, 
adopted almost all governmental institutions remaining from the previous regime, while 
changing the names of some and creating a number of new sections.  Republicanism in which 
election is the recognized way to fill some higher positions such as the presidency and seats in a 
                                                 
500 Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, Khadamāt-i mutaqābil-i Islam va-Īrān, 8th ed. (Tehran: Ṣadrā, 1375 [/1996]), 
58-60.  
501 Muṭahharī, Khadamāt-i mutaqābil, 61-66. Muṭahharī’s “internationalistic nationalism”, however, 
did not really catch on.  
502 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 15. 
503 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 15. 
183 
 
parliamentary-type “assembly” (Majlis) has also been admitted.  The presidency of the Islamic 
Republic is essentially a carry-over from the monarchical system, the former “National 
Consultative Assembly” reappears as the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis-i Shūrā-yi 
Islāmī), and Assembly of Experts (Majlis-i Khubragān-i Rahbarī), created to select or dismiss 
the leader-jurist, effectively replaces the former Senate (Kākh-i Majlis) so that the basic bi-
cameral structure of the previous government is also preserved.  
What has happened is that the Leader-Jurist simply sits on top of the already existing 
somewhat modern institutions (and also modern society) of Iran. The relation between the 
Leader-Jurist and political institutions of the state such as presidency, legislative assembly, 
judicial and military is essentially that of a caliphal system, in which all subsystems are 
legitimized by the head of the total system. In terms of Shiite juristic authority, Mufīd’s sulṭān of 
Islam (the Imam) with his amīrs and ḥākims (as legitimate subsystems) is now manifested in the 
Guardianship system. The interface between the faqīh and system below is not a compromise, 
much less a situation of “check-and-balance”, but rather allows the faqīh to project his power. 
This is the case with the Guardian Council (Shūrā-yi Nigahbān), established to vet laws passed in 
the parliament. Even the formation of the “Expediency Discernment Council” (Majma‘-i 
Tashkhīṣ-i Maṣlaḥat-i Niẓām) does not reduce the Leader-Jurist’s authority. Rather, continuous 
intervention of the “Supreme Leader” (Rahbar, another name for the office) in disputes between 
the three branches of the system and especially the Majlis and Guardian Council “invariably 
highlights the political system’s dependence on his own charisma,” 504 and the authority the 
theory of Guardianship bestows upon him. The Leader-Jurist holds – definitely in theory and also 
to a good extent in practice – the absolute (muṭlaqah) authority of the faqīh described by 
Khomeini. 
Ayatollah Khomeini, in short, designed his theory of Guardianship of the Jurist on the basis 
and within the thought-world of traditional Shiite jurisprudence and theology. It was not 
designed for a modern nation state. The state happened to be there and finally, by historical 
accident, it was captured. 
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This study has explored the nature, typology, and development of religious authority in 
Twelver Shiism, and particularly the authority of the jurists during the Occultation of the Twelfth 
Imam. Authority is an essential subject in the study of religion in general. It is critical for 
understanding Shiism especially since Shiism initially emerged as a separate branch of Islam due 
to distinctive notions of authority and then, in an unusual situation, was led by religious experts 
who claimed authority only indirectly since it was believed to belong ultimately to the Hidden 
Imam.  
The dissertation has also sought to apply Weber’s theory of authority, and particularly his 
notion of charisma, to the case of Shiite religious authority and leadership. Chapter One shows 
how scholars in Western institutions working on Shiism in the last few decades have been very 
critical of Weber. But they do not then discard him and use another framework. They apparently 
see some value in his theory; and there is not yet, in any case, a new framework available that 
can be used. The literature on Shiism and Weber is so extensive, as well as growing, that it has 
been necessary to critique it in some detail before proceeding to my own application. I find that 
Weber, when properly understood and applied, has a great deal of explanatory power for Shiism. 
The basic error of Weber’s critics who work on Shiism has been first, to understand charisma in 
the vague sense of something like personal magnetism; and second, to then make the “charisma” 
of particular personalities, whether Ayatollah Khomeini or the Shiite Imams, the starting point 
and focus of the analysis. Charisma should rather be understood as an exceptional quality 
constructed by the charismatic community, in particular circumstances and for particular reasons 
having to do with the tradition. Most importantly, charisma and its routinization should be seen 
as processes of religious traditions that have to be studied as long-term developments. Scholars 
first began to speak of charisma and Shiism after the conspicuous appearance of Khomeini on the 
international scene in the late 1970s. They tried to explain his charisma in particular, and then, as 
they began to delve deeper into the tradition, the charisma of the Ayatollahs and Imams; but the 
proper focus, in my view, is charisma as a process in Shiism, as part of the making of the 
tradition.  
The thesis has shown how Weber can be recovered. His definition of charisma fits. His 
highlighting of the exceptionality and supernaturality of the holders of charisma brings the 
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Prophet clearly into focus as the pure charismatic figure in the Shiite (as well as Islamic) 
tradition. The supernatural nature of the Prophet’s charisma is manifested in his tie to Heaven 
through revelation, which is unique for Muslims. Shiites do not give their Imams that position. 
The quality of the Imams is not the same as that of the Prophet and their functions are 
substantially different, for pure charisma ends with the Prophet’s death.  
Weber’s explanation of routinization also fits. His theory does explain, contrary to his 
critics, how Prophetic authority was transferred to his successors the Imams, at which point 
routinization did take place. When the long-term process of charisma and routinization is traced, 
we are not in danger of being led, as some scholars have been, by the wonderful personalities of 
the Imams into denying routinization. It is true that Shiites have gradually attributed 
supernaturalistic qualities to their Imams and these have increased over time. Imamic charisma, 
however, is hereditary and derivative; it comes from Prophetic charisma. It is important not to 
lose sight of the basic fact that the Imams are Imams because they are the Prophet’s successors. 
Without the Prophet, there are no Imams. Weber’s observation that the original charisma holder 
designates his successor also holds, since the Prophet designated ‘Alī, something on which 
Shiism places tremendous emphasis. By this designation, prophetic charisma is routinized into 
the office of the Imamate, and social and economic conditions shift, exactly as Weber said, 
toward institutionalization, which is not seen in a pure charismatic event.  
Weber’s notion of office charisma enables us to explain both Imamic and juristic 
charisma. Following routinization, the Imam possesses, as Weber says, charisma of office. The 
Imamate (imāmah), as the word itself tells us, is an office, and the Imams who occupy it take on 
the qualities of the office such as universal knowledge, infallibility, the right to rule, and so on. 
Here, however, I have introduced a refinement to Weber that I expect can also be useful for 
others applying his theory. Contrary to Weber’s view, after the routinization of personal into 
office charisma, a personal charisma still co-exists with it. We can see this in the case of the 
Imams. All the Imams, even those who were personally not very remarkable, derived charisma 
from holding the office of the Imamate; but some had an additional charisma due to exceptional 
characteristics recognized or constructed by the community in their time – for instance, ʻAlī ibn 
Abī Ṭālib due to his active leadership and struggle for justice and the sixth Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq 
due to his exceptional legal and mystical knowledge. In the case of the jurists, office and 
personal charisma also co-exist. The office of the jurist, though it is acquired and not inherited as 
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it is for the Imams, is still an office, and it is the basis of charisma. Without it, no charisma can 
be derived from Deputyship. The office is, however, rather limited. This explains why most 
jurists do not seem charismatic. They acquire the basic qualifications for the office and are 
acknowledged just for those. The potential for charisma remains dormant. Some, however, go 
beyond that to be hailed by their followers for exceptional personal qualities and actions that 
heighten and even re-define the office. These are the charismatic jurists we see in Shiite history, 
from Mufīd to Khomeini.  
Exceptionality can consist of different things, depending on the personality and on the 
context, i.e., historical situation and resulting response of the community. We saw that Mufīd’s 
exceptionality consisted in his scholarly achievement, which caused him to be hailed by the 
community while the tradition was still under construction shortly after the Occultation. Karakī’s 
charisma in the context of the Safavid era derived from his association with the ruling power, the 
championing of Shiism against the Sunnite Ottoman Empire, and the mobilization of the 
population. I have suggested that politicality has been particularly effective in gathering charisma 
in Shiism due to the political deprivation suffered by Shiites throughout most of history. Political 
power is effective in creating charisma in Shiism also because it recalls the Imams’ political 
leadership, for they are the ultimate and only legitimate political authorities, even though they 
were themselves mostly without political power.  Khomeini is an obvious example of political 
charisma.  
 The processes of charisma take place in Shiism in special circumstances. The charisma 
of the Twelfth Imam was routinized neither in his lifetime nor after the Occultation, since he is 
still present as a living human somewhere on the earth. Authority in Shiism is therefore 
theologically structured into prophethood and Imamate, with the chain of Imamate holding the 
leadership to the end of time. This restrictive context of juristic authority is expressed in the idea 
and doctrine of Deputyship (sometimes called niyābah) of the Imam, promoted by the Uṣūlī 
School in response to the problem of leadership during the absence of the Hidden Imam. 
Deputyship is the source of authority for the Shiite leaders, the jurists, in the absence of the 
Imam, so that it is vital to take it into account in any study relating to them.  
Juristic charisma in Shiism has the potential to be redefined and reproduced, with new 
interpretations in response to new places and times. Charisma should be understood to be 
dynamic. Not only personal charisma, but also elements of the office itself may change. My 
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study has shown that Deputyship has continued to be redefined in different contexts from its 
emergence in the tenth century to now.  
The striking fact, nevertheless, is that the jurists stay within the frame of Deputyship. This 
includes Khomeini who, despite his innovations and political personality, works with and 
expresses himself through the traditional theological and juristic categories, as seen in Chapter 
Four. (Previous scholars have not appreciated Khomeini’s use of the tradition because they have 
not fully taken account of his juristic writings, despite the fact that he works as a jurist and 
jurisprudence defines the ‘ulamāʼ and their way of acting.) From the first moment, Shiite 
jurisprudence demonstrates the efforts the jurists made to comprehend and explain the political 
marginality of the Shiites, and to resolve it. Despite the concern with governance, however, they 
are very conscious that their authority is subordinate to that of the Imam. Scholars have failed to 
recognize this not only in the case of Karakī (mistaking the authority he held as a functionary 
under the Safavids for actual religious authority), but also, I would say Khomeini. Khomeini also 
tries to solve the Shiite problem with governance, expanding Deputyship by basing it on an 
Islamic state, but all he finally really claims for the jurist is his traditional prerogative of 
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Maktabat al-Andalus, [1965, 1966]. 
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gharrāʼ. Two volumes. Iṣfahān: Intishārat-i Mahdavī. 
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---. Kitāb al-bayʻ. Two volumes. Tehran: Muʼassasat Tanẓīm wa Nashr Āthār Imām al-
Khumaynī, 1421/2000. 
---. Al-Makāsib al-Muḥarramah, Vol. 2nd. Qumm: al-Maṭbaʻat al-ʻIlmiyah, 1381[/1960]. 
---. Miṣbāḥ al-hidāyah ilā al-khilāfah wa-al-wilāyah, translated by Sayyid Aḥmad Fihrī (Tehran: 
Muʼassasah Tanẓīm va Nashr Āthār al-Imām al-Khumaynī, 1376[/1997]. 
---. Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāyah, Translated by Sayyid Aḥmad Fihrī. Tehran: …, 1368/1989.  
---. Ṣaḥīfah Nūr. Vol. 21. Tehran: Intishārāt Surūsh, 1369/1990. 
---. Ṣaḥīfah-’i Imām. Vol. 21. Tehran: Muʼassasah Tanẓīm va Nashr Āthār al-Imām al-
Khumaynī, 1378 [/1999]. 
195 
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Muntazịrī, Hụsayn ʻAlī. Mabānī-fiqhī’i ḥukūmat-i Islāmī: Dawlat va-ḥukūmat, trans. and ed. 
Maḥmūd Ṣalawātī, vol.1. Tehran: Intishārat-i Sarāīī, 1379 [2000]. 
200 
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